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This thesis studies and speculates upon the in- 
terrelations of artefacts with human and non- 
human agents. These interrelations form assem-
blages, some of which have emergent proper-
ties, becoming manifestations of processes that 
we cannot fully control or understand.  
The work started by exploring the theme 
of hospitality and hostility with the ambition to 
better understand the ecological complexity of 
the design process and its results. 
This work combines different literary, 
philosophical and theoretical discourses and 
traditions with experimental design in order to 
develop and articulate the concept of device. 
A device organizes, arranges, frames our environ-
ment and thereby defines and limits possibilities 
of relation. 
Through a series of design projects, the the- 
sis examines the potential range of an artefact’s 
relations. It does so by exploring grammatical 
associations that affect design conceptualiza- 
tions, creating tools (prepositiontools) as well as 
studying and articulating forms of symbiosis that 
an artefact might develop in and with its envi-
ronment (¡Pestes!). 
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Abstract
ABSTRACT
This thesis studies and speculates upon the interrelations of ar-
tefacts with human and nonhuman agents. These interrelations 
form assemblages, some of which have emergent properties, be-
coming manifestations of processes that we cannot fully control 
or understand. 
 The work started by exploring the theme of hospitality and 
hostility with the ambition to better understand the ecological 
complexity of the design process and its results. 
 As an assemblage, this work combines different literary, phil-
osophical and theoretical discourses and traditions with experi-
mental design in order to develop and articulate the concept of 
device. A device organizes, arranges, frames our environment and 
thereby defines and limits possibilities of relation. 
 Since relations can only be thought through a so-called natu-
ral language such as English, they must be taken into considera-
tion through the process of languaging, understood by Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela as “communication about com-
munication”, and as the most characteristic feature of the human 
species. My focusing on linguistic and biological phenomena is a 
response to this concern, in an attempt to understand how this 
process influences our perception of the world.
 Through a series of design projects, the thesis examines the 
potential range of an artefact’s relations. It does so by exploring 
grammatical associations that affect design conceptualizations, 
creating tools (prepositiontools) as well as studying and articulat-
ing forms of symbiosis that an artefact might develop in and with 
its environment (¡Pestes!). 
Title: Devices. On Hospitality, Hostility and Design.
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dent, ecology, symbiosis, autopoiesis, umwelt. 
ISBN: 978-91-979993-0-4
To mother Barei
Without the sun,
what day? What night?
Heraclitus
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Setting out
Setting out
I would like to proclaim one of the things of which I am ignorant, 
to publish a crucial indecision in my thinking, in order to see if 
some other doubter might help me to doubt, and the half-light we 
share turn into light. The subject is almost grammatical, which I 
announce as a warning to those readers who have condemned (in 
the name of friendship) my grammarianisms and requested a human 
work. I could answer that there is nothing more human (that is, 
less mineral, vegetal, animal, and even angelical) than grammar; 
but I understand and beg their indulgence this once. My joys and 
sufferings will be left for other pages, if anyone wishes to read them.
Jorge Luis Borges
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1.1 CCTV - Banksy.
Setting out
A grey, sharp-angled shape irrupts on an otherwise luminous and 
green natural scenery. A standing metal structure towers CCTV 
cameras beside a stream by a small country road among trees on a 
calm afternoon. Why are we affected by this image? What kind of 
violence are we confronted with? The presence of the cameras, 
through the contours of the metallic angles of the mast, become 
an uncomfortable sign of human threat and convert the scene, 
transforming both, ‘nature’ and artifice into an indistinguishable 
whole. The mast is not the only human sign on the picture though; 
the road clearly indicates human traces, the tracks of vehicles. 
But somehow, until then, these signs do not seem disturbing; 
without the mast we would perceive a ‘natural’ environment. 
This time Banksy’s intervention (Fig. 1.1) does not affect our 
perception of artificial environments but natural ones. And if his 
art has been associated with forms of ‘vandalism’, on this occasion, 
this vandalism does not affect material but imaginary ‘property’. 
A set of relations among elements where the mast is perceived as 
alien brings forth a sense of hostility —a psychological ecology 
gets disrupted. Projecting ourselves in this scenario, we become 
aware of a play of forces affecting the landscape, the situation; 
a potential (human) threat, may be robbery —and the abuse of 
integrity that this implies— as well as a counter measure; the 
observing cameras, part of a social network, a human-nonhuman 
assemblage of artefacts, policies, speeds, energy, among count-
less others that enact it, that make it possible. Do these cameras 
make noise? Do they also affect the life of birds and insects some-
how? As when certain electronic equipment emit electromagnetic 
waves that we do not perceive. If a fox or a deer are filmed, will 
they be reported to someone? What if a human couple making 
love is filmed? Who is it that is watching? Are they permanently 
operating? Will the mast deteriorate and contaminate the stream 
in the coming years? Are there other forms of pollution that we 
do not sense?
We may feel vaguely or strongly monitored, reassured, con-
cerned and so on, but we cannot avoid reacting to the mast’s im-
positions. This immediate form of coping with suggests —as in 
the reaction to the mast in this image— that these sort of actions 
do not spring from judgement and reasoning. That is, we do not 
reflect upon the situation and rationally understand the mast’s im-
positions; rather, we spontaneously, at the moment it is perceived, 
react to its presence and behave triggered by this stimulus. These 
actions are brought forth in everyday life situations, and as cogni-
tive scientist Francisco Varela suggests, they represent the most 
common kind of ethical behaviour. In Varela’s terms, we always 
operate in some kind of immediacy of a given situation, “We have 
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a readiness-for-action proper to every specific lived situation” 
(1999:9), and we move from one situation to another; transitions 
which are virtually imperceptible.
I call any such readiness-for-action a microidentity and its correspond-
ing lived situation a microworld. Thus, “who we are” at any moment 
cannot be divorced from what other things and who other people are 
to us. (Varela, 1999:10)
 
The emergence of a microworld may be shocking, as when we 
experience a form of threat. Or more commonly, when we sud-
denly discover that we have lost our wallet: at that moment the 
perception of the world shifts from say, pleasantly walking home 
looking forward to meet our children, to the worry of having lost 
valuable documents, and to the intensive focusing of the tracing 
of the steps that might have led to that loss. 
These interrelations con-form a fragile and complex ecological 
domain constituted by the possibilities, overlaps and interplay of a 
psychological ecology, a social ecology and an environmental ecol-
ogy, as Félix Guattari suggested.1 The kind of hospitality-hostility 
addressed in this work, is of this type; pervasive and anchored to 
everyday human behaviour, where our actions —mediated by ar-
tefacts and already at this micropolitical level— enact specific re-
lations to others, becoming therefore ethical manifestations with 
regard to humans and nonhumans. 
The scales of hospitality-hostility addressed in this work need 
to be assessed through multiple stances, thus the need to en-
gage with complementary types of know-how: on the one hand, a 
physical and situated one by means of empathic cohabitation, by 
getting in contact with beings or systems that we might or might 
not choose to cohabit with (as in the case of coping with the view 
of the CCTV mast). On the other hand, a more reflexive know-
how, as when we ponder or reflect upon a situation that demands 
our conscious attention, and that might imply, at a later stage, 
the enactment of some form of action. This action, in its turn and 
with repeated practice, might become incorporated or assimilated 
as a more spontaneous form of action. Both forms of know-how 
—in the case of human beings— are part of one single cogni-
tive onto-epistemological process. Ontology and epistemology 
must be conceived as a continuum, where knowledge production 
reinforces ways of being and modes of engagement in and with 
an environment, and where biological constraints elicit particular 
forms of knowledge. 
Returning to the sense of hostility that can be perceived in 
figure 1.1, I mentioned that the mast was not the only sign of hu-
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man presence. There are also tracks, traces which have been nat-
uralized throughout the years. Perhaps, even more importantly, 
we assume that the tracks were made by a vehicle such as cart 
lead by horses (to guess from the type of traces left on the ground 
in the painting), from a period when animals and humans lived in a 
somehow mutually beneficial relationship. If this is the case, how 
has our human relationship with horses developed, to the point 
that we perceive the tracks in the image as natural rather than 
artificial? To what extent does the cart become naturalized in this 
human-nonhuman relationship? 
We could ask ourselves, why do we accept the imprints left on 
the ground and not the CCTV mast? Is it really about the traces? 
Does it have to do with the temporal scale of these artefacts? 
Namely, the transitional aspect of the cart moving along the ter-
ritory in contrast to the permanence and static presence of the 
mast? Do we need the visual information to have empathy with 
an environment in order to perceive human or nonhuman disrup-
tions? What if we would see an artefact that disrupts an environ-
ment by going through it making neither noise nor leaving tracks 
or signs of visual pollution, but having a threatening effect on 
birds, insects and other organisms that we perceive, scaring them 
away as this machine moves along?
One can speculate that cart-horse relationships may be seen as 
mutually beneficial, if we, by extension project that the cart medi-
ates a human benefit, where humans profit from the strength of 
the horse, while the horse benefits from (ideally) the care in terms 
of food and shelter which is given. However, the relationship can 
also be understood as harmful to one of the parts, where the hu-
man benefits from the horse, while the horse becomes exploited 
for its strength and deprived of its freedom. What seems to be 
impossible to conceive, is a relationship where one of the actors, 
the human or the nonhuman can be indifferent to the relationship 
itself, that is, where one benefits while the other does not per-
ceive the relationship as either harmful or beneficial. 
In symbiotic terms, these three forms of association refer to the 
biological categories of mutualism, parasitism and commensalism. 
Succinctly, a mutualistic symbiosis is an association in which both 
symbionts benefit; an association in which one symbiont bene-
fits and the other one is neither harmed nor benefited is called a 
commensalistic symbiosis; while a relationship in which a symbi-
ont receives nutrients at the expense of a host organism is called 
a parasitic symbiosis. These notions will be explicitly developed 
to study host-guest relationships in the section entitled “Devis-
ing”, for the moment, and following these thoughts, I would like 
to compare Banksy’s ‘natural’ scene with one of the landscapes 
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that became the ecological niche of a device designed within the 
context of the project entitled ¡Pestes!
The natural scenery of figure 1.2 is barren, deprived of trees, 
due to the powerful winds of the region. It can also be observed 
that in the image there are traces of vehicles on the ground; be-
cause of the width of the tracks, we assume that cars or even 
trucks have left those traces. This implies a ‘stronger’ presence 
or a higher degree of the artificial than in figure 1.1, where the car, 
being totally artificial, stands in contrast to the cart-horse, where 
the elements that constitute the vehicle still come from materi-
als made of a natural substratum (leather, wood, metal, natural 
fibres in terms of textiles, even glass). Do these marks affect our 
perception of this landscape as being more or less ‘natural’ some-
how? Are these welcomed signs of the presence of humans, and 
thus a sign of comfort in an otherwise threatening nature? 
The signs that we perceive in the image do not seem directly 
threatening though. Unless we start projecting, figuring out, a 
set of alternative spatial and temporal relations, where we could 
for example see ourselves exposed to the coming night, isolated, 
vulnerable and unprotected from other beings better adapted to 
those conditions. Knowing that the image shows a region of Cór-
doba, Argentina, we might sense a threat from figuring out the 
capacity of the local puma to see at night, to smell at a distance, 
to be affected by sounds imperceptible to our ear; an unlikely en-
counter which nonetheless may strongly affect those unacquaint-
ed with the territory. 
The place itself as an ecological niche has, in spite of its bar-
renness, a wide range of alternatives, both in terms of shelter and 
nutrition. These however, may not suit human bodily needs. There 
are other organisms that thrive and draw upon the potential of 
this environment, hares, vizcachas, snakes, falcons, beetles and 
insects of different kind, among many others. For a human to be 
able to tap into these possibilities —the ecological resources of 
this environment— a mediation of some kind of artefact or device 
would be necessary. Through this mediation it would thus extend 
human bodily capacities to act, to survive. 
The forms of hostility that a human being might perceive in 
such situation expose ways of engaging in and with a given en-
vironment, which form part of a complex constellation of inter-
relations that constitute through our body vulnerability a basic 
experience of hospitality-hostility. From a human perspective, 
Banksy’s landscape depicts a more hospitable nature, one where 
we find water, shelter in the form of trees, less extreme temper-
ature conditions and where we assume other forms of life; less 
threatening animals that might accompany us, and also potential 
[¡Pestes! 129]
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sources of food: birds, hares, foxes among others. The irruption 
of the mast displaces these projections, the natural potential of 
the place in terms of resources, transforming the vulnerability into 
a (human) social phenomenon. Partly, the hostility that can be 
perceived comes from the aesthetic contrast with the environ-
ment in which it is has been placed, and by our knowledge of it 
as being an instrument of surveillance and control. At the same 
time, and almost paradoxically, one could say that the hostility 
that we perceive in relation to the mast in this situation originates 
from our understanding that the artefact does not draw upon the 
resources of this ecological niche (except its being anchored to 
stable ground and operating during daylight conditions), it is not 
‘in tune’ with the environment, it does not participate of its pro-
cesses; it imposes a structure and a logic which is alien to the site. 
This becomes evident from the uneasiness experienced when, in 
other contexts, we occasionally discover that a certain ‘tree’ is in 
fact a camouflaged radio or telephone mast. Designed to blend 
in a natural environment causing the least possible visual disrup-
tion, while still having the height that affords better reception and 
transmission of radio waves. 
How would forms that are more ‘in tune’ with the environment 
influence our perception of them? At ¡Pestes! we designed a set 
of radios, which were to function in given ecological niches and to 
draw upon the potential ‘nourishment’ of specific actors partici-
pating in the environments. Thus, a ‘commensalistic radio’ (Radi-
ophonum Ventosa Energia), was designed for the strong winds 
usually found in the region of the sierras between “La Cumbre” 
and “Ascochinga” (Fig. 1.2). The proposal implies a radio with 
electric energy generated by a kite, which, by means of a piezo-
electric circuit-board generates the 3V necessary to run the radio. 
The pressure exercised by the wind, bends the flaps of the kite, 
activating the piezo-electric board, generating electricity in its 
turn. (Figs. 1.3 to 1.5).
Through this design, and to some extent, the kite ‘participates’ 
in the landscape, drawing upon the resources of the wind. Beside 
the poetical associations which may elicit a sense of ‘harmony’ 
by projecting ourselves through this activity in this landscape, 
we could ask ourselves, more critically: if the kite/radio ‘benefits’ 
from the wind, but not the wind from the kite/radio, why is this re-
lationship considered ‘commensalistic’ and not ‘parasitical’? Also, 
if the relationship discussed is so specific as to involve only the 
kite and the wind, what other relations are formed by our pres-
ence and the rest of the parts of these devices, such as those in 
figure 1.6? And if these relationships exist, how do they influence 
the life or the ‘performing’ of other beings and systems?
[Appendix B 179]
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1.2 ‘Natural’ environ-
ment between “La 
Cumbre” and “Ascoch-
inga” for the commen-
salistic proposal.
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1.3 Radiophonum Ven-
tosa Energia - Com-
mensalism between 
the wind and the kite/
radio
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1.4 Radiophonum 
Ventosa Energia. Kite 
detail.
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1.5 Kite, detail of the 
‘flapping’ principle 
of the piezo-electric 
system.
1.6 Details, commen-
salistic radio.
31 30
These issues will be addressed in the coming sections. What I 
would like to emphasize for the moment, is that these late reflec-
tions speculate upon different and complementary levels of in-
teraction: on the degree of participation of an artefact with-in an 
environment, and also, on an ontological dimension (that of being 
a sentient biological organism) by exposing our physical depend-
ency upon a natural substratum and the interrelations established 
with other beings and systems by cohabitation, that is by the liv-
ing together which stands for sym-biosis. 
 However, no biological description of bodily needs could be dis-
associated from the socio-cultural development of human beings. 
Through a single aspect of the images examined so far, such as 
the media that materializes them, we understand that the paint-
ing style of figure 1.1 in contrast to the photographic medium of 
figure 1.2 imply forms of representations that can be more or less 
associated with sociopolitical and historical circumstances. This 
is partially what also qualifies our suppositions, when we read-
ily accept the presence of a car or a cart, always immersed in a 
semiosphere2, sense that is individually, collectively, and culturally 
produced.  
Throughout this work, these dynamic formations: (monitored) 
human in relation to a monitoring-sound-polluting-mast, in re-
lation to a decaying metal structure, in relation to... will be ad-
dressed through the notion of assemblage. An assemblage is a 
spatio-temporal composition of humans and/or nonhumans, in 
which there are “vitalities at play” that makes it unpredictable.3
Within the context of these thoughts ¡Pestes! will address as-
semblages to specific ecological niches, trying to explicitly articu-
late how given temporal and spatial relations such as those  found 
in the barren landscape of figure 1.2, can be conceived as forms 
of symbioses. The aim however —as will become evident through 
the work— will not be to provide a design ‘solution’ that will im-
prove the living conditions of the vulnerable human life, but to ex-
pose the choices and the conditions of design as human practice. 
THIS APPROACH
The sections of this book do not follow the traditional order of 
a ‘thesis’, where research questions are answered by the use of 
specified methods from a given discourse, leading to specific con-
clusions. This work is another kind of assemblage, one that com-
bines different literary, philosophical and theoretical discourses 
and traditions with experimental design in order to develop and 
articulate the concept of device.
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A device (Latin divisa, divisus; division) divides, that is, organ-
izes, arranges, frames our environment and defines thus, limits 
and possibilities of relation. 
Between “Setting out” and “Concluding”, there are three sec-
tions in this thesis: “Hosting”, which articulates the concept and 
the approach to hospitality-hostility. “Unfolding”, which through 
a pragmatic use of language articulates relations between humans 
and nonhumans. And “Devising”, which explores possibilities of 
the design process and the relations it enables. Each of these sec-
tions ends with a short summary of the issues presented, while 
introducing the following one, helping the reader to keep track 
and to follow the logic of the arguments. For the same purpose, 
a glossary of the main concepts will be found after “Concluding”.
More specifically, the section entitled “Hosting” will introduce 
views of hospitality-hostility as suggested by Jacques Derrida, 
and will challenge their anthropocentrism from the ethical and 
theoretical perspective of Judith Butler, as a way to move towards 
an ecological conception of hospitality-hostility. Position that will 
be further articulated through Francisco Varela’s understanding 
of ethical know-how. The notion of device introduced here acts as 
the key operating concept throughout the work. In this section, 
I will consider machines, artefacts, and apparatuses, as devices. 
This, in order to emphasize the dividing, the sorting out rather 
than the ‘solutions’ of a given architectural proposal, ‘consumer 
product’, law, and so on. Exposing the ethical domain of the devis-
ing process and its results, in the recognition or lack of recogni-
tion of other beings and systems.
The section entitled “Unfolding” will be concerned with the 
specific relationships that can be conceived through the use of 
language as a device.4 It will question the use of general categories 
(typological thinking) to understand the notions of hospitality and 
hostility. By means of the linguistic displacements that the uses 
of random prepositions stimulate, I will try to expand typological 
classifications following a logic of connectivity to approach the 
complexity of ecological manifestations. Developing in this way, 
what I call a ‘heterotopian’ approach to conceive design scenarios.
The section entitled “Devising” will be concerned with ‘host-
guest relationships’, by working with the biological notion of sym-
biosis to further understand the anthropocentrism and ecological 
implications of our conceptions of hospitality-hostility. By extend-
ing these biological categories to the processes of the produc-
tion of the artificial, the human-nonhuman assemblages become 
articulated as manifestations that necessarily acknowledge (or 
not) the presence and interrelationship with (some) others. In 
this section, I will use the ‘heterotopian’ approach sketched in the 
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previous section, in order to conceive the symbiotic relationships 
of the devices designed. Creating in this way aleatory combina-
tions, pushing systems and organisms to cohabit in unusual cir-
cumstances, testing combinational ideas to imagine some of the 
resilient capabilities of the devices and actors related and their life 
in symbioses.
The final section, “Concluding” summarises the work through 
a short revision of the projects that conform this proposal, while 
articulating their ethical perspective in their attempt to explicitly 
acknowledge an ethological, and an etho-ecological5 position, by 
affirming the inseparability of the ethos, the way of behaving pe-
culiar to a being, and oikos, the habitat of that being.
 All titles of the sections of this essay end in ‘ing’ as in set-
ting (out), hosting, unfolding, devising and concluding. In English, 
verbs and nouns ending in ‘ing’ are called gerunds, from the Latin 
verb gero, gerundus, meaning “to be carried out”. I have chosen to 
use the gerund form to emphasize this activity, this carrying out, 
the processing or the process aspects of the thinking proposed in 
each of the sections.
Partly, this is where my fondness for etymologies comes from, 
not that much a quest for origins —giving authority to the word 
by ‘finding’ its ‘real’ or authentic meaning6, rather, it is an ap-
proach to ‘open words up’, dismembering them slightly, to offer an 
image of the instability of language, its ongoing transformation, in 
its synchronicity and diachronicity, language, once again, as enac-
tion and process.
 All enactment is a form of attunement or composition in and 
to a milieu. Forms produced by humans, what we call the artificial, 
are predominantly operating and conceived at the human (instru-
mental) scale, the human cognitive model and the scale by which 
design comes into being. My focusing on linguistic and biological 
phenomena is a response to this concern, trying to understand in 
what way language or languaging as cognitive scientists Hum-
berto Maturana and Francisco Varela suggest, is the most charac-
teristic feature of the human species (1998:234). And in this way, 
how this process might influence our perception of the world.
 The work has been developed through a pragmatic and ex-
perimental approach that studies the results that might originate 
from a design thinking that is engaged not only with the artefact 
(noun, the static object, the thing itself) but also with the link, 
or linking, in the relation established; that which pre-supposes a 
position, and defines or constraints the conditions for experienc-
ing how artefacts relate to the assemblages that constitute their 
environment.
The study started by inquiring into what seemed to be a funda-
mental paradox, namely, that when we create —for example— a 
car, we create the possibility not only of transporting ourselves 
from one place to another, but also the car crash; a thing and its 
‘negative side’, the accident. Design, by dealing with the artificial, 
re-configures our environment by introducing new artefacts and 
produces new knowledge; thus parallel to every single invention 
design constantly creates the possibilities for new unexpected 
events, accidents. Following this basic logic, and believing that 
the designs that humans create are a way to provide humans with 
better living conditions, that is, making environments more hospi-
table, then, one can consider that one aspect of the hospitality of 
a car, such as the possibility to transport ourselves, is closely re-
lated to its hostility, the possibility to injure us through a car crash. 
The accident, by definition, is that which happens unexpectedly, 
without our (someone’s) knowledge or control. Thus, the notion 
of accident implies that such and such things have happened at 
that particular place and in that unexpected way. Typically, the 
accident of which we think about when we have a car crash in 
mind is that someone, for example Maria, fell asleep while driving, 
hitting the tree beside the road, which prevented her from injur-
ing pedestrians nearby… thus the accidental notion refers to the 
events that were not meant to happen —falling asleep and crash-
ing, but includes in this way even the presence of the tree, a ‘lucky 
accident’, since it prevented other people’s injuries. 
On a closer look, what becomes apparent is the human cen-
tredness of the word ‘accident’, or more precisely, the category 
‘accident’. If we shift scales and consider the phenomena involved 
in a given car crash from either a micro or a macro perspective, we 
would hardly consider it as an accident. If we imagine a car crash-
ing on to a tree from a micro perspective, we would not consider 
the transformation that the bumper undergoes under pressure 
when in contact with the wood an accident; we would describe 
it as a transformation of some kind, since this is the behaviour 
expected when such materials collide. In ‘nature’ there are no ac-
cidents only processes of transformation, becomings. 
At this level, there is a correspondence between the notion of 
affordance7 and the category accident. Examining the transfor-
mations that a car bumper undergoes when crashing on to a tree, 
we observe a particular relation between the structural properties 
of both systems. Current car design has become such, that all 
parts of a vehicle become deformed with relatively low impacts, in 
order to absorb the shock of a crash, protecting thus the human 
bodies inside of the cockpit or passenger shell. A process known 
as the “weakest link”, where using a weak element that ‘fails’, pro-
tects other elements in the system. The transformation will be 
[Grammarianis... 107]
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relative to the many parameters involved: speed, weight, inertia, 
distance/angle of impact, size and type of tree and so on. This 
form of interaction maybe totally destructive in some cases, but it 
most likely is a mere perturbation for a stronger vehicle such as a 
tank. In general terms, one can say that the relation tank-tree af-
fords different possibilities than the relation car-tree. Since most 
of us travel by car rather than by tank, we tend to project these 
qualities in the category accident.
Here the word affordance needs to be understood as part of 
an infra-language. Bruno Latour suggests (2005:30, 174) that in 
an infra-language words remain meaningless, except for allow-
ing the displacement, the connection and the consciousness of a 
given specific relation. Affordance cannot be ‘general’ in its ‘ap-
plication’; the tree affords a great variety of behaviour, depending 
on the relationship established with a given system or organism 
(cars, tanks, woodpeckers, worms...). Words that form part of this 
infra-language do not designate what is being mapped, but how it 
is possible to map it.8
The notion of accident is perceiver-dependent, a human con-
struction that applies to a human social logic. This has implica-
tions when trying to understand artefacts ecologically, since what 
was not planned (that which comes unexpectedly) cannot be un-
derstood as accidental, only as process, processes of becoming.
 This simple association of what is hostile to what is acciden-
tal has gradually led to a series of studies of the ‘possibilities of 
relating’ so to say, exploring combinational aspects from alterna-
tive perspectives. Thus, questions such as: what is the likelihood 
of this thing getting in contact (relating) with this other thing? 
Have pushed the study into researching transformation processes 
(when does this become hostile to…). In the context of this work I 
will return to the notion of accident and its relationship with hos-
tility. For the moment, I would like to emphasize two aspects of 
my approach to the theme of hospitality and hostility. I refer to 
both, hospitality and hostility, by writing hospitality-hostility with 
the intention to capture their reciprocal con-formation. The hy-
phenation of these words does not aim at describing a dichotomy, 
but rather at describing a single phenomenon characterized by 
a tension that can occur between human and/or nonhuman ac-
tors. It follows that hospitality-hostility is to be understood as a 
dynamic process. The questions asked in this work are not nec-
essarily concerned with ‘what is hospitable-hostile?’ but rather, 
with the hospitality-hostility of what, when, and for whom? Since 
a given process can at a given time-space be of harm or benefit 
to the system or organism in question at alternative scales. One 
can say for example, that our hospitality to another person by 
means of offering food (mangoes from the Philippines) might, at 
a later stage —due to the unsustainable practices in the produc-
tion, distribution, consumption and/or discard of these goods— 
become hostile not only to our guest, but also to us, the hosts of 
the gesture of hospitality, by causing a deterioration of the en-
vironments where ‘hospitality’ took place. What the project at-
tempts to articulate, is a need to understand hospitality-hostility 
from a ecological perspective, where human forms of hospitality 
to humans, con-form part of a complex web of interrelations that 
can only —unavoidably— be understood from an anthropocentric 
ethical perspective.
A FRAMING
As a mode of preface to his book Empire of Signs, Roland Barthes 
wrote a brief note; 
 
The text does not ‘gloss’ the images, which do not ‘illustrate’ the text. 
For me, each has been no more than the onset of a kind of visual 
uncertainty, analogous perhaps to that loss of meaning Zen calls a sa-
tori. Text and image, interlacing, seek to ensure the circulation and 
exchange of these signifiers: body, face, writing; and in them to read 
the retreat of signs. (1982). 
Analogously, not only the imagery but also, the three-dimen-
sional materializations included in this work have uneasy relation-
ships with the concepts and speculations of this essay. It is im-
possible to say at this point which has generated what, and in 
what way, or to what extent, the designs expand or introduce new 
conceptions to the arguments. To what extent the readings and 
the developing of the projects have reinforced or weakened posi-
tions taken. 
Through the practice of design, the materialization of devices 
have pushed and in many cases redefined the conceptual frame, 
or brought a set of constraints to the project as a (thinking, enac-
tive) process; realization involves the process of limitation, the 
narrowing down of possibilities, by which some are discarded and 
others made real, actualized. These have allowed me to provision-
ally position the arguments within a vast network of (sometimes 
problematic) associations, preventing the theme of hospitality, 
hostility and design to expand and displace itself endlessly.
The work has brought forth a range of approaches, the result of 
a personal need to articulate part of the complexity of the practice 
of design. Complexity, one of the words I frequently use through-
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out the work, should not be confused with neither completeness 
nor complicatedness. In Edgar Morin’s words, 
We can say on the one hand, that what is complex recovers the empiri-
cal world, the uncertainty, the incapacity to obtain certainty, to for-
mulate a law, to conceive an absolute order. And on the other hand, 
recovers something related to logic, that is to say, to the incapacity to 
avoid contradictions. (2004:99).9 
The series of projects interweaved with the paragraphs that 
conform this thesis are to be understood as propositions. Not 
only because, as I will develop in the coming sections, I emphasize 
through the ‘relational’, the ‘positional’ —thus the ‘pro-position-
al’— but more generally because the approach to the doctoral 
studies has been, as in a design project, to come up with a ‘pro-
posal’. In this way the emphasis lies in the pragmatic and experi-
mental character of the methodologies adopted, as well as the 
potential of the analysis and ideas generated. 
I have paid particular attention to what things10 do or are capa-
ble of doing. Studying how they work and what kind of behaviour 
do they afford, what do they make possible, available, to humans 
as well as nonhumans. 
Although I put emphasis on so-called natural languages11, I do 
not suggest a predominant role of a natural language when dis-
cussing cognition. On the contrary, as I will develop in the sections 
to come, I understand language as displacement of sense and a 
form of structural coupling, where the fundamental concepts 
of language derive from the experiential dynamics of corporeal 
movements. Language plays an important but not a constitutive 
role, reason why the physical enactment of design, its process 
—as in sketching, its gestures and the gestures that result in the 
interaction with a given materialization, are fundamental to un-
derstand the displacements and proposals suggested in this work.
I prefer to think of the devices that follow, such as the card and 
the stamp sets, the radios, and the book you are holding in your 
hand, as machines to think and to sense with. Devices conceived 
to favour, arrange and make available possible worlds. Without 
a doubt, these versions exclude other, no less interesting possi-
bilities, as will be understood by the notion of device. Part of the 
effort of assembling the thoughts, papers, machines, words and 
the rest of the elements that conform this proposal, have been 
invested in developing and presenting projects that leave open, 
and even (if aware) suggest alternative versions for addressing 
the issues at stake.
An important aspect for the reader to navigate not only the 
intricacies of this work, but also its many references, is to keep 
in mind several proscriptive constraints, that is, my conscious at-
tempts ‘not to’. 
I will therefore mention at least the ones that I have been ex-
plicitly and consciously aiming at minimizing. I have tried to avoid: 
a – typological thinking, by playing with categorizations; 
b – essentialism, by incorporating a relativistic perspective; 
c – linearity, by constantly looking for connections to other phe-
nomena outside the original starting point, and thus, 
d – mono disciplinary specialization, by studying and attempt-
ing to incorporate a plurality of forms of knowing and knowledge 
fields. 
The work questions the very assumptions by which one in-
quires. In this sense it imposes a form of affirmative auto criticism 
which requires not only proscriptive constraints, but also positive 
resources. In this case, I have looked for multipliers, have attempt-
ed to remain playful, shifting alternative time and spatial scales, 
and bringing disparate elements that would help me to question 
my own assumptions.
The search for these multipliers, pursued through the practice 
of design, have in many occasions implied a coupling with, for ex-
ample, literature or philosophy, that is, practices which in many 
ways are concerned with the ability to ‘write down’ thoughts, 
ideas, stories. With characteristic humour, Jorge Luis Borges used 
to say “arguments convince no one”12. His stories however, are 
in many ways an example of carefully refined logical arguments, 
crafted in an essayistic style. Borges’ rejection of “arguments” 
however, gives us insight into what in the cognitive sciences has 
come to be understood as framing.13 Human knowledge has an 
emotional basis, thus the need to have a prior form of engage-
ment with a given line of reasoning (the framing) that can be 
shared, tuned into someone else’s tone of voice, sensibility. The 
presence of a ‘purely’ logical argument does not suffice to com-
municate an idea; there is a need for a series of words to activate 
the frame. Creating a space where someone else can be identified 
with a given narrative. As such, literature or philosophy provide 
some of the entries into the several levels of the project. At the 
same time, even the (visual, material) design proposals must be 
understood as ‘framing exercises’. Thus, this ‘narrative’ notion of 
framing should be expanded to include artefacts that do not —
explicitly— ‘inform’ us, but which nonetheless in-form and implic-
itly constitute and affect our modes of engagement with and in a 
given environment. 
Framing, in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
points out a more fundamental gesture;14 that of ordering a world, 
[Relating by... 78]
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and an ontological manifestation of the production of excess15; 
design being one of these manifestations. By framing, the frame 
separates, arranges, and as such, it relates to the notion of de-
vice, as will be developed here. Elizabeth Grosz mentions, “the 
frame’s most elementary form is the partition, whether a wall or 
a screen” (2008:14). A device materializes, enacts such a form, 
becoming something that divides, arranges, partitions. Thus, a 
knife, by means of its blade in combination with a handle that can 
be manipulated by a human hand (the handle itself being another 
device), cuts through softer tissues and materials. The device be-
comes able16, affords, arranging for example, the human hospital-
ity with the gesture of slicing fruit (to continue with another level 
of our hospitality by offering mangoes) for a guest and the hostil-
ity of having lacerated the fruit. Yet, this laceration becomes a 
manifestation of one of the possibilities of hostility which we can 
directly —in the use of the knife— perceive; cutting as a form of 
violence. There are other possible (and likely) manifestations of 
hostility which are not directly in relation to our use of the knife: 
through the production, distribution, consumption and discard of 
the knife, the artefact —in the process of becoming a knife or of 
that of decomposing or being reused, or recycled— interacts with 
a myriad of humans and nonhumans for a period far longer than 
the average human life. In this way, it affects the environments 
and the ones that participate, willingly or not, in the becoming of 
this device.
Grosz suggests that, “At its most elementary, architecture, 
the most primordial and animal of all the arts, does little other 
than design and construct frames” (2008:13).17 When mentioning 
that architecture is doing “little other than design and construct”, 
the word design stands for a form of enaction, a way of doing, 
whether that is architecture or something else. It is in this general 
sense that I speak of design in this work, referring to a (human) 
way of doing, a form of enaction, the production of the artificial. 
Following this approach, architecture, graphic design, literature, 
painting, the writing of a speech, or any other form of human con-
struction are all manifestations that imply a way of doing, that is, 
a design. If specific or institutionalized forms of design are dis-
cussed, I will refer to them in terms such as graphic or industrial 
design, to give two common examples.18
Borges was sensitive, like G. K. Chesterton —a writer he wor-
shiped— that “the essay is the only literary form which confess-
es, in its very name, that the rash act known as writing is really 
a leap in the dark” (Chesterton 2000:17) and often adopted the 
uncertain role of the writer whose doubt becomes a source of 
affirmations. What Chesterton pointed out was, that the essay 
—as opposed to the epic, the sonnet, the ode— is by its very 
name and its very nature “an experiment”, and as such, “full of the 
future and the praise of experiment and adventure” (Chesterton 
2000:17). It is remarkable that Borges, through the practice of 
writing, ‘trusted’ the forms that were enacted —the stories that 
emerged from the discipline and the joy of writing— and allowed 
his body to become an instrument of literature. He actively prac-
ticed Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief”, allowing other 
people’s tones and voices to affect and to resonate in his own. 
He cherished the unconscious and often fantastic formations that 
arose in his sleep. In this sense, through his subtle and attentive 
sensibility, he cultivated dispositions that made possible a form of 
attunement that constantly affirmed other possibilities, other be-
ings, other worlds, which became part of his world.  
This work may also be understood as an attempt to cultivate 
dispositions, particularly those that seem to lead to the recogni-
tion of other worlds, other beings, and other systems. 
Of the many present voices, Borges’ tone is subtlety heard, 
sometimes in visible written form, but it also appears in the play-
ful and experimental way in which his speculations have informed 
and inspired some of my designs through his stories of possible 
worlds and literary games. As I write these lines, I have in mind 
the opening passage of this section, from a young Borges in his 
twenties, which help me to express some of my own feelings and 
reservations, as I embark in this human work of writing an essay.
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Hosting
Hosting
The danger represented by the thing given or handed on is doubtless 
nowhere better sensed than in the very ancient Germanic law and 
languages. This explains the double meaning of the word Gift in 
all these languages – on the one hand, a gift, on the other, poison.
Marcel Mauss
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HOSTIS: A GUEST, AN ENEMY
It is known that certain microorganisms thrive in ‘hostile’ environ-
ments, such as the acid waters of a hot spring or nuclear waste, 
where life was thought to be impossible. Each species adapts to, 
and co-creates the conditions of its existence; through the cou-
pling of systems and organisms, forms of coevolution and sym-
bioses have been developed where ‘hosts’ and ‘guests’ cohabit 
a given environmental niche. They become symbionts —which 
may be inside or outside of another symbiont— tapping into the 
resources as well as being constrained by the possibilities of the 
ecosystem. 
Hospitality-hostility is not a property of the systems or organ-
isms themselves, but have to do with human or nonhuman ways 
of relating to each other in a given environment.
From basic forms of shelter to today’s ‘intelligent’ homes, hu-
mans have modified environments so that they could afford hu-
mans safer and less straining —more hospitable— living condi-
tions. However, when we think of a host, or hospitality in general 
terms, we do not tend to think of biological relations. What we 
normally have in mind are human social gestures of cohabitation, 
many of which are mediated by artefacts: from a hand shake, 
through the offering of food, to shelter and urban planning, each 
human society has established more or less articulated rules of 
conviviality.
In general terms, the person that welcomes or invites us, the 
host that receives us, or the thing that offers a range of possi-
bilities, offers them according to a code, a set of rules, a law or a 
language that may or may not be ours. It is therefore interesting to 
look into a conflict that exists at the root itself of the etymology 
of a keyword to this study, that of host:
 
Host (1): one who entertains guests. L. hospitem, acc. of hospes, (1) a 
host, (2) a guest. The base hospit- is short for hosti-pit-, where hosti 
is the crude form of hostis, a guest, an enemy. Host (2): an army. (F.-
L.) The orig. sense is ‘enemy’ or ‘foreigner.’ M.E. host, ost.- O.F. host, 
a host, army.- L. hostem, acc. of hostis, an enemy (orig. a stranger, a 
guest); hence, a hostile army...1
Mauss’ opening passage to this section points at this, seemingly 
paradoxical, manifestation; hostis (a guest, an enemy) implies the 
presence, the existence of an-other, of a foreign actor and opens 
up for the possibility of hospitality-hostility. “The foreigner is first 
of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospital-
ity is formulated” mentions Jacques Derrida (2000:15), who sug-
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(explicit or implicit)” (1998:174). 
For a living organism, to act appropriately implies, at the most 
basic level, to react to its environment in a way that will continue 
to make its life possible, that is, to survive. 
every interaction of an organism, every behaviour observed, can be 
assessed by an observer as a cognitive act. [...] In a nutshell: to live 
is to know (living is effective action in existence as a living being). 
(Maturana and Varela 1998:174).2 
Thus, when talking about knowledge, one should keep in mind 
this onto-epistemological continuum, where a given organism (in 
this example, human) enacts forms of knowledge, resulting from 
a history of interactions, always participating and immersed in a 
given culture. Cognition must be understood as enaction, where 
enaction “connotes a bringing forth by concrete handling.” (Vare-
la 1999:8). In this sense, all knowing is doing and all doing is know-
ing.
Thus, ‘knowledge’ does not only stand for ‘knowing what’: 
such and such things are in such and such way, as when one as-
sumes ‘facts’. Rather, it includes a ‘knowing how’, which is a form 
of enactment constrained by the capacities of the organism in 
question. At stake is not to specify how a ‘perceiver-independent’ 
world can be described, but rather, to understand how action can 
be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent world. (Varela 
1999:13).
For a middle-age woman whose body is healthy, to act effec-
tively (appropriately, adequately) when approaching an automatic 
sliding door —with the intention to walk through it and move to 
the next room— is to move towards it with a determined pace 
that will give the sensors time to detect her while opening the 
door without delaying her walk. A child or cat would act, react, 
and interact differently. And in case their interactions are suffi-
ciently repeated, disrupting the system by say, constantly playing 
with it, a countermeasure will be taken (some form of interven-
tion in or with the design), acknowledging the unexpected form of 
engagement with the doors. In the realm of useful artefacts, the 
explicit or implicit question relates the user (aware or not) to an 
absent designer or creator who (consciously or not) has defined 
possibilities of use. 
The person that establishes contact with a given artefact acts 
in accordance with his or her knowledge of it, his or her experience 
with previous interactions, creating his or her own expectations 
on the possible outcomes of the interaction. What one knows is 
what will define whether that expectation will turn to disappoint-
gested in his seminars on hospitality, that hospitality is impossible 
without hostility. Hospitality and hostility constitute each other 
by defining each other’s limit; by tracing (re)movable boundaries 
that open up spaces of possibilities within a set of conventions, of 
cultural traditions. 
Foreignness however manifests itself in different ways and de-
grees: the human foreign that comes from another country and 
does or does not understand our language and our laws, to which 
Derrida refers; the bullet that has irrupted in the body and is for-
eign to the organism; the bird that is foreign to the rhinoceros 
and contributes to its health, among countless other examples. 
What these manifestations seem to have in common is that they 
are all forms of relation, in which the knowledge (or lack of it) of 
the foreign agent, of its presence, opens up to the possibility and 
re-cognition of hospitality-hostility.
EXPECTING HOSPITALITY
In order to act ‘appropriately’ one needs to know. The acting ap-
propriately however, implies a dependency on a given context and 
a history of personal interaction, in this way, what should or could 
be known (or understood as knowledge by an observer) differs, 
according to the behaviour that is expected, depending thus on 
the question that is asked. 
When considering whether someone has knowledge or not, 
we understand that “what we are seeking is an effective action 
in the realms were an answer is expected” (Maturana and Varela 
1998:173). Maturana and Varela exemplify with a student who is 
asked at an examination to calculate the height of a university 
tower by using an altimeter. The student performs several calcula-
tions where he uses the altimeter, but not as an altimeter, thus: he 
attaches a string to it and drops it to the foot of the tower, calcu-
lating that the tower is 30 meters and 40 centimetres; or goes out 
to the garden and standing close to the tower with a goniometer, 
he uses the length of the altimeter to triangulate the tower, by 
which he calculates that it is 30 meters and 15 centimetres. In 
this way, the student performs several other calculations, none of 
which are satisfactory to the professor. What Maturana and Varela 
point out is that from an observer’s point of view, the student had 
more knowledge that what he was asked for, but from the profes-
sor’s point of view, all answers were inadequate. (1998:173-174). 
For this reason, they mention that “We admit knowledge when-
ever we observe an effective (or adequate) behaviour in a given 
context, i.e., in a realm or domain which we define by a question 
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ment (being therefore noticed) or whether it is going to fulfil its 
predictability, becoming in that case, a step to the completion of 
a particular task or function. The woman that successfully walked 
through the sliding doors ‘knows’, because of the context that 
validates her actions; because nothing unexpected happened, 
otherwise she would need to reassess her behaviour and adopt 
a new tactic that will validate her knowledge. If she runs into the 
sliding doors without seeing (knowing) them, an ‘accident’ will be 
produced, causing her nose to bleed or the glass to break. This 
accident —any accident— is that which happens unexpectedly, 
without a deliberate plan or cause. That which is expected is the 
‘pact’, in Derridean terms, that has been established consciously 
or not, among the performing actors/actants3 through previous 
interactions. The evaluation of whether or not there is knowledge 
is always made in a relational context, but this ‘pact’ —since it has 
been incorporated as knowledge, therefore expected— would not 
be perceived as ‘truly’ hospitable. 
According to Derrida, hospitality, in order to be perceived as 
such, will require a transgression of the expected function. Der-
rida mentions, 
 
the absolute or unconditional hospitality I would like to offer him or 
her presupposes a break with hospitality in the ordinary sense, with 
conditional hospitality, with the right to or pact of hospitality. […] we 
are taking account of an irreducible pervertibility. The law of hospital-
ity, the express law that governs the general concept of hospitality, 
appears as a paradoxical law, pervertible or perverting. It seems to 
dictate that absolute hospitality should break with the law of hospital-
ity as right or duty, with the ‘pact’ of hospitality. (2000:25). 
 A “making do” similar to the tactic operations described by De 
Certeau (1984), where the practice of everyday life becomes an 
artistic expression, in search for those boundaries that lead to the 
transgression of hospitality in order to become ‘truly’ hospitable. 
 Something ‘expected’ is assumed as knowledge in a given situ-
ation. As it is known, false expectations may have important effects 
on the person, the Placebo effect being perhaps the best-known 
example.4 But even when expectations can influence perception 
and behaviour, the changes are temporary, fading away, being re-
incorporated into knowledge. 
Following the logic suggested by Derrida, we understand that 
the roof that shelters or the door that opens are constantly being 
‘naturalized’. Our interacting with them results in forms of expec-
tations that assume their performing correctly (sheltering, sepa-
rating spaces), thus our —experiential— need for the transcend-
ence of their (original) hospitality, in order to experience them as 
‘truly’ (absolute, in Derrida’s sense) hospitable. 
KNOWLEDGE AS HOSPITALITY
If absolute hospitality is only possible through the transcendence 
of the known, as Derrida suggests, then behavioural patterns, the 
capacity of a given organism to perceive and conceive a particular 
state of things is decisive for the identification of the elements 
that provide useful guiding (and mis-guiding) information5. How-
ever, as we have observed, the information depends on a pre-
existing competence, knowledge. What are the clues that I have 
(perceive) for understanding a given situation? If we observe the 
following image by Carsten Höller, (Fig. 2.1) part of the series and 
exhibition entitled “killing children”, we note that the work is ad-
dressed to an spectator that knows, but (in the imaginary) the 
situation is staged for children —by means of the spread can-
dies— who don’t know. 
In the work there are perceptual clues that act as narrative el-
ements (the candies, the power chord leading to the wall) that 
‘guide’ or provide clues for behavior. The chord —for example— 
narrates by being plugged on to the wall, standing on its own, 
being an appealing and clearly differentiated element that points 
to the socket on the wall, indicating to the experienced observer 
the threatening of the situation: the 220 volts shock is inevitable 
for those who lack knowledge of electric appliances and house 
installations. The situation may only be defined ‘accidental’ in 
case someone or something unaware of the risk, gets in contact 
with the electric source. For the experienced observer the elec-
tric shock as such —since it is expected— is but the effect of a 
cause, a predictable consequence, the outcome of those ‘poten-
tialities’. Thus the tension hospitality-hostility (‘inviting’– electri-
fying) is perceived and understood in advance. We see how the 
candies and the chord ‘invite’ (afford human beings) possibilities 
of behaviour: being visible, manipulable and accessible. These fea-
tures and affordances are to be handled differently depending on 
the knowledge and intentions of the one interacting with them, 
thus —as spectators that know— we tend to perceive them as 
both hospitable and hostile. The ‘pact’ lies in the sharing or having 
shared this knowledge, a necessary act of communication since 
we, as humans, are unable to perceive the invisible threat of elec-
tricity. It can be said that the hostile proposition of Höller’s arte-
fact is based on our sensory limitations, perhaps, what biologist 
Jakob von Uexküll called our umwelt.
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The concept of umwelt, which could be translated as the ‘world 
brought forth’ by a given living being, was developed by von 
Uexküll, whose most famous example to describe a simple umwelt 
is that of the tick. He wrote: 
 
The tick is blind and deaf, she is unable to perceive odors, except one, 
and that is butyric acid. And that happens to be the only odor that 
is common to all mammals, because it is a component of sweat. In 
the Umwelt of the tick there are no ‘sight things’ or ‘hear things’ and 
only one single ‘smell thing’, that infallibly functions as an alarm signal, 
causing the tick to fall off its perch. If it lands on the warm skin of a 
mammal, the warmth is a second perceptual cue that releases the act 
of sucking. (von Uexküll 2001b:119). 
These signs alone constitute the umwelt of the tick, nothing 
else exists, even if they may be significant for another organism. 
As philosopher Brett Buchanan explains,
It is on this point that we can see a parallel with other organisms. In 
the way that a tick can sense the precise odor of mammalian sweat, 
the same odor may have no significance for other living beings. This 
sign does not figure into my umwelt; it has no significance for me. 
(Buchanan 2008:25).
 
An umwelt is conceived as an “island of the senses”, a per-
ceptual sensory sphere. Regarding the human umwelt von Uexküll 
mentions, 
 
For man, all distant objects are sight-objects only, when they come 
closer they become hearing-objects, then smell-objects and finally 
touch-objects as well. Finally objects can be taken into the mouth and 
be made taste-objects.6 
 Our perception of electricity depends on physical contact 
(touch), a mediated relation through other artefacts, or informa-
tion mediated by language. 
The hospitality–hostility that may be perceived, re-cognized 
and understood to be real, is not only perceptually guided but also 
perceiver–dependent. In spite of both being mammals, our human 
perception of environments at night greatly differs from that of 
the bat who navigates it mainly by means of sound. 
As mentioned, our knowledge (all living cognitive beings’ 
knowledge) needs to be understood as enaction; what counts as a 
relevant is inseparable from the structure of the perceiver (Varela, 
1999:13). The welt (German for world), of the um-welt indicates 
2.1 Killing children – 
Carsten Höller.
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a frame that validates their behaviour. If “The foreigner is first of 
all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is 
formulated” as Derrida suggests, the first instance of hospitality 
lies in the acknowledgement of that difference, on the commu-
nication and the articulation of that (legal) language that, until 
then, excludes an-other. The morality suggested by the word duty 
in this last quote refers to a (human) ‘obligation’; traditionally, to 
offer shelter, to give food, satisfying the basic needs of the other. 
Gestures mediated by artefacts, the plate, the cutlery, the chop-
sticks, the roof, the bed, the chair or cushion, each one embody-
ing particular ways of performing these basic duties. 
How does the designer, and later on his or her design, influence 
this mediation? As suggested by Bruno Latour, artefacts mediate 
human-nonhuman interactions based on human value systems, 
extending a morality by means of “delegation” which in its turn 
implies forms of “anthropomorphism”. Thus, a door ‘solves’ the 
‘problem’ of passing through a wall but creates the problem of, 
for example, leaving the door open after one has gotten into the 
room.  For this purpose, ‘grooms’ have been designed, delegating 
the human (polite) behaviour of closing the door once one has 
passed, to the artefact that ‘behaves’ anthropomorphically.9 
The artefacts in question may act as mediators or as interme-
diaries; 
 
Are they well-aligned intermediaries, making no fuss and no history 
and lending themselves to a smooth passage, or full mediators defin-
ing paths and fates on their own terms? Are they more of the same 
– that is intermediaries – or are they really others – that is mediators? 
(Latour 1997). 
In this sense, the perception of a mediator implies a form of 
significance to the perceiving organism —an event, while an in-
termediary remains unnoticed, allowing for a ‘smooth passage’. 
One could say that design(ers), by making something ‘invis-
ible’, that is, by aligning all the elements in a particular situation, 
by converting things into intermediaries, tune into someone else’s 
instrumental engagement with that environment. The design of 
intermediaries reflect, at its best, the sharing (the design act) as 
hospitality. That is, the designing of an artefact which is in har-
mony with a range of predictable human behaviour.10
The act of sharing might lead to the experience of hospital-
ity or hostility, by turning an insignificant passing occurrence 
into a significant event. Sharing implies a relation established by 
different actors/actants. In the case of artefacts, since humans 
produce them, they are already conceived, and constrained by, 
a world,7 but a particular one; although the cognitive agent is ‘in’ 
both, we need to distinguish between ‘world’ and ‘environment’. 
Francisco Varela, who does not refer in his work to the notion of 
umwelt, makes the following distinction:
 
On the one hand, a body interacts with its environment in a straight-
forward way. These interactions are of the nature of macrophysical 
encounters –sensory transduction, mechanical performance, and so 
on- nothing surprising about them. However, this coupling is possible 
only if the encounters are embraced from the perspective of the sys-
tem itself. This embrace requires the elaboration of a surplus significa-
tion based on this perspective; it is the origin of the cognitive agent’s 
world. Whatever is encountered in the environment must be valued 
or not and interacted with or not. This basic assessment of surplus 
signification cannot be divorced from the way in which the coupling 
event encounters a functioning perceptuo-motor unit; indeed, such 
encounters give rise to intentions (I am tempted to say ‘desires’), and 
intentions are unique to living cognition. (1999:55-56).8
I believe that the “world” to which Varela refers to, can be seen 
as a contemporary form of von Uexküll’s umwelt, being a world 
brought forth by the possibilities of the cognizing organism itself. 
Returning to our previous example, the woman that walks to-
ward the sliding doors can also be seen as enacting a gesture of 
hospitality, by (re-cognizing) acting as she is expected to. Hospi-
tality-hostility is a co-creation, however, the signs of the relation-
ship that lead to one or/and the other are not always shared.
SHARING AS HOSPITALITY
When coming across a new situation, a person might lack the pa-
rameters by which to judge the best possible way to behave.
It is in such a context when the sharing itself of the knowl-
edge (rules, form, general in-form-ation) becomes the first step 
towards the establishment of the possibility of hospitality, that 
is, to the sharing as hospitality. What defines hospitality–hostility 
is a social code, a set of implicit or explicit signs to be communi-
cated. As stated before, the sharing of that code (knowledge) is 
vital to the ‘pact’ of hospitality, but the following (respecting it or 
not, consciously or unconsciously) of the signs, code, of the rules, 
is what determines whether a circumstance becomes hostile or 
hospitable. Like in a game in which the rules are not being fol-
lowed, the players turn hostile to the host by not respecting the 
agreements, making the game thus unplayable due to the lack of 
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posture inscribes a significant difference that lead to perceptual 
change. This allows Francisco Varela to formulate the notion of 
(human) self as a form of narrative, where the weaving together 
of a personal story brings forth a sense of personal identity. Var-
ela elaborates on the idea of self as “a virtual person”, where the 
construction of a personal narrative through language sustains a 
mode of being in (social) relation with others. 
What we call “I” can be analysed as arising out of our recursive linguis-
tic abilities and their unique capacity for self-description and narration. 
As long-standing evidence from neuropsychology shows, language is 
another modular capacity cohabiting with everything else we are cog-
nitively. Our sense of a personal “I” can be construed as an ongoing 
interpretative narrative of some aspects of the parallel activities in our 
daily life, whence the constant shifts in forms of attention typical of 
our microidentities […] If this narrative “I” is necessarily constituted 
through language, then it follows that this personal self is linked to life 
because language cannot but operate as a social phenomenon. In fact, 
one could go one step further: the selfless “I” is a bridge between the 
corporeal body which is common to all beings with nervous systems 
and the social dynamics in which humans live. My “I” is neither private 
nor public alone, but partakes of both. And so do the kinds of narra-
tives that go with it, such as values, habits, and preferences. (Varela 
1999:61-62).
Understood as such, human cognition shares the patterns that 
lead to behaviour with all kind of living organisms, to the extent 
that Varela believes that “Ethical know-how is the progressive, 
firsthand acquaintance with the virtuality of self.” (1999:63). A 
way to understand otherness can result from the insights of a 
shared perceptive coherency. An emergent process that results 
in our re-cognition of a given situation and our relationship to the 
environment where the (re-cognized) event takes place.
DEFAMILIARIZING HOSPITALITY-HOSTILITY
The experience of hospitality–hostility lies in the pleasant (or un-
pleasant) unfamiliarity that will lead to a specific behaviour, in the 
strangening of the setting, thus in the search for the transgres-
sion that Derrida calls “absolute hospitality” which final measure 
would be the experience, the meaningfulness of the event. Design 
conceived in this way has no formula that can guarantee ‘commu-
nication efficiency’ or ‘transparency’ since it would work against 
the very principle of design; by definition, the creation of the new, 
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under specific knowledge and material conditions. Although not 
all possibilities of interaction can be pre-figured, our interaction 
with artefacts have been ‘planned’ by someone who, aware or not, 
constraints (whether this is seen as constructive or destructive, 
positive or negative) human and nonhuman possibilities of behav-
iour. The hospitality that an artefact such as a garbage bin offers, 
can be understood, for example, in being reachable by the average 
human hand. 
Thus, it is both, the guest (human user) and the host (designer/
creator mediated by the garbage bin) that offer mutual hospital-
ity in their reciprocal recognition, by allowing11, by accepting each 
other’s behaviour and actions. One could also say that in order to 
offer hospitality, it is not strictly necessary to start off from the 
existence of a dwelling, but from the dislocation of the shelter-
less, of the one ‘without’ (place, food...) that can open up to the 
authenticity of hospitality. This can be done directly by humans, 
as in human to human relations, as when giving a hug, a kiss or a 
handshake; or mediated by artefacts, as in the relation between 
the one that lacks some-thing (a bed where to sleep or a place 
where to throw garbage) and the thing itself. 
Design itself can be understood as a gesture of hospitality–hos-
tility; by enacting and inventing worlds, it inscribes significant dif-
ferences which are of harm or benefit to some beings or systems. 
Hospitality–hostility is not a program that unfolds mechanically 
on each case. Hospitality-hostility participates in the dimension 
that is the gift, otherwise there would not be invention, only re-
production of the same. Mauss’ pointing out Germanic languages’ 
dual meaning of the word gift as both, gift and poison, instantiates 
another manifestation of the logic of artefact-accident. An obliga-
tion (imposition) to exchange is produced once we get in contact 
with a given thing; by participating in its use12 we potentiate ac-
cidental forms of emergence. A device, designed and conceived 
to function in a ‘hospitable’ way will most likely become ‘hostile’ to 
some other actor or actant at a given point. Hospitality-hostility 
constitutes a (political) problem of thresholds and borders, be-
tween I and (the recognized) other. 
The re-cognition of otherness, including self-as-other, has 
profound ethical implications. Current studies of cognitive pat-
terns evidence that cognition results from a given perceptive 
coherency based on the cross correlation and working together 
of bodily functions. Thus, even small differences such as change 
of posture  in the same lightning conditions affect the neuronal 
responses that enact vision, our capacity to see (Varela 1999:47-
48). Cognition does not flow seamlessly; in contrast, it is formed 
by a succession of behavioural patterns. The slight change of 
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the re configuration of the known. Designer Kenya Hara speaks of 
exformation, which in his view, is a tactic for the defamiliarization 
or the strangening of something that we believe we ‘know’. For 
Hara, exformation is an operation performed as a counterpart to 
information, 
‘In’ is to ‘ex’ as ‘inform’ is to ‘exform’. In other words, I want to specu-
late on the form as well as the function of information, not for making 
things known, but for making things unknown.” (2008:376). 
Hara worked with students at Musashino Art University in To-
kyo to communicate the idea of exformation. One of the results 
of this collaboration was the ‘exformation’ of the Shimanto river 
in Japan. The images elaborated at the project show a composite 
of a full scale asphalt road and the surface of a river, which leads 
to the experience that the terrain as well as the movement of the 
river are perceived “with a reality beyond our expectations” (Hara 
2008:371). By means of our memory of asphalt roads, and our 
relation to them through cars, our perception of the size an flow 
of the river changes, through the unusual associations with car 
sizes and speed.
When talking about exformation, Kenya Hara never refers to 
science writer Tor Nørretranders, who had coined the term exfor-
mation previously.  In his book The User Illusion, Nørretranders’ 
notion addresses “discarded information”, that is, information that 
is not explicitly dealt with but meaningful in providing context to 
information. Biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer and theoretical bi-
ologist Claus Emmeche write: 
every time we create knowledge, we also – and by necessity – create 
non-knowledge. To make things visible, we make other things – or 
in a certain sense the same things – invisible. This creation of non-
knowledge, which by necessity accompanies any process of investiga-
tion, is in itself a legitimate reason for the very widespread uneasiness 
towards the scientifc project. (1991). 
In this work, however, the notion of exformation includes both, 
Hara’s and Nørretranders’ conceptions since they relate to the 
logic of the device, by explicitly dealing with what in-forms and 
what ex-forms; in this work, that which divides, arranges. And in 
this way, with the general conception of information as in-form-
ation as will be developed in “Devices”. 
One could say, that Front’s bin for Materia (Fig. 2.2) “makes 
an entrance for curiosity” as Hara would put it. It is in its defa-
miliarizing the average garbage bin that we experience a sense 
2.2 Bin - Designed 
by Front for the 
furniture manufacturer 
Materia.
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of wonder for its behaviour: the communicating of a ‘with’ and 
‘without’ garbage. Although performed by all containers, the re-
lationship nonetheless does not become explicitly communicated 
through the behaviour of these type of artefacts. The exforming 
act of its design exposes the weight and the pressure (that which 
is ex-formed, hidden) exercised in the relation content–container. 
DEVICES
As mentioned, etymologically, a device divides, that is, arranges, 
frames, organizes. It might arrange for example an environment, 
an activity, or a gesture; devices become the agents that medi-
ate a given relationship. The notion of device has been elaborated 
and developed in several contexts; I especially draw upon philoso-
pher Giorgio Agamben’s understanding of it, which is a particular 
elaboration of Michel Foucault’s notion of the term dispositif.13 As 
Agamben notes, Foucault never stated a clear definition of what 
a dispositif (apparatus) is14. In an interview from 1977, Foucault 
states: 
 
What I am trying to single out with this term is, first and foremost, a 
thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative meas-
ures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the 
elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that 
can be established between these elements […] by the term ‘appara-
tus’ I mean a kind of formation, so to speak, that at a given historical 
moment has as its major function the response to an urgency. The ap-
paratus therefore has a dominant strategic function […] I said that the 
nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we 
are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a 
rational and concrete intervention in the relation of forces, either so as 
to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize 
them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a 
play of power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge 
that arise from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is 
precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces supporting, 
and supported by, certain types of knowledge. (Foucault).15 
Here, Foucault refers to dispositifs as ‘strategies’, thus empha-
sizing the conscious plan behind these assemblages. In the course 
of this work however, I refer to them to emphasize the unknown, 
‘unconnected’, unplanned and the dividing. In other words, the 
conscious and the unconscious acts of the plan, project or devis-
ing process; the division of the device that leaves aside an ac-
tor likely or unlikely to come in contact with, thus pointing out 
at the potentiality, the ‘accidental’. At the same time, Foucault’s 
paragraph emphasizes the “forces supporting, and supported by, 
certain types of knowledge”. This is crucial, I believe, for under-
standing the hospitality-hostility that a given device might trigger, 
as we have seen through Höller’s installation (Fig. 2.1). 
Foucault’s apparatus, points at a (pre)conceived order, but 
when a device participates in the con-formation of a given en-
vironment, it establishes relations that are both expected and 
unexpected. A device has agency and forms assemblages with a 
given world, a given environment; some of these relations may 
have emergent properties, this is the reason why Agamben’s defi-
nition of an apparatus is closer to my understanding of the term. 
Agamben notes: 
 
Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, 
I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the ca-
pacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or se-
cure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings. 
Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, 
confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth 
(whose connection with power is in certain sense evident), but also 
the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navi-
gation, computers, cellular telephones and –why not- language itself, 
which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses... (2009:14). 
In the following section, we will look into language and some 
of its linguistic components as devices. For the moment, I would 
like to further expand the already expanded large class of appara-
tuses, by noting that all things can be understood as apparatuses 
or devices. We can say, things afford (Gibson 1979) possibilities of 
behaviour, thus, a stone offers shelter to the worm, separating it 
from the warming sun, the song of a bird distracts a human reader, 
rain mobilizes insects… having capacities to capture, orient, deter-
mine, intercept, model, control, and so on. In other words, we are 
structurally coupled with a given environment that we con-form, 
the affection of perceivable objects trigger possibilities of enac-
tion, including the bringing forth of worlds. 
At this level, the distinction between ‘natural’ things and ‘artifi-
cial’ artefacts/devices becomes irrelevant, since the possibilities 
not only of the ‘artificial’ but also the ‘natural’ can be understood 
as devices. However, being concerned with the production of the 
artificial, I refer to devices agreeing with Agamben’s conception, 
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behaviour, although, through their in-form-ation, they attempt 
to arrange or inscribe some possibilities rather than others. Also, 
when talking in terms of a “sacrificial economy”, the risk becomes 
that the word ‘sacrificial’ might be interpreted as a form of re-
nouncement or abstinence, as it is often found in discourses on 
ecology18. From my perspective, although the concept of device 
seems to introduce a negativity that derives from its associa-
tion with something that divides, thus something that subtracts, 
slices; what this ‘dividing’ does, is to introduce a difference that 
influences given systems or organisms in positive and negative 
terms. Thus, if the idea of sacrifice is to be accepted, it needs to 
be understood in more neutral grounds, where sacrifice stands for 
the effort that a human being makes in sustaining (consciously 
or not) a world-view. In this sense the device is understood in 
terms of what it makes available to humans as well as nonhumans 
throughout the whole of its life-cycle, as opposed to the specific 
human ‘sacrifices’ during the useful-cycle of the artefact. In this 
work, the notion of device co-relates to Latour’s often-quoted line 
by Gabriel De Tarde “To exist is to differ” (Latour 2005), and by 
extension, to make differences to those who interact with it.
Information as in-form-mation becomes a (perceivable) differ-
ence, which makes a difference. Jesper Hoffmeyer and Claus Em-
meche quote anthropologist and cyberneticist Gregory Bateson,
‘There are in the mind no objects or events - no pigs, no coconut 
palms, and no mothers. The mind contains only transforms, percepts, 
images, etc....It is nonsense to say that a man was frightened by a lion, 
because a lion is not an idea. The man makes an idea of the lion’ (Bate-
son 1972: 271). // According to Gregory Bateson information is based 
on difference. A sensory end organ is a comparator, a device which re-
sponds to difference. While reading this, for instance, your eyes do not 
respond to the ink, but to the multiple differences between the ink and 
the paper. // The number of potential differences in our surroundings, 
however, is infinite. Therefore, for differences to become information 
they must first be selected by some kind of ‘mind’, the recipient sys-
tem. Information, then, is difference which makes a difference (to that 
mind). (1991).19
Returning to the notion of hospitality-hostility, it can be said 
that the design act itself can always be understood as an act of 
hospitality, as a gesture that consists of the enactment or mate-
rialization of an idea to be used by a human being. A designer de-
cides a specific height of the door-knob (itself an item that offers 
possibilities of behaviour, like any other component), which would 
allow some (people), let us imagine that most, to be able to open 
where apparatuses “capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, 
control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discours-
es of living beings”.
The notion of device acknowledges the power —hence mor-
als— manifested through any artefact16. This agency however, 
needs to be understood, as political scientist Jane Bennett points 
out, as “distributive agency”, distinguishing between (willed) 
agency and a (subject-less) distributive agency.
  
In the tradition that defines agency as moral capacity, such new ef-
fects are understood as having arisen in the wake of an advanced plan 
or an intention, for agency ‘involves not mere motion, but willed or 
intended motion, where motion can only be willed or intended by a 
subject. A theory of distributive agency, in contrast, does not posit 
a subject as the root cause of an effect. There are instead always a 
swarm of vitalities at play. (Bennett 2010:31-32). 
This distinction has important implications in this work, partly 
due to ecological concerns, and also, as we have seen, since ac-
cident, as that which happens without control, is inscribed in the 
potentialities of an assemblage17. From a biological perspective, 
distributive agency also helps us understand a (human) subject as 
assemblage in relation to human and nonhuman assemblages, as 
when conceiving the emergent property of the human self (Varela 
1999). Regarding the assemblages that we conform with devices 
design theorist Cameron Tonkinwise mentions, 
A device allows me to focus on some aspect of the world only by hid-
ing other aspects of the world. There is therefore always some kind of 
sacrifice to any technology, something that is given up to attain new 
powers. Critical theorists of technology worry about how little atten-
tion we pay to the world-obscuring aspects of technology devices; we 
do not seem to miss what we are missing when we uncritically accept 
what this or that piece of technology enables us to do. But this very 
point indicates that innovative designs almost never present them-
selves in terms of this sacrificial economy. Designs simply declare 
what they make possible; they manifest their value, never all the sup-
posed sacrifices that one is going to have to make to access that value 
(learning new interactions, buying new peripherals, becoming a differ-
ent kind of person, etc). Designs, presented in these non-comparative 
ways, offer themselves for voluntaristic affirmation. (2011). 
Sharing this view, one should be careful to note that unless 
talking of advertising campaigns, designs do not “simply declare” 
what they make possible. Devices trigger, allow possibilities of [Boundaries 73]
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humans and although we can sometimes, and to some extent, 
choose who to share our life with, as in the case of choosing a hu-
man partner or living close to friends or family, we cannot choose 
who to cohabit the earth with. This cohabitation implies complex 
ecological inter-dependencies of systems and organisms at local 
and planetary level. Interdependencies which humans have ex-
ponentially de-stabilized.21 Human bodies, like any other systems 
and organisms, have degrees of resilience, they are vulnerable, 
precarious. Along this line of reasoning, philosopher Judith Butler 
elaborates an ethical perspective based on the principle of pre-
carity, understood as body vulnerability. 
Precarity only makes sense if we are able to identify as clearly political 
issues bodily dependency and need, hunger and the need for shelter, 
the vulnerability to injury and destruction, forms of social trust that 
let us live and thrive, and the passions linked to our very persistence. 
(Butler 2011:19). 
Butler extends the anthropocentrism of an ethics of cohabita-
tion to an ecological ethics, arguing that 
every inhabitant who belongs to a community belongs also to the 
earth, and this implies a commitment not only to every other inhabit-
ant of that earth, but we can surely add, to sustaining the earth itself. 
(2011:13).
In this way, Butler echoes some of the claims of Bruno Latour’s 
Politics of Nature, in trying to articulate and to bring together 
a “collective” of humans and nonhumans invoking and pointing 
out the political difficulties of what philosopher of science Isabelle 
Stengers calls “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”. Through this pro-
posal, Stengers affirms, 
the inseparability of the ethos, the way of behaving peculiar to a being, 
and oikos, the habitat of that being and the way in which that habitat 
satisfies or opposes the demands associated with the ethos or affords 
opportunities for an original ethos to risk itself.22
By placing human manifestations within this cosmo-political 
and etho-ecological domain, Stengers retains the word “politi-
cal”, as something “signed” by humans, in opposition to a pseudo 
“neutral” anthropological category. The idea of the cosmos, is not 
that of the existence of a “good common world”, but of a slow-
ing down of the construction of this common world. No ‘good’ 
definition of a ‘good’ common world can be achieved. At stake 
it, provided that they come into contact with the door. Excluded 
from that possibility would be short children, and perhaps, even 
people with some form of disability. It is here where the notion 
of device —that which divides, organises, arranges— becomes 
explicitly relevant to the understanding of hospitality–hostility. As 
I have been suggesting, this gesture, in order to apply to the more 
pervasive forms of hospitality–hostility addressed in this work, 
must be developed following an ecological sensibility. This will ac-
count for the inclusion not only of humans, but also nonhumans.
Generally speaking, artificial environments afford human beings 
with lifestyles that involve less effort than natural ones.20 Ecologi-
cally, a sacrificial logic, understood in terms of effort rather than 
renouncement or abstinence, can be of help to conceive that in 
design terms, as philosopher John Rajchman suggests, 
 
The problem of autri, of being with others, then becomes one of con-
structing spaces owned by no one, allowing disparate points of view 
to coexist in the absence of any ‘architectonic’ system or harmony. 
(1998:96). 
Thus, we could ask ourselves: what constructions allow for 
sacrificing the least while including the most? Once again, ‘the 
most’ is not ‘all’. The devising slices, arranges. 
In the context of this work, machines, artefacts, and appara-
tuses are devices, in their quality of arranging, disposing a given 
partition. As we have seen, although the Foucaultian term dis-
positif has been rendered into English as apparatus, the French 
word can designate any sort of device; a dispositif is precisely 
that, something that disposes, arranges.
By considering these things devices, what I highlight is the di-
viding, the sorting out rather than the ‘solutions’ of a given archi-
tectural proposal, ‘consumer product’, law, and so on. Addressing 
the inclusions and exclusions of the results and the devising pro-
cess itself.
WHOSE WORST-CASE-SCENARIO?
Psychoanalyst and philosopher Julia Kristeva quotes the cosmo-
politans of the French Revolution, “Hospitality means the right of 
a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the 
land of another” and then asks “Whence would such generosity 
follow? Quite simply… because the earth is round: naturally there-
fore, inevitably” (1991:172). 
Inevitably, we cohabit the earth with other humans and non-
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‘information excluded’) becomes the other side of the coin of in-
form-ation. The differences that can be valued differ from being 
to being, depending on the ecological niche of the organism in 
question. In spite of both being mammals, our human perception 
of environments at night greatly differs from that of the bat which 
navigates it mainly by means of sound. 
Design (the devising process) implies acts of inscriptions, in-
clusions and exclusions, where the device becomes a particular 
manifestation of human assumptions and concerns.
Devices cannot be de-scribed in general terms, only in ecologi-
cal relationships, hence the need to acknowledge the partition-
ing, the devising process and the choices and decisions made, 
which inevitably take part for a group of actors/actants while dis-
criminating others. The notion of device does not designate what 
something is or can be (what is ‘out there’), but how the entity 
recognized arranges a partition, a division. 
Understanding cognition as enaction becomes a crucial fac-
tor in the perception of hospitality-hostility. This matters to the 
discussion of design and design thinking since devices prescribe 
domains of interaction of ecological proportions, which are always 
fragmentary and fragmenting. Thus, when a given device has been 
conceived keeping in mind ‘user-friendliness’ (human hospitality 
to humans) it embodies a form of knowledge that ignores count-
less actors at alternative situations and scales. ‘User-friendliness’ 
also enacts and inscribes forms of hostility, to humans and non-
humans. 
By considering machines, artefacts, and apparatuses as devic-
es, what I emphasize is the dividing, the sorting out rather than 
the ‘solutions’ of a given architectural proposal, ‘consumer prod-
uct’, law, and so on. Addressing the pre-scriptions and in-scrip-
tions, inclusions and exclusions of the results and the devising 
process itself, and in this way the ethical domain in which design 
operates in its recognition (or not) of other beings and systems.
From the devising follows the device which arranges, parti-
tions. The next section entitled “Unfolding” explores how we 
think relations through language, and how the languaging process 
affects the process of devising and our perception of the ecologi-
cal relations of the artefacts produced. It develops thus the notion 
of cognition as enactment, by looking into how these languaging 
procedures bring forth worlds by concrete action.
are the problems originated by human knowledge, its practices, 
technical equipment, and judgements which have repercussions 
that are global.23
In order to understand the multiple levels where hospitality-
hostility manifests itself, one should be aware of the ecologi-
cal interrelations among panarchies,24 or ecosystem hierarchies 
where a given eco-system provides (hosts)25 the conditions and 
the possibilities of existence of an-other. Design, as the manifes-
tation of the artificial, plays a significant role by enacting a sub-
ject’s ‘willed’ agency  through a human social group that influ-
ences not only those humans, in the triggering of behaviour, but 
also the environments throughout the processes of the life-cycles 
of these devices. Once again, assemblages which are per-formed 
and transformed through the interrelations of a triple ecological 
register —psychological, social, and environmental.
Traditionally, the threat of nature in its otherness, reminded us 
of our body vulnerability, affecting us in such a way that,
To achieve their universal design solutions, manufacturers design for a 
worst-case scenario; they design a product for the worst possible cir-
cumstance, so that it will always operate with the same efficacy. This 
aim guarantees the largest possible market for a product. It also re-
veals human industry’s peculiar relationship to the natural world, since 
designing for the worst case at all times reflects the assumption that 
nature is the enemy. (McDonough and Braungart 2002:30) 
Nature, which historically has been considered as otherness 
par excellence, has relatively recently become vulnerable, “fragil-
ity has just changed sides” (Serres, 1995:20). 
HOSTING IN SHORT
The word hostis, meaning both, a guest, and an enemy, implies 
the presence, the existence of an-other, of a foreign actor and 
indicates the possibility of hospitality-hostility. Knowing whether 
someone or something might potentially become one or the oth-
er depends on the conditions of the relationship established; its 
many parameters such as place, time, and history of interactions. 
Implicit in this relation is a capacity to value (or not) the other as 
different.
Information, being a “difference that makes a difference” to 
someone or something, implies an umwelt, an etho-ecological 
way of being of a particular organism in a given habitat. By dis-
criminating, valuing some things and not others, exformation (as 
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The totality of the causes of evil is the totality of relations… 
to know what these are one has only to describe the network of 
prepositions. 
Michel Serres
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RELATION AS ACCIDENT
Architect and technology theorist Paul Virilio has mentioned, 
 
Since I have a Judeo-Christian religious background, it is obvious to 
me that one must link any definition of the accident to the idea of 
original sin. The content of this idea is merely that any person has the 
potential to become a monster. Now, this idea of original sin, which 
materialist philosophy rejects so forcefully, comes back to us through 
technology: the accident is the original sin of the technical object. 
Every technical object contains its own negativity. It is impossible to 
invent a pure, innocent object, just as there is no innocent human be-
ing. It is only through acknowledged guilt that progress is possible. 
Just as it is through the recognized risk of the accident that it is pos-
sible to improve the technical object.1 
Here again, this time through Virilio’s point of view, we sense a 
constitutive aspect of the logic of the sacrificial (negativity, guilt). 
The sacrificial however, should be understood as effort rather 
than renouncement. Which implies that what is produced has a 
cost in terms of energy (usually required for the ‘performing’ of a 
combination of machines, humans and nonhumans), with its cor-
respondent impact on the environment. But also, that whatever 
choice we make demands an effort: a social and psychological in-
vestment to achieve desired forms of knowledge and behaviour. 
The demands of the interfaces of new electronic devices are the 
most evident examples; the phenomenon however, is pervasive. 
One can think of the way a simple t-shirt might affect someone’s 
behaviour. How, for example, a teenager might identify with a 
certain group, fashion, or subculture, and how the t-shirt might 
embody some of the values that relate to this group through a 
material feel, fit, set of colours and so on, creating a renewed 
sense of self perception, attachment and cultural heritage. We 
can imagine that this type of process of individuation might create 
an assemblage such as: perfume-convertible car-electronic mu-
sic band-clean black t-shirts-suburban garage scenes-at night. 
Among the countless instances where efforts are made to main-
tain and regenerate such lifestyle, there are the occasions where 
keeping the t-shirt clean might require washing it at say 60 de-
grees. Washing at that temperature2 —to take one single aspect 
of it— causes a chemical called nonylfenol to be released from 
the t-shirt to the sewage. This chemical, already known as “ex-
tremely poisonous to water organisms” (Prevodnik 2008), is used 
in the production phase of the t-shirt as a dilutant in most t-shirts 
in the market in Sweden, and can still be found on sewage in the 
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waters of Stockholm 20 years after it has been released. Around 
46 tons (from 310000 tons of textiles) were imported to Sweden 
in 2006. Among other effects of nonylfenol, recent studies found 
a hormone related feminisation of male frogs. This change of sex-
ual behaviour —which affects all water species and not only the 
frogs— affects in its turn, the water conditions of the Baltic sea.3
 The emergence (the accident) of the relation t-shirt-frog 
through the assemblage formed by teenage desire becomes, in its 
psychological, social, and environmental complexity, overwhelm-
ing; especially if in the short or long term, some of the compo-
nents is hazardous to some form of life.
At the same time, one should not forget the accident’s reveal-
ing of our perceptive constraints. In spite of its negativity, Virilio 
ascribes positive value to the accident. As such, the accident re-
veals something that we would not be able to perceive, becom-
ing a “miracle in reverse”, being a “gift brought before the eyes” 
(Virilio and Lotringer 2005:63). Not all accidents are destructive; 
or more precisely, what is destroyed yields way to new forms, new 
lives; being at the same time, constructive, creative4. A broken 
wine-glass (made of the material glass) would no longer afford 
containing the same (or any) amount of liquid, but it will afford 
tearing apart, cutting softer objects such as paper napkins. Thus 
the affordances of the useful tool (glass to contain liquid) may 
be thwarted, but its materiality continues to afford possibilities 
of behaviour. A transition from order to disorder and vice-versa 
that points out a phenomenon that Yuri Lotman has called explo-
sion. Lotman’s explosion is not a physical phenomenon (dynamite, 
the atomic nucleus, etc.) but a philosophical concept associated 
with the idea of transformation and generation. The moment of 
the explosion is also the place of a sudden increase of informativ-
ity; information about the latent state of things, their tendencies, 
their possibilities (Lotman 1999:28). The explosion is unpredict-
able, but if considered once it has happened, in retrospective, it 
changes the object observed: seen from the past into the future, 
we see the present as a set of all sort of possibilities equally prob-
able. When looking to the past, it acquires the status of ‘fact’ and 
we are inclined to see in it a single possibility (Lotman 1999:172); 
the explosion seems to us logical since the information has been 
assimilated into knowledge. “Once technical objects are stabi-
lized they become instruments of knowledge” writes Madeleine 
Akrich (in Bijter and Law 1992:221) referring to the breakdown 
situation, where “there is a failure that reveals the inner working 
of the setup”. Illustrating how the instability of a system becomes 
‘informative’. 
Virilio has written that “the beginning of wisdom would be to 
acknowledge the symmetry of substance and accident instead of 
constantly dissimulating it”5. Following this logic with the inten-
tion to move on beyond what was said in the introduction, namely 
that when we create a car, we are simultaneously creating the 
possibility of the car crash. What is interesting at this point is to 
ask ourselves: what are the implications of thinking in terms of 
this particular set of words: substance-accident? Since the word 
“symmetry” implies a form of ‘alignment’ that ‘bring things to-
gether’, a particular form of relationship, we could start by asking: 
what does it mean to relate, to ‘put’ these things ‘together’? Re-
late suggests that which has reference to something, from referre 
(re + ferre: to bring) to carry back, bringing into, establishing an 
association, a connection. By means of a so-called natural lan-
guage such as English, we conceive these associations through 
prepositions. 
We say that such and such things are related in a specific way, 
that for example, the bin is on the floor, or that it is beside the 
door, or across the corridor and so on. In grammatical terms, 
prepositions link nouns, pronouns and phrases to other words in 
a sentence, while indicating a temporal, spatial or logical relation-
ship. 
Philosopher Michel Serres’ opening quote to this section draws 
our attention to this particular function of language mediated by 
prepositions6: the defining, enacting or determining of relation-
ship.
But relating, having reference to something seems not to be es-
sential to the thing it refers to, that is, it is not one of the proper-
ties that constitute what something is, but how this thing relates 
to other things. Distinguishing between what is essential and ac-
cidental leads us back to Aristotle whose philosophy divided Being 
into substance (‘what’) and accident (‘how’: modalities, proper-
ties, accidents of the substances). In his accident categories we 
find:
Quality: sensible characteristics of a substance (e.g., colours 
and sounds), shape, active and passive powers, dispositions, habits. 
Quantity: dimensions of a substance (continuous quantity, 
e.g., lines, surfaces:   the subject-matter of geometry); number 
(discrete quantity:  the subject-matter of arithmetic).
Relation: how a substance stands with respect to other sub-
stances (mother of, teacher of, to the left of, bigger than, etc.).
Where: place.
When: temporal characteristics.
Action (acting): what a substance is doing.
Passion (being acted upon): what is being done to a substance.
Having: what the substance has on (e.g., clothes, makeup. 
[Proposing a... 151]
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Position (or posture): how a substance’s parts are ordered with 
respect to one another.7 
Interestingly, the Latin substantia substance, essence (lit., that 
which stands under, i.e., underlies) grounds and sustains acciden-
tal properties. If Maria is pale and small —and we cannot avoid 
seeing her as pale and small— the existence/being/substance of 
Maria underlies and sustains (and is partly revealed by) the ac-
cidental properties. This substantia, that which ‘sub stat’, that lies 
under, grounds and sustains accidental properties, becoming thus 
the pre-position of prepositions. 
It is relevant thus that not only relation, but also position falls 
within the Aristotelian accident categories, since prepositions 
pre-establish, pre-figure or pre-define a position (temporal, spa-
tial, logical) in relation to. 
Manuel DeLanda points out that Gilles Deleuze has tackled the 
issue by proposing  
 
that we get rid of the dichotomy between the essential and the ac-
cidental, affirming that everything is accidental, but distinguishing in 
the latter between the ordinary and the singular (or the special, the 
remarkable, the important). As he [Deleuze] writes: ‘It will be said that 
the essence is by nature the most ‘important’ thing. This, however, is 
precisely what is at issue: whether notions of importance and non-im-
portance are not precisely notions which concern events or accidents, 
and are much more ‘important’ within accidents than the crude op-
position between essence and accident itself. The problem of thought 
is tied not to essences but to the evaluation of what is important and 
what is not, to the distribution of the singular and regular, distinctive 
and ordinary points, which takes place entirely within the unessential 
or within the description of a multiplicity, in relation to the ideal events 
that constitute the conditions of a problem’.8
Deleuze, by shifting from the distinction between essence and 
accident to “the problem of thought” (that of evaluation), pro-
poses a philosophy that emphasizes the particular relations with 
an ‘object of study’; indicating its ecological implications, as well 
as the positions taken when a thought performance occurs. Since 
we cannot but think with a language, through language, the un-
derstanding of the performative operations of prepositions, reveal 
this connecting, this ‘tying’ of things to one another; without this 
activity we would not be able to neither classify nor order our 
worlds. 
RELATION AS ORDER
Language is never neutral; any so-called natural language implies 
ways of understanding and perceiving the world. Languages are 
modelling systems; they are means not only for communication 
but also modellization.9 Partly, as cognitive linguist George Lakoff 
points out, what is important is to understand that most symbols, 
such as words and mental representations do not designate par-
ticular things or individuals in the world such as the Eiffel tower or 
Louis Armstrong,   
Most of our words and concepts designate categories. Some of these 
are categories of things or beings in the physical world –chairs and 
zebras, for example. Others are categories of activities and abstract 
things –singing and songs, voting and governments, etc. (1987:xiii) 
Understanding the constructed, artificial and cultural nature of 
categories through words is vital to gain insight into the logical 
and performative implications of a given natural language.10 Lakoff 
argues that 
human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experi-
ence and imagination – of perception, motor activity, and culture on 
the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the 
other. (1987:8) 
Thus, “to change the concept of a category is to change not 
only our concept of the mind, but also our understanding of the 
world.” (1987:9). 
Looking into the word accident in its everyday use, being ac-
cident, a notion (and a category) that allows chance and causality 
to coexist, it is possible to perceive a particular viewpoint, an or-
der of things. If language —through prepositions (in combination 
with verbs, nouns, etc.)— plays a con-forming role; by which pro-
cedure can we use it to influence our understanding of the world? 
Is it an accident that the milk has fallen in the glass? We tend to 
answer: no. An accident would be if the milk has fallen outside the 
glass. In these two sentences the accident is defined as such by 
a particular instrumental view where we assume specific actors, 
cultural contexts and times. The milk falling in the glass becomes 
no accident, because we assume someone, a human agent, pour-
ing it from a package (that has possibly been stored in a fridge), 
who wants to drink it. Following the same implicit assumptions, 
the milk falling outside the glass becomes an accident, since our 
human agent has missed the target (glass for example) and has 
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spilled the milk, wasting a valuable good. What if we were to chal-
lenge these assumptions by replacing the prepositions used in the 
sentences?
If we think in terms of positions, of pre-positions and preposi-
tions, it is possible to better understand the framing, the syntag-
matic assemblages implicit in our (world)views. 
Let us consider the following sentences:
The milk is on the glass.
The milk is under the glass. 
The milk is against the glass. 
The milk is before the glass.
Each of these variations suggests a particular view, a particular 
perception of the relation between the elements in question and 
its imagined context. If we speak of ‘milk’ as the white liquid that 
infants normally drink, and not —by metonymy— of the generali-
zation ‘milk’ that stands for both the liquid and its package, then: 
“The milk is on the glass” may suggest a fallen glass with the milk 
spilled on to it, while “The milk is against the glass” may suggest 
a sense of physical gravity, a poetical sensibility at work.
If we look instead at the Aristotelian notion and category of ac-
cident, we perceive that the same phrases: milk on, under, against, 
before the glass, do not affect the notion of (or the real) ‘milk’, or 
rather that the milk does not affect the other bodies until we start 
imagining for example, that the milk under the glass implies an 
absorbing material such as wood, where eventually a process of 
evaporation will take place, separating the water molecules from 
the ‘milk’, or rather, the components that in combination with wa-
ter, one distinguishes as ‘milk’. As such, an operation which re-
quires a contextualization of the ‘substance’ in question, and thus, 
an inevitable combination with the accidental categories. The key 
criteria being a perspective —human scale— and a given percep-
tion of ‘substances’ as given, as ‘out there’. Such logic presents 
difficulties when contextualizing specific elements (‘milk’) in an 
ecological framework that considers relation to acting and affect-
ing bodies and processes. As von Uexküll suggests, in relation to 
other beings, things are carriers of meaning: if someone grabs a 
stone that lies on a path to scare away a barking dog, and man-
ages with a throw to get rid of the dog, no one would doubt that 
the stone is, afterwards, still the same stone. 
Neither the shape, nor the weight, nor other physical and chemical 
properties of the stone have changed. Its color, its hardness, its crys-
tal formations have all stayed the same -and yet it has undergone a 
fundamental transformation: it has changed its meaning. (von Uexküll 
2010:140).
 
Transformation which implies our perceiving it from a “path 
stone” to a “throwing stone”. Becoming thus a carrier of meaning, 
once it enters into a relationship with an organism, in this case, a 
human. Following von Uexküll and considering our milk-glass ex-
ample, we could imagine that we have a glass that is transparent 
and cylindrical. We could insert the glass into a wall of a house, 
transforming it into a window, letting sunlight to come in and mak-
ing difficult for passers-by to seeing inside. The glass could also 
be put on the table, filled with water and used as a flower vase. 
None of these uses change the properties of the artefact,
But as soon as it has transformed itself into a carrier of meaning such 
as “window” or “vase”, a distinction of properties according to their 
rank becomes apparent. For the window, transparency is the “leading” 
property, whereas curvature represents a supporting property. For the 
vase, on the contrary, curvature is the leading property and transpar-
ency the supporting property. // Through this example, we can gain 
some understanding of why the Scholastics divided the properties 
of objects into essentia and accidentia. They only ever had carriers 
of meaning in mind, whereas the properties of relationless objects 
have no gradations. Only the tighter or looser binding of the carrier 
of meaning to the subject allows for the separation of properties into 
leading (essential = essentia) and supporting (nonessential = acciden-
tia). (von Uexküll 2010:141).11
As sentient human beings participating in and with an environ-
ment, and keeping in mind Deleuze’s suggestion that everything 
is ‘accidental’, we need to better understand the singularity of the 
perceptions that we are capable of conceiving through the use of 
language. Sentences such as ‘the milk is under the glass’ might 
point at a syntagmatic shift, that pushes us to reevaluate experi-
ence, and at a reconfiguration of preconceived boundaries that 
might lead to a less anthropocentric perspective.
BOUNDARIES
Studying ‘mechanisms’ by which cultures establish differences 
among each other, semiotician Yuri Lotman points out that 
One of the primary mechanisms of semiotic individuation is the 
boundary, and the boundary can be defined as the outer limit of a 
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first-person form. This space is ‘ours’, ‘my own’, it is ‘cultured’, ‘safe’, 
‘harmoniously organized’ and so on. By contrast ‘their space’ is ‘other’, 
‘hostile’, ‘dangerous’, ‘chaotic’. (1990:131)12  
Although interdependent with culture, the physical and biologi-
cal relations in which we find ourselves immersed in and are part 
of, play a significant role in defining, constraining our possibilities 
to think and reason.13 
A distinctive characteristic of the human cognitive model is its 
capacity to languaging as Maturana and Varela suggest. As we 
have seen, whenever a question is stated, there are distinctions 
being made, as well as criteria for those distinctions being implic-
itly or explicitly formulated. For this reason, it is important to try 
to understand the implications of the distinctions that our (hu-
man) organisms are capable of doing, of organizing. To begin with, 
the distinction between living and nonliving beings implies an idea 
of a given organization. 
‘Organization’ signifies those relations that must be present in order 
for something to exist. For me to judge that this object is a chair, I 
have to recognize a certain relationship between the parts I call legs, 
back, and seat, in such a way that sitting down is made possible. That 
it is made of wood and nails, or plastic and screws, has nothing to do 
with my classifying it as a chair. This situation, in which we recognize 
implicitly or explicitly the organization of an object when we indicate 
it or distinguish it, is universal in the sense that it is something we do 
constantly as a basic cognitive act, which consists no more and no 
less than in generating classes of any type. Thus the class of ‘chairs’ 
is defined by the relations required for me to classify something as a 
chair. […] When we speak of living beings, we presuppose something 
in common between them […] our position is that living beings are 
characterized in that, literally, they are continually self-producing. We 
indicate this process when we call the organization that defines them 
an autopoietic organization. (Maturana and Varela 1998:42-43).
Maturana and Varela identify that a feature distinctive of cel-
lular dynamics in living organisms compared to other molecular 
transformations in natural processes is that 
the cell metabolism produces components which make up the net-
work of transformations that produce them. Some of these compo-
nents form a boundary, a limit to these networks of transformations. 
In morphologic terms, the structure that makes this cleavage possi-
ble is called a membrane. Now, this membranous boundary is not a 
product of cell metabolism in the way that fabric is the product of 
A
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3.1 As in Maturana and 
Varela 1998:46, 74.
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a fabric-making machine. The reason is that this membrane not only 
limits the extension of the transformation network that produced its 
own components but it participates in the network. If it did not have 
this spatial arrangement, cell metabolism would disintegrate in a mo-
lecular mess that would spread out all over and would not constitute 
a discrete unit such as a cell. What we have, then, is a unique situa-
tion as regards relations of chemical transformations: on the one hand, 
we see a network of dynamic transformations that produces its own 
components and that is essential for a boundary; on the other hand, 
we see a boundary that is essential for the operation of the network 
of transformations which produced it as unity [Fig. 3.1-A]. Note that 
these are not sequential processes, but two different aspects of a uni-
tary phenomenon. (1998:42-46). 
Thus, an autopoietic organization is an organization which 
is capable of self production (from the Greek auto: “self”, and 
poiesis: “a making”). The ontogeny (the history of the structural 
changes) of autopoietical unities results from the continuous in-
teraction with an environment. Autopoietical units become struc-
turally coupled through a history of recurrent interactions, lead-
ing to the structural congruence between two or more systems. 
(Maturana and Varela 1998:75). 
Maturana and Varela have diagrammed the coupling of a unity 
as in figure 3.1-B1. When considering the ontogeny of more than 
one unity, the corresponding diagram is that of figure 3.1-B2.
The notion of structural coupling is valid for all kind of system, 
living and non-living. One can speak of the structural coupling of 
a car with a city and the mutual perturbations/changes that each 
system triggers on the other. Think of the small cars populating 
the centre of Rome in contrast to the wide four-wheel-drive vehi-
cles of northern Scandinavia. As living beings do, if what is typical 
of a region is the presence of snow, cars will manifest features 
conceived to better function (behave) in these conditions. One 
important aspect of Maturana and Varela’s notion is that the envi-
ronments or systems that a system interacts with never specifies 
a particular behaviour; environments and systems trigger behav-
iour, which is conditioned by the capabilities of the autopoietic 
structure, and vice versa (1998:75). Thus, the car’s structural 
coupling will —at that particular moment in history— material-
ize a range of possibilities within the materials and processes of 
the system itself, responses to the ‘problem’ of snow. These may 
result, in the case of tyres for example, in components developed 
with softer versions of rubber, with the consequent environmental 
pollution.
The human body —as any autopoietical organization— is a re-
sult of a legacy of structural coupling in and with an environment. 
Human cognition pertains to the biological domain while it is lived 
in a cultural tradition, and in spite of a multiplicity of cultural tradi-
tions, regularities can be observed. Lotman writes,
 
Human consciousness forms its model of the world from such con-
stants as the rotation of the earth (the movements of the sun across 
the horizon), the movements of the stars, and the natural cycle of 
the seasons. No less important are the constants of the human body, 
which posit certain relationships with the outside world. The meas-
urements of the human body determine the fact that the world of 
mechanics and its laws seem ‘natural’, while the world of particles and 
cosmic space can be conceived of only speculatively and with extraor-
dinary mental effort. The correlation between average human weight, 
the force of gravity and the vertical position of the body have resulted 
in what is universal for all human cultures: the opposition of up and 
down. (1990:132).
This paragraph resonates with cognitive linguists George La-
koff and Mark Johnson’s studies where the authors propose that 
our conceptual system is largely metaphorical; that is where —
for example— expressions of spatial orientation such as up-down, 
front-back, on-off, centre-periphery, and near-far provide the ba-
sis for understanding.
Thus, Lakoff and Johnson explain how up is ‘good’ and down is 
‘bad’, as in: hitting a peak last year, being downhill ever since… or 
how up is ‘happy’ while down is ‘sad’: being in high spirits, falling 
into a depression… This metaphorical register depends on expe-
riential bases, 
 
…no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately repre-
sented independently of its experiential basis. […] Though the concept 
up is the same in all these metaphors, the experiences on which these 
up metaphors are based are very different. It is not that there are many 
different ups; rather, verticality enters our experience in many differ-
ent ways and so gives rise to many different metaphors. (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999:19). 
In this context, the importance of the notion of boundary partly 
lies in the human-centred nature of these perceptions, 
 
When things are not clearly discrete or bounded, we still categorize 
them as such […] Human purposes typically require us to impose artifi-
cial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete just as we are: 
entities bounded by a surface. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999:25). 
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Categories bring forth a world. The understanding of the role of 
boundaries of ‘human consciousness’ is of relevance, since prepo-
sitions act as ‘bridges’, ‘linking’ entities (bounded and identified 
as such). Maturana and Varela mention “By existing, we generate 
cognitive ‘blind spots’ that can be cleared only through generat-
ing new blind spots in another domain” (1998:242). What we can 
do, according to them, is generate explanations through language 
that reveal a mechanism of bringing forth a world.
RELATING BY LANGUAGING
It is important to keep in mind that we are specifying a linguistic 
(human) experience through so-called natural languages in order 
to address the displacements that prepositions might mediate. 
This emphasis on language however, should not be understood 
as giving predominance to language as a mode of cognition; one 
should conceive human bodies as “post-kinetic”, where “the fun-
damental concepts of language are anticipated in the experiential 
dynamics of corporeal movements” as argued by Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone14. As we have seen, human consciousness forms mod-
els from the constants of the body and the environment. It is 
through this structural coupling with the environment that human 
language came into being. Maturana and Varela mention, 
 
We humans, as humans, exist in the network of structural couplings 
that we continually weave [...] Language was never invented by any-
one only to take in an outside world. Therefore, it cannot be used as 
a tool to reveal that world. Rather, it is by languaging that the act 
of knowing, in the behavioural coordination which is language, brings 
forth a world.”15 
Natural languages imply displacements of sense, what Deleuze 
and Guattari have called deterritorializations16, which become re-
territorialized in language, the body, society, the biosphere as a 
whole. Language, Deleuze would claim, “exists only as a reaction 
to a non-linguistic material, which it transforms.”17 In this dialogue 
(deterritorialization-reterritorialization) language does not be-
come “embodied”, it is important to understand these manifes-
tations as enaction, where a process is realized, brought forth. 
The risk of talking in terms of “embodiment” in relation to living 
beings, is to perpetuate a Cartesian divide between self/subject 
and body. 
 
When calling something embodied one has already presupposed some 
essential belonging to a de-corporealized hypothetic domain of reality 
that could, in principle, be somehow separated from the body. But how 
can anything be embodied if it is itself a body? (Hoffmeyer 2008:301).
The capacity to communicate through language is not exclusive 
to the human species, this is where the notion of languaging as 
a form of human enaction differentiates from other animals. Even 
well known linguistic examples such as bees’ ‘language’18 does 
not constitute language in Maturana and Varela’s terms, since in 
their understanding, there is language when there is “communica-
tion about communication”. According to Fritjof Capra, Humberto 
Maturana illustrated this meaning of language with a hypothetical 
communication between a cat and her owner,
Suppose that every morning my cat meows and runs to the refrigera-
tor. I follow her, take out some milk, pour it into a bowl, and the cat 
begins to lap it up. That is communication -a coordination of behaviour 
through recurrent mutual interactions, or mutual structural couplings. 
Now suppose that one morning I don’t follow the meowing cat be-
cause I know that I’ve run out of milk. If the cat were somehow able 
to communicate to me something like ‘Hey, I’ve now meowed three 
times; where’s my milk?’, that would be language. Her reference to her 
previous meowing would constitute a communication about a commu-
nication. (Capra 1996:280-281).
 
In this sense, the ‘language’ would qualify as languaging. At 
the same time, we cannot be too certain of the degrees of com-
municative interaction among other organisms. Examples can be 
found in a life-long series of recordings as well as recent studies 
by musician and bio-acoustician Bernie Krause that reveal phe-
nomena that the human ear is unable to register. Among Krause’s 
recordings there are cotton trees’s ‘talking’, that is, their signal-
ling their process of exuding fluids which attracts certain insects, 
and in their turn, birds to the tree resulting in mutually beneficial 
forms of symbioses.19 It is well known that blue whales have big-
ger brains than humans, and that their capacity to communicate 
under the water reaches thousands of kilometres, science writer 
Dorion Sagan comments,
The threshold of pain to the human ear is 120 to 130 decibels. A jet 
engine is about 140 decibels. Concert music, at its loudest, is 150 deci-
bels. Blue whales, comparatively, belt out their vocals at 188 decibels. 
Their communications are time-delayed because of water. They may, 
in their giant Umwelten, have fabulous multisensory pictures of major 
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portions of the ocean, images that, even if we had direct access to 
them, we couldn’t process, because our brains are too small.20 
Cats may not be able to perform such languaging operations, 
but other primates such as chimpanzees, by creating new expres-
sions by combining signs, seem to blur and thus point at a need 
not to distinguish these two modes (language-languaging) too 
sharply.
one of the chimps, named Lucy, invented several signs combinations: 
‘fruit-drink’ for watermelon, ‘food-cry-strong’ for radish, and ‘open-
drink-eat’ for refrigerator. One day when Lucy got very upset upon 
seeing that her human ‘parents’ were getting ready to leave, she 
turned to them and signed ‘Lucy cry’. By making this statement about 
her crying she evidently communicated something about communica-
tion. (Capra, 1996:281). 
 
With regard to these studies Maturana and Varela write “It 
seems to us, that at that point, Lucy is languaging” (1998:215). 
Through the process of languaging, as a displacement of sense 
that brings forth a world, human beings use prepositions to de-
fine: what is outside, inside, above, below, before... Acts which 
influence our perception of relations. As such, as Agamben sug-
gests, any so-called natural language can be understood as a 
device. Although it can be said —metaphorically at least— that 
even though language is less discrete or bounded than other de-
vices such as chairs, bins, books, or toys could be; it still (per)
forms arrangements, specific forms of displacements. It is impor-
tant to note that although I am considering language as a device, 
what I mainly point out is the capacity of natural languages to 
model, to organize worlds. Once again, natural languages should 
be understood in their dynamism, as forms of enaction, as pro-
cess, as languaging.
What if we look instead at the way material artefacts define 
relation as language? Can a given three-dimensional artefact, a 
device, be understood as a ‘material preposition’?
MATERIAL PREPOSITIONS
Things afford possibilities of behaviour. From an instrumental 
point of view, and at the human social scale, some everyday mate-
rial artefacts are better at communicating how they should/could 
be used than others.
As mentioned, being interested in the results that might origi-
3.2  Selected preposi-
tions and their picto-
rial representations. 
This is a selection  
of 32 prepositions, 
commonly used in  
the English language.
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on
3.3 ‘On’, as 
depicted on the 
card-set  
(see preposition-
tools).
nate from a design thinking that is engaged not only with the ar-
tefact (noun, the static object, the thing itself) but also with the 
link, or linking, in the relation established, I designed a first ap-
proach to a methodology that attempts at visualizing relation by 
combining a series of prepositions with specific icons that com-
plement them. (Fig. 3.2).
The specificity of the icon in comparison with the word indi-
cates that there is a degree of metaphor/metonymy that acts/
models the associations. Thus, the on seen in figure 3.3 suggests 
a spatial rather than a temporal relation; having this icon in mind, 
it would be difficult to think of —for example— someone being 
‘on time’.
If we look into the ways in which three-dimensional artefacts 
establish ‘relations with’, we could return to Front’s bin for Ma-
teria (Fig. 2.2), where the logic (the prepositions used) to create 
the artefact could be thought to be with/without, by which the 
user/viewer understands the ‘state’ of the artefact.
Note that this with/without highlights the relation container-
contained; alternative prepositions could be introduced in order to 
explore how the artefact relates to other actors in space, in time 
and across scales. Thus, this particular with/without of the bin 
implies specific views of relation, namely, the with of the garbage 
bin suggests ‘container’, ‘pregnancy’, thus differing from the im-
age ‘with’ that can be established by thinking for example ‘with 
a friend’, that is, a relation of adjacency and not of containment. 
If one considers a work such as the silicon crutches by Mona 
Hatoum, one understands that the with/without of this artefact 
can be thought differently. The physical support provided by the 
standard crutches that it refers to is no longer a structural com-
ponent of the material, thus the without is read neither as con-
tainment nor as adjacency but as ‘lack’, although it could also be 
thought as a more diffuse form of ‘containment’.21 
Perhaps, in experiential terms and paraphrasing Lakoff and 
Johnson, one could say that ‘withoutness’ enters our experience 
in many different ways, and so gives rise to many different meta-
phors. While keeping the shape of the wooden or metal crutches, 
the strength, support, potency, which are the physical proper-
ties characteristic of the general human-scale relation to metal-
human or wood-human, are replaced with the softness, instability 
and faintness, which are characteristics of the general human-
scale relation to silicon. This material replacement generates thus, 
associations of ‘lack of’: of absence, of isolation, of despair, that 
can be projected (in an art installation for example) onto social 
and psychological domains by a human observer.
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As we can notice, the icons suggest already particular relation-
ships to the words. This narrowing can be seen as somehow prob-
lematic since it becomes clear that the concept of a preposition 
cannot be distinguished too sharply. A preposition has ‘overlaps’ 
of sense, our experience tells us that there is more to perceiving 
relations than this static symbol can hint at; language’s ambigu-
ity demands contextual information. With these pictorial schemes 
that accompany the words, I do not aim, however, at linguistic 
descriptions that match a specific situation. Following Lakoff, I 
have attempted to depict the prepositions at the centre, so that 
the senses of each preposition can form chains with specific de-
scriptions or situations.22 If we consider the preposition over, we 
can get a better understanding of what is at issue here. A closer 
inspection of the word over, reveals that the central sense of over 
combines elements of both, above and across (Fig. 3.4). I here 
summarize in a simplified version Lakoff’s survey of previous stud-
ies.23 We say for example, 
The plane is flying over the hill.
Sam is walking over the hill. 
Sam lives over the hill. 
The wall fell over. 
Sam turned the page over. 
Sam turned over. 
She spread the tablecloth over the table. 
The play is over. 
You made over a hundred errors, among others.
In figure 3.4, the plane is understood as a trajectory (TR) ori-
ented relative to a landmark (LM). TR and LM are generalizations 
of the concepts figure and ground. In 3.4.A the landmark is un-
specified. The arrow in the figure represents the PATH that TR is 
moving along. The LM is what the plane is flying over. The PATH 
is above the LM. The dotted lines indicate the extreme boundaries 
of the landmark. The PATH goes all the way across the landmark 
from the boundary on one side to the boundary on the other. Al-
though the drawing in 3.4.A indicates noncontact between the 
TR and LM, this sense is actually neutral on the issue of contact. 
There are instances with contact and instances without contact. 
The instances of the schema 3.4.B to D are arrived at by adding 
information, in particular by further specifying the nature of the 
landmark and by specifying whether or not there is contact. These 
are all linked to schema 3.4.A since they are all instances of that 
schema. In a sentence like Sam walked over the hill in 3.4.C, we 
can think of the hill, vertical and extended, while walking requires 
contact with the ground. The verb walk would match the contact 
specification, and the direct object hill would match the verti-
TR
LM
A - The plane ew over.
TR
LM
B - The plane ew over the hill.
TR
LM
C - Sam walked over the hill.
TR
LM
D - Sam lives over the hill.
3.4 Senses of the 
preposition over. 
(Adapted from 
Lakoff 1987:418).
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cal extended specification. The differences is whether the verb 
and direct object add the extended and contact specifications or 
whether they match it (in relation to the centred schema 3.4.A).
In the examples of figure 3.4, the different senses of over form a 
chain, having figure 3.4.A at its centre, as a schema that covers a 
wider range of situations. 
The iconography developed for the prepositiontools attempt to 
perform this type of conceptual operation. To centre the sense of 
each preposition, while acknowledging their overlaps. My materi-
alizing them as —while using them through the playful approach 
of— prepositiontools aim at enabling us to conceive alternative 
logical spaces, while implying ways to enact versions of the fu-
ture,24 and thus, to sensitize ourselves to the potential becomings 
of the things we relate to.
PREPOSITIONTOOLS
To illustrate the specificity, as well as the power for analysis and 
ideation that prepositions posses, we might take as an example 
a well-known package design by Naoto Fukasawa called “Juice 
Skin”.
Taking two prepositions, through and during, I have highlighted 
existing and potential aspects of the package. On the one hand, 
by using through, one can point at —for example— the existing 
package material which ‘breathes’, letting oxygen come in contact 
with the juice through the ‘skin’ but does not let water come out 
of it. On the other hand, by using during, one could suggest —for 
example— the expiry date by considering the time aspects and 
ageing of the juice container (Fig. 3.5). 
In order to come up with a more dynamic way of stimulating 
thinking using the disruptions25 provoked by prepositions, I devel-
oped a set of cards and a set of rubber-stamps that I call prepo-
sitionstools. 
These two sets aim at stimulating thinking by creating disrup-
tions and unfolding categories. Prepositiontools are meant to raise 
the question what if? Asking ‘what if?’ implies, at the same time, 
an assumption that things ‘are’, already, in ‘some way’, and that 
we strive for an alternative, for something else. We imagine things 
doing something, performing something in some way or another. 
When using prepositiontools, what is at stake is the understand-
ing of what things do, using them as tools for analysis, and also, 
what they could potentially do, that is, using them as tools for 
ideation.
3.5 Examples of 
design studies for 
analysis and ideation 
using prepositions. 
In the picture: Naoto 
Fukasawa’s “Juice 
skin” and my own 
redesign based on the 
preposition “during”, 
suggesting a possible 
visualization of the 
expiry date.
inside/
in
outside
around
at
through
between
against
during
through/during Naoto Fukasawa: juice skin
below, my version of its ageing process 
(expiry date)
>
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3.6 Preposition cards 
– The backside of 
the cards symbolize 
‘directionality’, in this 
case illustrated with 
icons formed by ar-
rows or small triangles 
spreading from a 
centre.
The designs of these tools reflect a concern not only with prep-
ositions (under any natural language, in this case, English), but 
also with the material and embodiment of prepositions. The impli-
cations of the materializations that I here propose as well as their 
potential uses range from the written word, to the written word 
accompanied by an icon, these in their turn, integrated onto a se-
ries of sets: cards or stamps. As it can be noticed, the interacting 
with these tools in the form of a card set (Fig. 3.6) differs, even if 
slightly, from interacting with them as a stamp set (Fig. 3.7).
Based on my own experience as well as on exercises performed 
with students, an important implication of the different materiali-
ties of these two sets, is that in the case of the cards, the playing 
with them becomes somehow more dynamic and ‘conceptual’ or 
‘abstract’, while the action of stamping the prepositions and leav-
ing the marks on a page or an object tend to ‘fix’ a few of them. 
It is also interesting how the ‘bearing’ of a stamp acts as a 
reminder, which modifies our perception of the things through 
time. Thus, an image such as figure 3.9, where through has been 
stamped on to a hand, might remind that person to perform a 
specific action ‘persuading’ him or her —for example— to ‘go 
through the corridor smiling at everyone he/she sees…’ or (adopt-
ing another perspective and scale) reminding that person of his 
or her relation to the surrounding environment by pointing at the 
breathing of the skin.
As a linguistic experiment, a ‘prepositional approach’ would im-
ply, an opening to a more plural or diversified understanding of 
artefacts’ affordances. Not only in relation to us humans (under-
standing their form of enabling impositions, constraints, and the 
useful-cycles they provide, that is, the psychological and social 
aspects), but also the environmental dimension, in suggesting re-
lations to alternative environments, systems, organisms. 
We should be thankful to the designers of the bin (Fig. 2.2) for 
the gift of communicating, of depicting a with or without garbage. 
What follows however, is a sense, perhaps, of perplexity from not 
perceiving many other relations. Where are the rest of the prepo-
sitions? Above, below, beside, far, close, around, behind, via, near, 
on, in, between, across, out, against, among, at, during, etc. Can 
they also be visualized? Do they need to be visualized in order 
for us to understand what the bin can do? What it affords? Can 
we think a temporal relation that points out the potentialities of 
its different components and better understand the hostility that 
comes from considering this garbage bin beyond its useful life? 
What if we would appoint ourselves the task of looking into some 
of the possibilities of relating through each of the prepositions of 
the prepositiontools? (Fig. 3.13).
[Appendix A... 173]
91 Unfolding90
3.7 Detail of a rubber-
stamp with the box as 
background.
3.8 Paper with marks 
left by some of the 
rubber-stamps.
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3.9 The rubber-stamp 
seems to modify the 
way a user perceives 
the relation by being 
literally ‘stamped’, 
carried on the thing 
itself.
From the series of figures 3.10-13, another image emerges; that 
of the bin formed by layers. In this image the artefact becomes 
blurry, which in a sense, suggests a more ‘realistic’ perception of 
the artefact, in all its invisible futures, in all its unrealized potential, 
likely or unlikely to happen. A kind of “real virtuality”, as DeLanda 
understands it.26 Not that the ‘clear-cut’ bin lacks relational pos-
sibilities, rather, that the bin no longer communicates (as in the 
with–without) its potential associations.
I suggest that a form of engagement with the logic that these 
methodologies imply might result —if the tools are used playfully, 
without becoming too systematic— in an approach that light-
ens, “as though one were to insert oneself into it like a surfer in 
a wave” as Rajchman proposes through his principle of operative 
abstraction “...when a spatial construction is loosened up… to be-
have in other less predictable ways or affect us along other, less 
direct lines” (1998:47). Operation which he relates to the more 
“…‘schizophrenic’, Borgesian situation where characters become 
so flexible or indeterminate that at any point they might bifurcate 
and go off into other possible narratives.” (1998:104-105). 
As a way to unfold typological thinking at alternative scales27, 
grammatical prepositions act as ‘hinges’ in the establishing of re-
lations that can be thought, sensed, conceived. Bridging, in Var-
ela’s terms, the microworlds that we enact and constituting the 
microidentities of which we are unaware of, since the transitions 
from one state to the other are “virtually imperceptible”. Varela 
mentions,
it is the breakdowns, the hinges that articulate microworlds, that are 
the source of the autonomous and creative side of living cognition. 
Such common sense, then, needs to be examined on a microscale, for 
it is during breakdowns that the concrete is born. (1999:11).  
Breakdowns in human perception illustrate our particular re-
lation to the emergence of knowledge. We might find ourselves 
pleasantly walking home, looking forward to meeting our children, 
when, all of a sudden, we realize that our wallet is gone! Our per-
ception shifts and we no longer see the world in the way we did 
just an instance ago, instead, we find ourselves immersed in the 
intensive process of focusing on the actions that might have led 
to our loosing the wallet and the valuable documents in it. 
The time span that a human being calls ‘present’ has been cal-
culated to 200 to 500 msec (Varela 1999:49). This is, the time 
when the cross correlating of the networks lead to the emergence 
of what Varela calls a microworld; the shift from walking pleas-
antly to the intensive focusing on the actions that might have led 
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3.10 Layering relations 
with tracing paper.
3.11 Layering relations 
with tracing paper.
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3.12 Layering relations 
with tracing paper.
3.13 Layering relations 
with tracing paper.
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to our loss. At such breakdown, affected by the re-cognition of 
this event, we act based on a personal history of interactions.28 
By considering these three-dimensional artefacts as ‘material 
prepositions’ I am simultaneously conceiving them as ‘devices’, 
that is, things that divide, organize, arrange. The parallelism arte-
fact-device implies a perception of things as actors organizing our 
environments, inscribing differences. Each contact at each given 
instance with a thing implies a re-discovery and a continuation or 
discontinuation of the narrative that we construct when behaving 
in everyday life. The wallet no longer being there shocks, because 
it is a discovery (during a breakdown), that lead to the discontinu-
ity of our current self: ‘parent on her way to meet children’ to that 
of ‘person without wallet’, robbed or otherwise. 
Similarly, when facing the CCTV mast of figure 1.1 for the first 
time, we are confronted for an instance with such a disruption of 
our microidentity (person pleasantly walking through a natural en-
vironment) and with our acting and re-acting based on our knowl-
edge of situations with such devices. We immediately understand 
that we have already been seen, at least potentially. Whatever be-
haviour follows the discovery of the mast, is based on an already 
limited set of possibilities to choose from, since they have been, 
to some extent, predefined, constrained: not being seen is not an 
option; not affecting other systems and organisms (human and 
nonhuman) is not an option either. 
A genesis of mutual interactions with situations and environ-
ments results in the structural coupling that lead to ontogenesis, 
that is, “the history of structural change in a unity without loss of 
organization in that unity” (Maturana and Varela 1998:74). Even 
though this form of everyday disruption does not cause the in-
terruption of the human processes of living, it becomes signifi-
cant enough for someone to behave differently. As such, these 
forms of structural coupling could be understood as a looser form 
of symbiogenesis, that is, as a history of the lineages of systems 
and organisms as they change through time and in symbiosis to 
one another; forms of collective becomings. Thus, Varela’s em-
phasis on these forms of interaction as being the most common 
kind of ethical behaviour, “‘who we are’ at any moment cannot be 
divorced from what other things and who other people are to us” 
(Varela 1999:10).
From a psychoanalytical perspective, Julia Kristeva points out 
that the insight of being “strangers to ourselves” lead to an ethi-
cal shift which in human social terms implies the recognition of a 
weakness (our radical strangeness), and the possibility to engage 
us in action; people “ready-to-help-themselves in their weakness” 
(1991:195). The same sensibility can be extended understanding 
that shared biological processes should or could lead to forms of 
empathy with nonhumans.29 
If we, by means of tools such as the prepositiontools, would ac-
quire expertise in this —playful— languaging procedure, it would 
be easier to understand the interrelations of the triple register of 
the psychological, social, and environmental ecologies. Where the 
prepositiontools would become tools for transversality, as tools 
that facilitate to open up and examine ‘closed logics’ or hierar-
chies.30
One could say with architect Keller Easterling that “Expertise 
in this [error] language might involve the practice of knowing 
nothing rather than the practice of protecting an accepted set of 
skills.” (2005:134). In a way, Easterling’s epistemological concern 
also expresses, on a linguistic plane, the concern of being with 
others, that which Rajchman identified with the problem of “con-
structed spaces owned by no one”. A space constituted by the 
possibilities of movement, from a thing to another, until the ethi-
cal stance —relating this and not that— of the device becomes 
enacted, materialized by a design.
Through the specificity of the relations brought forth by the 
prepositiontools, we can ask: the hospitality-hostility of what, 
and for whom?31 And in this way glimpse at the places, the logical 
and spatial constructions of design.
AND…
William James mentions, 
Things are ‘with’ one another in many ways, but nothing includes 
everything. The word ‘and’ trails along after every sentence. Some-
thing always escapes. ‘Ever not quite’ has to be said of the best at-
tempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining all-inclusiveness. 
(1996:321-322). 
 It is the word and, as James points out, that trails along here 
(and everywhere), after every sentence; in its inclusiveness, it 
suggests the network, the connection, the forgotten, the un-
known, the unforeseen.
And points not only at what (we know) ‘exists’ but also suggests 
what is to come or might come in the future. The potentiality of 
the nuclear plant and the tsunami, of the shoes and the bacteria, 
of the t-shirt and the frog, indefinitely bringing together likely or 
unlikely encounters. One could ask as well, more specifically, how 
is ‘and’ expressed through a so-called natural language? When 
[Heterotopian... 109]
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we say, this and that, or this goes with that, we are suggesting an 
association, a conjunction that becomes further specified once 
we ask, how is this going together with that? We mainly express 
those associations through prepositions, determining the way the 
‘and’ is to bring forth a relationship. Thus as we have seen, the 
milk is on, under, or against the glass, are all particular instances 
of milk and glass. Beside these systematic and somehow mechan-
ical examples, we can consider other cases to understand how a 
full-fledged language enacts meaning. Think of W. B. Yeats’ poem, 
When You Are Old,
When you are old and grey and full of sleep,
And nodding by the fire, take down this book,
And slowly read, and dream of the soft look
Your eyes had once, and of their shadows deep;
How many loved your moments of glad grace,
And loved your beauty with love false or true,
But one man loved the pilgrim soul in you,
And loved the sorrows of your changing face;
And bending down beside the glowing bars,
Murmur, a little sadly, how Love fled
And paced upon the mountains overhead
And hid his face amid a crowd of stars.
The poem accumulates through the coordination of the and, a 
description of a personal history that can be shared by the reader. 
Its nostalgic beauty treads forth through the associations of the 
and, weaving a universe of emotional experience finally suggested 
by a face amid stars.
Consider the implicit ‘and’ in Heraclitus’ fragment:
Without the sun,
what day? What night?
How the relation day and night, mediated by the presence-
absence of the noun sun through the preposition without, is ren-
dered nonsensical as opposition and duality.
We observe how and, as a conjunction, performs a particular 
operation: it is additive, differing from other conjunctions such 
as nor, but, yet, so, in presenting non-contrasting items or ideas.
Thus one says: Maria is pale and small —being affirmative. Other 
conjunctions introduce instead contrasts, alternatives or excep-
tions: Maria is (neither) pale nor small —a contrasting negative 
idea. Or Maria is pale but small —a contrast or exception. Or Ma-
ria is pale yet small —a contrast or exception. Or Maria is indoors 
so she is pale and small —a consequence. And thus, simply —
neutrally or even positively— ‘brings’ things together. 
In strict linguistic terms however, conjunctions are not ‘speci-
fied’ —as I suggest— by prepositions; conjunctions and prepo-
sitions work as complementary constituents of grammar. Keep-
ing this in mind, the logic formulated here, belongs to a form of 
philosophical grammar rather than a linguistic one. In this sense, 
the progression of the ‘anding’, through our capacity to conceive 
alternative logical, spatial, and/or temporal relations, lead or 
glimpses, at a way to grasp what one might call, using Deleuzian 
terminology, a multiplicity. In search for other actors that relate or 
can possibly relate to a thing in question, expanding the frame, in 
the case of day and night, most likely, a horizon, a sky, darkness, 
and so on, to extended them introducing illogical connections and 
associations, provoking a disruption, a schism in the logical and 
experiential ‘image’ of a given thing. 
The non-contrasting inclusiveness of the conjunction ‘and’, the 
ever present need to account for yet another element, feature or 
aspect not ‘included’, that is, not related to, works, according to 
John Rajchman, as the basic logical operator of Deleuze’s phi-
losophy.32 According to Rajchman, with this ‘and’ “Deleuze’s logic 
frees itself from the question of ‘ontological determination’ […] It 
supposes a different kind of grammar or logical coherence than 
the ones modelled on sentences like ‘the sky is blue’ or ‘God ex-
ists’.”33 In dialogue with Claire Parnet, Deleuze mentions, 
What defines [a multiplicity] is the AND, as something which has its 
place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND-
stammering. And even if there are only two terms, there is an AND 
between the two which is neither the one nor the other, nor the one 
which becomes the other, but which constitutes the multiplicity. 
(2006:26).
The abstract machines of Deleuze and Guattari presuppose 
such a logic, of the abs-tractus, the act of withdrawal or turning 
away through the ‘affirmative’ exit of the and.34
Prepositiontools as tools for analysis and ideation, can explic-
itly help defining the way the ‘anding’ results in the bringing forth 
of worlds. This bringing forth implies propositions, which can be 
constructed with prepositions, as in something relating to some-
thing else in this or that way. At the same time, prepositions imply 
propositions, that is, proposals (assertions) of how humans and 
nonhumans relate to each other. 
As suggested by their name, prepositiontools are precisely 
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that, tools. These tools have the capacity to stimulate a particular 
performativity, one that emphasizes chance, and highlights (on 
the linguistic plane) the tools’ capacity to originate ‘concepts’. 
But equating preposition with proposition is not merely a linguis-
tic word play. The use of prepositions randomly —by breaking 
with experiential (and syntactic) logic— opens up for (images of) 
thoughts35, proposals which are unlikely to be made otherwise, 
and launch us on to unexpected considerations.
UNFOLDING IN SHORT
Classifying certain processes of transformation as accidents, 
imply a particular framing, an instrumental human perspective, 
where specific forms of association are considered of harm or of 
benefit to human beings. Categories perform in/ex-clusions, con-
necting this and not that. As such categories should be under-
stood as devices. We cannot avoid categorization, what we can 
do is to be aware of our tendency to crystallize particular views of 
things or state of things that are otherwise dynamic. 
The “symmetry” substance-accident implies understanding ac-
cident as it manifests itself through unexpected relations, in eve-
ryday life and at all spatio-temporal scales. These relations, since 
we cannot but think of them through language, must be taken into 
consideration through the process of languaging, understood by 
Maturana and Varela as “communication about communication”. 
The central role of prepositions, by being the grammatical constit-
uents that ‘link’ things to each other, allows for the development 
of ‘tools’ such as prepositiontools. These facilitate to playfully ask 
‘what if’, and help us to model and imagine the future as open-
ended, to become tools for transversality. 
Prepositiontools become devices that help us to unfold catego-
ries in order to emphasize in-betweeness and to compose and as-
sociate things that we otherwise would be unlikely to conceive. 
One could say that prepositions help de-scribing thus tracing a 
network, defining an account where each actor is or becomes 
a mediator, that is, where all the actors do something (Latour 
2005:128). 
Awareness of the performative role of prepositions eases the 
development of a mind set capable of conceiving the future as 
open-ended. Emphasis on the modelling of natural languages 
however, does not imply a predominance of language as a mode 
of cognition. Rather natural languages should be understood as a 
result of complex processes of individuation, playing an important 
role in the bringing forth of worlds.
Devising is an act of inscription of particular views, in relation 
to a given situation and a set of constraints. The disruptive capac-
ity of prepositiontools allow us to create logical shifts, some of 
which will be explored in the following section entitled “Devising” 
through a logic that will be called ‘heterotopian’. The studies that 
follow are attempts to explicitly address some of the symbiotic 
relations established by the devising process.
105 104
Devising
Devising
Invention is a question followed by an answer. But for each question 
set a thousand answers are possible, of all possible degrees of 
completeness and exactness.
Gabriel De Tarde
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GRAMMARIANISMS
The products, the results of the speculations of this section are 
the physical manifestations of thinking ‘prepositionally’, or more 
precisely, of using grammar (prepositions, conjunctions, nouns, 
pronouns, verbs, adverbs, punctuation marks, and so on) while 
paying particular attention to the logical operations that we real-
ize when ‘linking’, when relating things to one another. However, 
as mentioned previously, the whole of grammar in any so-called 
natural language is not capable of expressing all experiential nu-
ances. I will take a concrete example from the sketching process 
during my work on the icons for the prepositiontools. 
I started a series of drawings while I was choosing among the 
prepositions most commonly used in the English language. Since I 
was interested in the example of the bin —‘with’ and ‘without’— I 
followed the logic of this particular artefact and I sketched among 
others, the icon of figure 4.1, but could not assign to it a single 
preposition that would allow me to include it in the series. The 
icon demanded not a single word but a whole sentence. Some-
how, this icon suggests (if we keep the logic of containment of 
the bin by Front) a previous state of things, one which demands 
a without before the bin without the garbage. It suggests, I be-
lieve, a gesture of a previous instance by which we perceive the 
coming movement (and our particular relationship to the physical 
constitution of the artefact). An instance that can be understood, 
not (only) in the linking or connecting with a given thing (with-
without garbage), but with the process itself of expanding and 
contracting, with the tension and pressure exercised not only by 
the garbage, but by multiple variables that can be conceived in re-
lation to its material and structural possibilities. Prepositions imply 
a way, but the process resulting in a particular behaviour can only 
be de-scribed (and to a limited extent) through all components of 
a given natural language. 
To describe an icon such as the one with the question mark 
in figure 4.1, one would need to write a sentence, not unlike this 
one: “the container has the capacity to contract and expand by 
means of its structural and material properties, affording a human 
observer the possibility to understand the degrees of emptiness-
fullness of the artefact.” Here we observe how the specificity of 
the icon can hardly be expressed through the use of words. If the 
structure of the bin would behave in such a way, one could im-
agine for example that the icon with the question mark of figure 
4.1 can be explained with the same logic, through a —normative, 
instrumental— design that indicates that the ‘starting point’ for 
the functioning of this device includes the containing (weight) of 
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4.1 without?-without-
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withwithout?
a garbage bag, item which brings the contracted bin to a ‘straight’ 
line, indicating its correct modus operandi.
Devices are normally understood as nouns: ‘this is a bin’. If we 
also think of these ‘nouns’ as verbs and as prepositions, we in-
crease our capacity to perceive their ecological complexity.1 
The ‘bin’ as verb implies a more dynamic conception of the ar-
tefact, where we start looking into it in terms of processes and in 
terms of actions by thinking ‘will be’, ‘has been’ and so on. In rela-
tion to the bin, one might think of: expanding, contracting, ageing, 
corroding... to name but a few. This helps us to understand what 
an artefact becomes through time. By looking into it in terms of 
prepositions, we refine our perception of the becoming process 
by paying attention to the relations that the artefact is able or is 
likely to establish in and with the environment where it is located. 
Corrosion as the particular relation water-oxigen-metal and the 
likelihood of this process to affect other things that it relates to; 
a carpet, a human hand, a piece of land when thrown away and 
so on. These three basic grammatical perspectives contribute 
to expand our understanding of devices, by allowing us to think 
their effects as well as by helping us to imagine their potential 
affects.
HETEROTOPIAN PROPOSITIONS
In 1966 Michel Foucault published Les Mots et les choses, later 
translated on to English as The Order of Things. In the preface 
to that book, Foucault starts by quoting a passage from Borges’ 
“The analytical language of John Wilkins”2 and tells us, 
 
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter 
that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my 
thought –our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age 
and our geography- breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the 
planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of 
existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten 
will collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. 
This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is 
written that ‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the emperor, 
(b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) 
stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) 
innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, 
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way 
off look like flies’. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we 
apprehend in one great leap, the thing that by means of the fable, is 
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demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is 
the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.
Foucault then asks the question, “But what is it impossi-
ble to think, and what kind of impossibility are we faced here?” 
(1994:XV). He suggests that 
 
Borges adds no figure to the atlas of the impossible… he simply dis-
penses with the least obvious, but most compelling, of necessities; he 
does away with the site, the mute ground upon which it is possible for 
entities to be juxtaposed. (1994:Xvii) 
What Foucault points out, is not only the site (geographical 
place-space) but also a method for constructing an argument, as 
in classical rhetoric, the Greek tópos koinós, common place,3 and 
develops accordingly a nomenclature to distinguish the tópos, dif-
ferentiating between u-topia and hetero-topia.
Utopias afford consolation: although they have no real locality there 
is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able 
to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planned 
gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them 
is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they se-
cretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name 
this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because 
they destroy the ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with 
which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax 
which causes words and things (next to and opposite to one another) 
to ‘hold together’. This is why utopias permit fables and discourse: 
they run with the very grain of language and are part of the fundamen-
tal dimension of the fabula; heterotopias (such as those to be found so 
often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest 
the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths 
and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences.” (1994:Xviii).4
It is in this, de-stabilizing way that the design projects that fol-
low can be said to be heterotopian. They propose a dislocation 
of experience by means of illogical vicinity (as in figure 4.2), by 
displacing the ground on which our human experience operates 
through the use of language.5 More specifically, the use of prepo-
sitions allow us to systematically create thoughts closely related 
to those of Borges’ ‘Chinese encyclopaedia’ as in “(n) that from 
a long way off look like flies”, where the trigger of this could be 
the preposition ‘far’, a particular relation that establishes a link 
between the range of human sight, particular lightning conditions, 
of
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4.2 Prepositiontools to 
create heterotopias.
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KITE AS PARASITE?
To further explore the relationship host-guest, by proposing de-
signs conceived through the biological notion of symbiosis, I de-
veloped a project entitled ¡Pestes! Before looking into the impli-
cations of this proposal, it is necessary to revise and develop our 
understanding of the three categories which conform the notion 
of symbiosis. 
In biology various types of symbioses, whether beneficial or 
harmful, are described by the terms mutualism, commensalism 
and parasitism. As mentioned, an association in which both sym-
bionts benefit is called a mutualistic symbiosis; an association in 
which one symbiont benefits and the other one is neither harmed 
nor benefited is called a commensalistic symbiosis; while a rela-
tionship in which a symbiont receives nutrients at the expense 
of a host organism is called a parasitic symbiosis. Of these forms 
of interaction and association the most common is parasitism. In 
terms of evolution, biologists suggest that mutualism and com-
mensalism arose from parasitism.11 One should keep in mind that 
living associations form and dissolve, thus, these categories fluc-
tuate, they are transitional, establishing relationships that may 
be stable or ephemeral, blurring their own boundary lines. What 
might start as a form of parasitism might co-evolve as a form of 
mutualism or commensalism.  
Michel Serres notes that etymologically, to parasite means ‘to 
eat next to’ or feeding beside (2007:7). To para-site (the Greek 
parásītos, stands for one who eats at another’s table), drawing 
our attention to the distinction that the host is not a prey. The 
parasite does not ‘eat up’ its host, the way a lion might hunt, kill 
and eat up a zebra. The parasite finds nutrition on or in the host, 
but this host is also —at least temporarily— its residence, its 
habitat.
The way a given organism might develop a form of co-evolution 
with another system or organism will depend on the organisms’ 
resilience and capacity to adapt to the contingencies of their life 
in symbiosis. Forms of symbioses may be nutritional or protective; 
still, most people’s perception of parasitism relates strongly to nu-
trition12; we tend to picture a ‘life sucking’ organism, image which 
in most cases has a negative connotation, part of the anthropo-
centrism of the category parasite. Moreover, we tend to equate 
parasitism with pathogens (infectious agents), missing thus their 
contexts in terms of symbiosis and evolution, where parasites may 
participate in vital functions of an organism, and becoming in this 
way indistinguishable from the body itself. 
If we consider the work of artist Michael Rakowitz entitled 
an object of study and so on, with the objective to establish a tax-
onomy, a particular order. 
They are also heterotopian in the sense that they challenge 
“epistemes”.6 As in a Borgesian garden of forking paths, the design 
exercises that follow present possible worlds7, where a chosen al-
ternative explicitly enacts, unfolds, a series of possibilities while 
eliminating others. Or in Deleuzian terminology, where a combi-
nation actualizes a virtuality, which then open further paths that 
may or may not be actualized. Thus, the idea of a ‘possible world’ 
is here related, following Deleuze, to the notions of compossibility 
and of virtuality. Deleuze not only distinguishes, as we have seen, 
between the essential and the accidental, but also between the 
virtual and the possible or the actualization of the virtual and the 
realization of the possible. The actual is what manifests and ef-
fectuates the virtual, but the actual never completely activates all 
the potential, all that the virtual implies. 
The virtual lies in those forces or potentials whose origin and out-
comes cannot be specified independently of the open and necessarily 
incomplete series of their actualizations […] the virtual is thus not an 
abstraction, a generality, or an a priori condition. It doesn’t take us 
from the specific to the generic. It increases possibility in another way: 
it mobilizes as yet unspecifiable singularities, bringing them together 
in an indeterminate plan.8 
A thinking that acknowledges the virtual affirms possibilities by 
saying ‘and’. Conceptions such as the ones that can be proposed 
through the use of prepositiontools, allow a greater number of 
singular connections. It is the opposite of reducing specificity by 
finding something more general. It is in this sense that the ‘com-
posing’ of these possible worlds can be understood as multiple, an 
arrangement or disposition that allows for the greatest number of 
specific connections.9
One might consider the word site, not only as the ‘discursive’ 
site that Foucault exemplifies with Borges’ stories, but also the 
spatial site in a geographical sense, as being closely related since 
the worlds that can be brought forth by an organism are depend-
ent on the organism’s capacity to perceive and conceive signs10 
from an environment. Thus, with regard to human organisms, the 
dynamic continuum of ontology-epistemology implies the (onto-
logical) relation to an environment which, among its processes 
and through the organism’s capacities, enacts, brings forth, (epis-
temological) worlds. In this sense, all topoi (places), by being par-
tially enacted by some organism, could be potentially conceived 
as biotopes.
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One could simply start by asking: can a kite be a parasite? The 
nutritional metaphor of the kite ‘feeding off’ the wind is appealing 
but insufficient to describe the relation, since we immediately un-
derstand that the ‘life’ that the wind affords the kite with has no 
energetic components in terms of food. The kite affects the wind, 
but it does not harm it, does not ‘weaken’ it or ‘infect’ it14, there 
is no influence of the kite on its ‘host’ except in dynamic terms, 
creating turbulence and disrupting its flow. 
A distinction needs to be specified here; the (biological) cat-
egory of parasitism applies to ‘living’ organisms, not to systems 
thinking in general. Thus, the wind does not ‘live’, cannot be said 
to be autopoietical, and thus does not belong to the (logical) class 
that we can use to establish such a relation: wind-kite parasitism. 
In fact, neither the kite nor the wind is an autopoietical organism. 
In contrast to autopoietic organizations which, as we have seen, 
produce themselves, Varela describes (artificial) machines as al-
lopoietic, that is, as machines that produce something other than 
themselves (1979). This is indicated by their prefixes, allo being 
the Greek for “other”, while auto, being the Greek for “self”. The 
kite, being an artefact, a device producing (in this case) electric-
ity should be considered in the frame of allopoiesis rather than 
autopoiesis. 
Part of what defines an autopoietic network, is that it is not a 
set of relations among static components, as in the wind, but a set 
of relations among processes of production of components, and 
“If these processes stop, so does the entire organization” (Capra 
1996:163). 
To explain the structure of living systems, Fritjof Capra com-
plements the organizational closure of Maturana and Varela’s 
autopoietic networks with the notion of dissipative structure by 
physical chemist Ilya Prigogine, where the emphasis on the pro-
cess of living resides in flow of energy and matter, rather than on 
the closure of the networks. 
Thus a living system is both open and closed – it is structurally open, 
but organizationally closed. Matter continually flows through it, but 
the system maintains a stable form, and it does so autonomously 
through self-organization. // To highlight that seemingly paradoxical 
coexistence of change and stability Prigogine coined the term ‘dis-
sipative structures’. (1996:164) 
Not all dissipative structures are living systems. In order to 
visualize the coexistence of continual flow and structure stability, 
Capra exemplifies with a whirlpool in a bathtub (a vortex in flow-
ing water), that is, with a nonliving dissipative structure.  
paraSITE, it is possible to understand that even the distinction 
nutritional/protective is problematic. Rakowitz places inflatable 
tubular shelters for homeless that ‘feeds off’ a building’s exhaust 
system. Literally in these series of works, the para-site, is that 
which eats/shelters next-to. But, is it possible to talk of parasitism 
here? Are we confronted with a case of biological parasitism or a 
metaphor of parasitism that applies to human social life? Who or 
what becomes the parasite? The human? The nonhuman device 
that provides shelter? Both, considering the artefact as assem-
blage, or as extension as in McLuhan (2001)? By naming it a para-
site, are we not projecting a ‘life’ on to structures (architectural 
building and shelter) that are otherwise perceived as lifeless? 
Before developing this point, it is interesting to briefly recon-
sider some of the arguments on hospitality-hostility in relation to 
devices. Rakowitz’s paraSITE, an inflatable structure that ‘feeds 
off’ (inflates itself while using the warm temperature of the air 
of) the building’s exhaust system, organizes, arranges a situation 
by which a human can take advantage of the sheltering structure 
to find refuge. Its hospitality exposes the homeless’ vulnerability, 
precarity. 
The shelters communicated a refusal to surrender, and they functioned 
as a protest against authorities seeking to make their cities ‘homeless 
proof’. They made visible and legitimized through artistic gesture, the 
unacceptable circumstances of homeless life within the city.13
From my perspective, although the nomad homeless stages, as 
suggested in the previous quote, the unacceptable circumstances 
of such life, neither the human nor the nonhuman become para-
sites in this particular relation. The works propose a looser form 
of social (human-human) parasitism, rather than establishing a 
concrete parasitic relationship. The structure (shelter) does not 
harm the system (ventilation of the buildings), and in this way, 
the parasite cannot be considered a pathogen. Perhaps, the rela-
tionship should rather be understood in terms of commensalism. 
In this way however, the artefact’s critique gets diluted by the 
lack of poignancy of the word commensalism, in contrast to the 
stark set of associations that can be triggered through the word 
parasite. Rather, it is the word paraSITE in its etymological sense 
(eating next-to) that metaphorically constitutes, and brings forth 
the category parasite as socially problematic. Regarding the para-
sitism of artefacts and their assemblages, I believe that the issues 
can be more clearly approached by looking into the more ‘basic’ 
relations established by a kite and the wind, which is one of the 
symbiotic associations proposed at ¡Pestes! (Figs. 1.3-5). 
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enough’, to use a Deleuzian expression. Their performing implies 
the use (the recognition), of the most basic parameters that allow 
their performance to occur. Thus, a television set would have per-
forations on the back cover of the screen, allowing the artefact 
to dissipate the heat coming from its electronic components. This 
does not imply, for example, that as a boundary, this cover would 
also react —like human skin does— to the internal/external tem-
perature conditions, or to the protection of the TV set from a for-
eign agent such as water.  The degrees to which any of these 
are taken into account, exemplifies the level of elaboration of the 
devices and their devising processes.
By thinking in symbiotic terms, even about artefacts, one be-
comes aware that organisms function only in relation to other 
organisms, and that each organism is the result of symbiogen-
esis and of co-evolution in and with a given environment. The be-
coming of these living and nonliving systems, witness a legacy of 
structural coupling and continuous refinement of adaptation. At 
the same time, we should be careful to note the analogies and the 
metaphorical degrees when comparing allopoietic with autopoi-
etic systems. These systems are different dynamic systems from 
one another, operating, not in harmony, but in their own tensions 
in and with their environments.16
Since humans’ exploitation of ecological niches has no prec-
edent in the biosphere, it seems that at this point in history, the 
capacity of human beings to adapt can be challenged. The deple-
tion of resources has made difficult or impossible in some cases, 
the development of other life forms, affecting vast ecosystems’ 
capacity for resilience, systems which we influence and of which 
we are part of. In spite of the exponential growth of technology, 
in most cases, the results of our labour are far from implementing 
(even understanding) products that would lead to a human sus-
tainable life-style in its ecological complexity. 
Our partial knowledge however, is not unique in the realm of 
living species, on the contrary. The plasticity of human cognitive 
capacities has been the key to our adapting to multiple environ-
ments. In all living species forms of knowledge become enacted, 
ranging from the individual (i.e. ant) to the species specific (i.e. 
ant colony) and even to inter-species forms of cohabitation and 
coevolution. The plant does not transform CO
2
 into oxygen in or-
der to elaborate a product that will continue to make possible the 
life of hyenas or anything else but itself. Rather, as we know, it has 
co-evolved during millions of years through the coupling in and 
with a multiplicity of environments, developing specific biological 
features co-creating a niche that exploits, simplifying for the sake 
of this argument, sunlight. 
[Boundaries 73]
Like the whirlpool, the wind in our example, must be seen as a 
nonliving dissipative structure. The balancing forces of the whirl-
pool and wind are mechanical, while those of a living organism 
are chemical (Capra 1996:163). The wind, being neither allopoietic 
nor autopoietic, being a manifestation of moving air caused by dif-
ference in air pressure within our atmosphere, should be consid-
ered according to the physical laws of thermodynamics.15
We speak of structural coupling between humans by means of 
the assemblages that we form with a given environment, where 
a history of interactions lead to some form of congruence. We, 
as humans (autopoietic organisms), create artefacts (allopoietic 
systems), extensions that form assemblages, products of our in-
teraction with an environment. As we have seen, the environment 
only triggers structural changes in the autopoietic unities (it does 
not specify or direct them), and vice versa for the environment. 
Thus, our recognizing of affordances in the wind is triggered by 
our perception of, for example, its carrying capacity in relation to 
our and other bodies.
In terms of parasitism, Donna Haraway has mentioned that 
“Disease is a relationship”, explaining that there is no relationship 
until a host and a parasite recognize each other; arguing that if 
there is no infection there is no relation (2000). However, could 
one say that if there is no recognition of the carrying capacity 
of the wind, there will not be relationships established, neither 
‘parasitic’, nor ‘commensalistic’ or ‘mutualistic’? Even if we would 
not recognize the wind’s carrying capacity, the wind would still be 
affected; our presence creating turbulence. 
Once again, one must distinguish between metaphorical, bio-
logical and systemic uses of the word parasitism. I believe that 
although Haraway refers to a biological form of parasitism, she 
is equating parasitism with pathogens, missing thus the broader 
context of symbiosis and evolution, where parasites may partic-
ipate in vital functions of an organism, thus becoming indistin-
guishable from the body itself. Disease might be called a ‘relation-
ship’ in the same way that health might be called a ‘relationship’. 
The focus should not be put on them as being relations, rather, 
on health or disease as becoming particular forms of relationships 
that harm/benefit a given system or organism at a specific spatio-
temporal scale.
If the devising, the design process, of any given artefact has 
not considered the phenomenon of a potential coupling by/with 
an unexpected actor (i.e. a hacking technology), the relation will 
still affect the system, while ‘parasitism’ will remain unnoticed by, 
for example, human monitoring. 
In their allopoiesis, machines are sometimes not ‘machinic 
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of space, a distribution in space. By that token, it is the ethos, but the 
ethos is also the Abode. (2004:344)
The ethos, the way of being, coincides with its home, its abode. 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari created the con-
cept of refrain (ritournelle), which explains this psychological 
shift were an individual creates space by means of sound. Thus, 
a child in the dark comforts herself by singing, or a housewife 
sings to herself or listens to radio, where radio and television sets 
“are like sound walls around every household and mark territories” 
(2004:343-344). 
The marking and diverse expressions of territorialization be-
come the signature of a species, a way to compose social assem-
blages with spatial and temporal ranges. In need of protection, 
mating, food, or rest, species develop partitions, frames that allow 
them to organize an otherwise chaotic world. 
Attentive to the risks created by the tension between natu-
ral selection and sexual selection, Grosz develops this Darwinian 
distinction, pointing at their roles in developing language and art. 
Grosz explains that Darwin introduced an excessiveness into the 
development and transformation of species,
 Species are no longer natural collections or kinds developed to sur-
vive and compete, they are also the a posteriori and ultimately incal-
culable consequences of sexual taste, appeal, or attraction. Perhaps 
sexuality itself is not so much to be explained in terms of its ends or 
goals (which in sociobiological terms are assumed to be the [com-
petitive] reproduction of maximum numbers of [surviving] offspring, 
where sexual selection is ultimately reduced to natural selection) as in 
terms of its forces, its effects (which can less contentiously be under-
stood as pleasure in indeterminable forms), which are forms of bodily 
intensifications. Vibrations, waves, oscillations, resonances affect liv-
ing bodies, not for any higher purpose but for pleasure alone. (Grosz 
2008:33).
In this sense, art becomes the sexualization of survival, “sexu-
ality is the rendering artistic, the exploration of the excessiveness 
of nature” (Grosz 2008:11). 
One could say that what is produced, enacted, through the 
framing established (whoever or whatever organism enacts a 
framing) is a selection, by picking up signals, and differentiating 
some aspects of a given situation. What the frame includes in its 
organization is the enactment of a sensibility, thus, the enactment 
of a ‘desiring’ organism, always partial; developing knowledge of 
some things and not others. As enactment, the tension knowl-
FRAMING
What is common to a range of multicellular organisms is an ‘ex-
cess of life’ manifested in a myriad of selective processes that are 
not only ‘natural’ but also ‘sexual’.17 Sexual selection as aesthetic 
process, by which organisms have developed responses and ‘so-
lutions’, but also created, through framing, their own risks by be-
coming attractive, desirable, to their potential partners, since they 
also become recognizable for their predators.
While being life sustaining, sexual selection indicates a surplus 
of life which has a ‘cost’: the more beautiful the peacock’s plum-
age, the more visible it is for all. By becoming more attractive, 
individuals not only attract partners but also become vulnerable 
to predation. Interestingly, birds that do not visually impress their 
partners have tended to develop musical, singing capabilities in-
stead. Their way of becoming attractive has been enacted differ-
ently: their songs have framed nonvisual possibilities of contact.
There is only environment rather than world until qualities per-
ceived and generated by someone or something are brought forth 
to the world. We understand that some signs have no significance 
for me, they do not figure into my umwelt or world. The notion of 
framing, in this respect, involves a mode of organization and of 
sensibility that is characteristic of each form of life. In this sense 
the notion complements framing as the ‘narrative technique’, 
introduced earlier, while still retaining that conception (framing 
as narrative) as a particular manifestation of this more general 
(ontological) territoriality suggested by Deleuze and Guattari.18 In 
Deleuze and Guattari, framing becomes a spatio-temporal terri-
torialization enacted by vibratory forces. Partly, they follow von 
Uexküll, who believed that nature works “by counterpoint”, a con-
trapuntal agreement where spider and fly perform in tune to one 
another. Thus, the spider weaves threads that have to withstand 
the collision of the fly, the threads, on the other hand, need to be 
thin enough to become invisible to the fly, while its mesh matches 
the size of the fly’s body (von Uexküll 2001b).  These performanc-
es (actions with a purpose) of animals “are not products of a har-
monic build of the body, it is the harmony of the performance that 
determines that of the body” (von Uexküll 2001b). Thus, Deleuze 
and Guattari say that the territoriality framed by a bird through its 
song responds to a “nomos” (in ancient Greek philosophy, a law, 
a convention), or a 
musical ‘nome’ [...] melodic formula that seeks recognition [...] The 
nomos as customary, unwritten law is inseparable from a distribution 
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In design, art and architecture more or less comprehensive no-
tions of symbiosis have been developed. At a personal level, the 
following cases have been of relevance: architect Kisho Kurokawa 
has proposed a “philosophy of symbiosis” (1996, 2005) that em-
phasizes processes of transformation, metabolism. In Kurokawa’s 
view, the roots of symbiosis are to be found in Buddhist philoso-
phy. Although many of Kurokawa’s approaches to architecture 
and design are valuable to an understanding of the processes and 
the becoming of design, his view of symbiosis is not compatible 
with the perspective of this work, since he understands the gen-
eral notion of symbiosis as a form of mutualism. This conception 
is particularly expressed in sentences where the term symbiosis 
stands for forms of ‘harmony’: “[symbiosis] rather than coexist-
ence, harmony, or peace”.20 
Designer Li Jönsson developed a project entitled “Made by 
Products” in which she studied forms of energy (heat, noise/vi-
bration, water particles —steam, among others) that dissipate 
from the use of home appliances such as kettles, televisions, or 
lamps, proposing design responses for tapping onto the poten-
tial of these phenomena.21 The possibilities of devising artefacts 
that function in relation to the ‘by-products’ (steam coming from 
a kettle, when what we desire to obtain is hot water for a tea) of 
these devices indicates possibilities for other machines, and other 
organisms for parasitism, commensalism, or mutualism. Through 
the “parasite lamp”, designers Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby had 
previously suggested one such scenario, where the lamp ‘para-
sites’ electric appliances benefiting from their electromagnetic 
fields.22 By explicitly addressing the ‘waste’ produced by devices 
which is not assimilated as ‘food’ by other systems or organisms, 
the ecology of devices of a given environment becomes exposed: 
the possibilities to study alternative scales of a phenomenon, 
ranging from —to continue with the example of a (plastic) ket-
tle— the microscopical scale of the heat that transforms the 
molecular structure or its plastic shell, to the scale of the steam 
(visible by the human eye), or the human manual labour invested 
in interacting with it. 
“Symbiots”, a project within an initiative called Switch! at the 
Interactive Institute in Sweden has explicitly dealt with human-
nonhuman interrelations and interdependencies through the 
notion of symbiosis (Bergström et. al. 2009). Although the cat-
egories of symbiosis (parasitism, commensalism, mutualism) are 
not explicitly articulated in relation to the urban interventions 
proposed, the project addresses cultural and energetic forms of 
edge-non-knowledge becomes articulated through bodies and 
materialities that actualize some possibilities of behaviour and not 
others.
The frame affects us by organizing, enframing powers and forc-
es which might be impossible to experience otherwise. In Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of affect (1994), affects, like intensities and 
sensations, are connected to forces in general, and with bodily 
forces in particular.19 Grosz comments,
What differentiates them [sensations, affects, and intensities] from 
experience, or from any phenomenological framework, is the fact that 
they link the lived or phenomenological body with cosmological forces, 
forces of the outside, that the body itself can never experience di-
rectly. Affects and intensities attest to the body’s immersion and par-
ticipation in nature, chaos, materiality. (Grosz 2008:3). 
 
With regard to an organism’s participation of and with forc-
es, Varela has mentioned that the origin of the cognitive agent’s 
world is based on the coupling of an excess, an elaboration of a 
surplus signification,
this coupling is possible only if the encounters are embraced from the 
perspective of the system itself. This embrace requires the elaboration 
of a surplus signification based on this perspective; it is the origin of 
the cognitive agent’s world. Whatever is encountered in the environ-
ment must be valued or not and interacted with or not. (1999:56).
Once again, von Uexküll’s umwelt resonates through Varela. If 
this surplus, this excess, can be considered (as aesthetic becom-
ing and as a form of attunement to worlds and environments) as 
the driving force behind the production and enaction of ‘a way’ 
(design); one could speculate that sexual selective forces engage 
us (humans) in an exchange —through the production and con-
sumption of artefacts— with forms of threat and unexpected 
events (accidents), that we might, consciously or not, feel are 
‘worth paying for’. Following this reasoning, it becomes interest-
ing to look into design manifestations as conceptions that bring 
forth and enact forms of attunement that prefigure or somehow 
discover negative or ontological aspects of the artificial.
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4.3 Street Cinema 
- Switch! Symbiots 
team, Interactive 
Institute. 
harm or benefit to those identified as part of the network through 
alternative everyday life (human social) behaviour. In this sense, 
“Symbiots” suggestively visualizes (urban, human) ‘trade offs’ of 
cohabitation. This can be seen for example, in one of the scenar-
ios proposed (Fig. 4.3), where a group of neighbours have been 
rewarded with the screening of a film in the middle of a street, 
becoming a seat and a traffic-stopping event by means of raising 
the level of the stripes of a crosswalk. This event results from a 
collective effort were everyone in the area works together to low-
er energy consumption. In this way, the intervention becomes “a 
parasite” that feeds off the surplus of energy resulting from low-
ered consumption of traditional house appliances. “The survival 
of the parasite depends upon its ability to minimize the energy 
consumption of local residents sharing the resources of the host 
grid.” (Bergström et. al. 2009:4).
Designer and theorist Otto von Busch, has worked with stu-
dents at the London College of Fashion, exploring the theme of 
the von Uexküllian umwelt under a course entitled “Neighbour-
hoodies” (2010). von Busch focuses on the framing of territo-
ry produced by rhythm. He follows Deleuze and Guattari, who, 
through von Uexküll, had suggested that
There is a territory when the rhythm has expressiveness. What de-
fines the territory is the emergence of matters of expression (quali-
ties). Take the example of color in birds or fish: color is a membrane 
state associated with interior hormonal states, but it remains func-
tional and transitory as longs as it is tied to a type of action (sexual-
ity, aggressiveness, flight). It becomes expressive, on the other hand, 
when it acquires a temporal constancy and a spatial range that make it 
a territorial, or rather territorializing, mark: a signature. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004:347).
Along this reasoning, von Busch writes “The borders or fronts 
of neighbourhoods also take cultural and traditional expres-
sions along which the [refrain] ritournelle can be experienced” 
(2010:10). Thus, 
an ethnic group might use communal cooking along the street as a re-
frain recreating home by means of culinary expressions, the gustatory 
sense of specific spices and olfactory markings. Muslim communities 
have loudspeakers on minarets to announce the calls to prayer, thus 
framing the neighbourhood sonically, not too different from the refrain 
of birds. (von Busch 2010:10).
The concrete outcome of the speculations were materialized as 
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4.4 Neighbourhoodie, 
Brixton covered mar-
ket - Kate Wakeling. 
street style garments, “hoodies”. Identified with the stigmatized 
and criminally minded and as an “intimidating uniform” by cer-
tain politicians in England, the hoodies became the canvas were 
each neighbourhood’s umwelt would resonate. Figure 4.4 shows 
a project by Kate Wakeling, were she expresses Brixton’s covered 
market’s diversity, “which although chaotic, helps to maintain a 
friendly and cohesive community”. In her version of the hoodie, 
the honeycomb pattern represents the constant “hive of activity” 
that can be experienced any day of the week at Brixton.
The designs of Tuur Van Balen as well as those of Revital Cohen 
investigate possible scenarios through biotechnologies. In “Pigeon 
D’Or” (Fig. 4.5) Van Balen explores cities as complex metabolisms 
and proposes the modification of feral pigeons’ digestive systems 
through synthetic biology. With the help of specific interfaces, 
Van Balen introduces a bacteria designed and created in such a 
way that, when fed to pigeons, turns their faeces into detergent 
and becomes “as harmless to pigeons as yoghurt is to humans”, 
in other words, the pigeons become designed to defecate soap.23 
In Revital Cohen’s “Dialysis Sheep” (Fig. 4.6) a transgenic lamb 
‘cleans’ blood for a human patient with kidney failure. The sheep’s 
kidneys are connected via blood lines to the patient. During the 
night, pumps remove waste products from the patient’s blood by 
pumping it out of the body, through the sheep’s kidney while re-
turning it cleaned.24
A variety of degrees of ‘naturality’ and ‘artificiality’ are enacted 
through this small selection of design manifestations. Each of 
these projects raises important ethico-aesthetical issues, modes 
of engagement that question our capacity to control, and per-
form, through technologies, relations to systems and organisms. 
The devices frame and crystallize given partitions, inscribing dif-
ferences and sensitizing us from their own logic, by prescribing 
more or less unexpected forms of cohabitation. In my view, each 
of them articulates —by making visible— a form of ethology. 
Ethology, the scientific study of animal behaviour, puts emphasis 
on the behavioural patterns occurring in specific environments. It 
stresses the study of relations between an organism and its en-
vironment, and in this way, among systems, living and nonliving. 
A design that stresses the interactions with humans and non-
humans, generates awareness of ways of being in the world, and 
the possibilities of short and long term cohabitation. In this sense, 
ethology —etho-ecological studies— provides insights into the 
possibility of hospitality-hostility to beings (and systems) that af-
fect and conform the biosphere. 
In this respect, Otto von Busch’s “Neighbourhoodies”, by ex-
plicitly addressing the human umwelt as a form of attunement to 
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¡PESTES!
From a biological perspective, forms of symbiosis may be nutri-
tional or protective. Even though, as we have seen, the categories 
are problematic, I decided, in order to keep the concept relatively 
simple, to design artefacts considering the symbiotic relations 
from a ‘nutritional’ perspective. My use of single quotation marks 
emphasize the metaphorical register of the word ‘nutritional’. The 
symbiotic concepts of ¡Pestes! must be understood in the light 
of the complex interrelations of assemblages, as extensions, thus 
as processes of (human) singularization, where a psychological, a 
social, and an environmental ecology overlap and are at play.
I have dealt with a relatively simple and well-known artefact, 
the radio. Partly because of its iconic status, being easily rec-
ognizable. It is also, at least in most of the so-called developed 
world, economically affordable and accessible in terms of inter-
face, most of these devices having the quality of being portable. 
I have chosen the radio as a generic ‘artefact’ that stands for, or 
represents so-called consumer products in general. I could have 
chosen other devices which are also easily recognized; clocks, 
lamps, or telephones, to name a few of the most common every-
day ones. The choice of the radio had to do with the possibility of 
modelling and prototyping these machines in real scale, as well as 
with the possibility of raising issues that concern intangible and 
unperceibable dimensions such as the reception and transmission 
of electromagnetic waves, aspects suggested, but not explicitly 
addressed here.
Implicit in the symbiotic interrelations studied, ¡Pestes! (mean-
ing “pests” in Spanish) plays with the idea, and suggests the role 
of humans as forms of pest.
Although I initiated the project in Stockholm months earlier, 
¡Pestes! was developed in Córdoba, Argentina (Fig. B.1) during a 
3-month period, between March and June 2011.
I designed the radios in collaboration with industrial designer 
Leonardo López. Each radio was designed considering a specific 
‘ecological niche’ that ranged from a ‘natural’ context to an ‘arti-
ficial’ one. We decided to situate each form of symbiosis in a set-
ting that we would name ‘artificial’, ‘natural-artificial’ or ‘natural’, 
to emphasize more explicitly that the concepts do not deal with a 
dichotomist opposition between what is ‘natural’ or what is ‘artifi-
cial’, but with degrees of ‘naturality’ or ‘artificiality’, and where all 
kind of symbiotic relationships exist. ‘Artificiality’ simply implies a 
more pervasive presence of human constructions.
As the project developed, Leonardo and I ‘aligned’ the artificial 
setting with the parasitic proposal, the natural-artificial one with 
local (in this case urban) environments, articulates an ontological 
dimension of design that we tend to be unaware of. 
I believe that the human parasitism to the lamb or the seem-
ingly commensal relation to the pigeons, expose degrees of hos-
pitality-hostility to other beings, human and nonhuman. In their 
biotechnological instrumentality, Van Balen’s and Cohen’s works 
capture and channel a life force, an existing power of which we 
are part of, and explicitly address forms of interrelations with a 
natural substratum (biological, systemic) which tends to be ab-
stracted in the urban and artificial settings of most design pro-
jects.25 Exposed to their framing, the appeal of these works sug-
gest accidents of biotechnology, their designs stage the shock 
of a first time encounter, as in a breakdown: the hospitality of 
the lamb, and its accident through the hostility of the (ab)use of 
the lamb. But only temporarily, until it is naturalized, incorporated 
into knowledge. What follows —in order to become truly hospita-
ble— is the need to form a new territoriality, another movement 
in search for a framing that will displace the expectations of the 
hospitality of these bodies. 
My particular attempts to deal with forms of symbioses reflect 
a personal need to articulate, to make explicit, the categories —
parasitism, commensalism, mutualism— as a form of territoriali-
zation, as enframing. And question, through a systematic engage-
ment, their difference in register; whether they are for example, 
metaphorical, anthropocentric, ecological, a combination of them, 
or whether they suggest a given temporal or spatial perspective. 
My intention, is to elaborate distinctions to further understand the 
emergence and the ethical implications of possible assemblages.
Understanding cognition as enaction, by which what we can 
do, sense and think influences what we can be and become, the 
designs that follow are an attempt to materialize proposals that 
stress ontological politics, where realities are enacted rather than 
pre-given (Hinchliffe and Whatmore 2006). Pushing epistemolog-
ical claims of things being something ‘known’, to engage instead 
in an open and speculative relation with affordances of specific 
environments, systems and species.   
The more we acknowledge other entities and their needs, all 
places (topoi) should be conceived, at least potentially, as bio-
topes. However, the division, the partition will remain; from the 
devising follows the device. That is to say, from the planning, im-
agining, conceiving, an action or a materiality is enacted as a re-
sponse to the preconceived arrangement. The less fragmentary 
the thought, the less damaging the resulting conceptions.    
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4.7 Iconic radios and 
matching of forms 
of symbioses to local 
environments.
the mutualistic proposal, while the natural setting was matched 
with the commensalistic proposal (Fig. 4.7). 
Gradually, three designs for radios where suggested in rela-
tion to the niches studied. In all cases, the general design process 
was a combination of work with prepositiontools (associating ele-
ments such as water, or air —as in figure 4.2— to organisms or 
system components, depending on the environment in question), 
as well as traditional desk and field research. Some instances of 
this process are documented in “Appendix B”.
Partly, as I understand it, the relevance of the ‘heterotopian’ 
approach to symbiotic relationships lies in its unpredictability. 
In this sense, it is interesting to note with Lynn Margulis, that 
“symbiogenesis is far more splendid than sex as a generator of 
evolutionary novelty.” (1998: 89). Explicitly —instead of gradual 
evolutionary processes— unexpected events have led to aleatory 
combinations, pushing systems and organisms to cohabit in what-
ever circumstances, and to the testing of resilient capabilities and 
their life in symbioses.
The search for energy sources in the artificial setting  resulted 
in the decision to contextualise the parasitic radio (Radiopho-
num Electridis Prehensio), in a neighbourhood called “Juniors” 
—where our studio was situated— being the houses of this area 
located particularly close to the electrical network, to the extent 
that some of the cables at more than three meters height can be 
easily reached with a hand through windows in the upper floors 
(Figs. 4.8-9). 
The prototype of the parasitic radio was built according to 
standard electronic radio devices. It consists of a wooden case 
divided into pieces that form the outer shell of the radio, these 
parts are joined by magnets that keep the case in one piece (the 
three radios of this set are built with the same magnetic princi-
ple). The radio receiver is electronic, as well as the transformer 
that converts the 220V coming from the terminal into the 3V re-
quired to run the radio. Its terminal —by which one can puncture 
the existing electrical network— consists of two piercing metal 
instruments (see figures 4.10-11), each of them puncture a single 
of the four cables of the network. Of these four cables, three of 
them conduct 220V, while the fourth one is grounded, for the ra-
dio to function the piercing metals must be connected to a single 
220V cable as well as a grounded one.
The commensalistic radio (Radiophonum Ventosa Energia), 
was designed for the natural setting and the strong winds of the 
sierras between “La Cumbre” and “Ascochinga”(Fig. 1.2). As men-
tioned, the proposal suggests a radio functioning on electric ener-
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Electridis Prehensio - 
Parasitism in an artifi-
cial environment.    
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gy that originates from a kite, which, by means of a piezo-electric 
circuit-board generates the 3V necessary to run the radio. The 
pressure exercised by the wind, bends the flaps of the kite, acti-
vating the piezo-electric board, generating electricity in its turn 
(Figs. 1.4-5).
The mutualistic radio (Radiophonum Piscea Energia), was con-
ceived for the natural-artificial setting located in the area belong-
ing to an electric power plant from 1911 in “La Calera” still produc-
ing energy to the region until the staging of our project in May 
2011. A traditional hydroelectric plant, producing electricity from 
the flow of water of the river beside its building (Fig. 4.12).
The proposal implies a radio with electric energy generated 
by the pressure from the movements of water flow in conjunc-
tion with the energy provided by the biting (on the terminal made 
of balanced food) of Serrasalmus spilopleura, a local fish called 
“palometa”.  The piezo-electric devices designed to oscillate with 
the water flow as well as the biting obtain and transmit the 3V 
necessary to run the device (Figs. 4.14 and 4.16). The mutualism 
proposed here, reflects the relationship with the fish, where the 
providing of food in exchange for energy is seen as mutually ben-
eficial. 
Figure 4.15 shows images of two specimens of Serrasalmus 
spilopleura, one of them being infected with a parasitical fungus, 
quite common in this species. Partly, what interested us —form-
ing through the radio a relation of mutualism— was the possibility 
to design the food on the piezo-electric terminals (Fig. 4.16). In 
this way, the notion of mutualism with this species could have 
higher/lower degrees of benefit. To begin with, food, in this case, 
cannot be ‘bait’, which is the standard association of the human-
fish relation through fishing. Food in this context equals ‘balanced 
food’, as in pet’s food. In this way, if local communities of fish are 
identified (categorized) as ‘ill’ or affected by such fungi, the food 
might be, for example, treated with doses of medicine, increasing 
the degree of mutualism with the fish. 
The degrees of “exactness” of which De Tarde speaks of in the 
opening quote to this section, imply a degree of inclusion-exclu-
sion, we could say, of hospitality-hostility. The suggestion of cura-
tive balanced food, does not only point at a possible ‘application’ 
for the ‘improvement’ of a product, it also exposes the choice: 
without fully understanding their ecological roles26, intuitively, we 
tend to prefer the fish rather than the fungi. It would also be pos-
sible to devise an alternative that stimulates the advance of fungi. 
Provided that we sympathise, if not directly with the fungi, with 
the idea of a mutually beneficial relationship. The practice of de-
sign has always been ethico-aesthetic.27
4.11 Details, parasitic 
radio.
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4.16 Details, mutu-
alistic radio. In the 
middle: Balanced food 
for Serrasalmus Spilo-
pleura, study model.
4.15 Serrasalmus spi-
lopleura - locally called 
“palometa”. (Below: 
individual affected by 
fungi).
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By conceiving the radios in relation to specific actors of eco-
logical niches (the wind, a fish, a particular electric network), the 
focus of the designs becomes displaced from their traditional 
human-centredness to the given energetical relations that allow 
the devices to function. Each niche becoming a source of dis-
covery and potential, by being performed, enacted in relation to 
the devices. Each actor investigated, examined for its capacities, 
abilities to perform in-relation-to.
My presenting images of the places, the niches, where the 
radios were to later function, is a response to this concern: to 
render the environments ‘visible’ by looking for potential forms 
of interaction which are non-standard in current energetic terms, 
since most devices rely on a global, standard, electrical network 
as energy source.
The three radios where conceived as a ‘family’ of radios, thus 
their visual resemblance. More specifically, what an observer rec-
ognizes as ‘the’ radio is an iconic design that proposes the artefact 
as a prototypical member of a category (radio), making it familiar 
in order to maximize the radios’ capacity to suggest and com-
municate the complexity of the concepts in question, rather than 
challenging the observer with the recognisability of the device as 
a radio (Fig. 4.7). The designs were conceived to communicate 
the (symbiotic) concepts, thus the size, particularly the thickness 
of the cables used in the models/prototypes, which follow the 
‘concept’ rather than the optimal cable diameter that a specific 
electric voltage would require. This is particularly noticeable in the 
‘parasitic’ device, the cables being thicker than for the standard 
electric appliances running on 220V, in order to communicate the 
threat of ‘hooking’ the device by puncturing the electric network.
Although as I mentioned, all concepts are predominantly con-
ceived from a ‘nutritional’ perspective, the ‘parasitic’ radio can be 
said to operate at a more diffuse level of social parasitism. Being 
a device that ‘feeds’ on electricity that originates from an existing 
—human, social— network, the ‘nutritional’ aspect is perceived 
as an act of piracy, since the user of the radio cannot but be aware 
of its illegal mode of operation. 
LATIN NAMES 
Based on the ‘nutritional’ conception of the devices, the radios 
were given Latin names that refer to the source of energy that 
makes them function. Thus Radiophonum Electridis Prehensio 
(Fig. 4.17) means “radio (artefact) that ‘takes’, ‘seizes’, or ‘pre-
hends’ electricity”. Radiophonum Piscea Energia stands for “ra-
dio (artefact) that runs on energy coming from a fish”, while Ra-
diophonum Ventosa Energia stands for “radio (artefact) that runs 
on energy coming from wind”.
The Latin names were given to create associations with the 
world of living or natural species, using the traditional biological 
nomenclature to designate a ‘domain’ where the artefacts might 
‘belong’ to, in relation to living (and artificial) systems. 
I believe that through this procedure, one does not only address 
the taxonomic relativity of their classification, a much debated 
topic and not only in biology, but also and more importantly in this 
work, the naming itself as an act that con-forms our perception of 
a given artefact-system-organism’s ‘position’ or ‘philum’.
The naming ‘freezes’ so to say a perspective, a given set of 
relations. As a name, Radiophonum Piscea Energia for example, 
‘captures’ the relational aspect between the energy coming from 
the fish, and in this sense works already at a basic descriptive 
level. In its specificity, this description does not suggest any other 
of the relations that the device establishes with its environment, 
neither at the time when the artefact is being used by someone 
as a radio, neither before, nor during, its production or distribu-
tion as a product, or after, once the radio is discarded. Our nam-
ing reflects this tendency to ‘fix’, or rather, to perceive artefacts 
as fixed, static and bounded. However, nothing is static, natural 
and artificial things evolve, age, transform themselves in relation 
to their environments. It is in relation to our own bodies, as sen-
tient organisms, that the duration of these entities is perceived as 
static, or with a certain degree of permanence.
The naming resembles, in a sense, the logical operations per-
formed by some of the works of Joseph Kosuth, as in “One and 
Three chairs” (Fig. 4.18), where the word “chair” for example, par-
ticipates in a de-limitation and con-formation of a category. A per-
formative and generic notion that includes not only this particular 
artefact but also all the ones that resemble it. Kosuth includes in 
the installation, the dictionary definition of  “chair”, as well as a 
photographic image of the three-dimensional chair itself, located 
where it is, confronting us with what one might understand as 
degrees of ‘chairness’. Note that Kosuth entitled the work “One 
and Three chairs”, where the ‘anding’ brings together, coordinates 
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in this case, these three 
particular arrangements, 
all of them bringing forth 
a type of chair. 
Once again, Roland 
Barthes’ satori moments 
come to mind, the “retreat 
of sings”, in-between our 
perceptions. Similarly, the 
photographic images and 
the names of the devices 
proposed at ¡Pestes! are 
meant to complement 
or even supplement (if 
one can think of them as 
‘increasing’ reality) performing a movement, a tension between 
familiarization and defamiliarization. We familiarize us, when we 
perceive the three-dimensional artefact, the radio, and relate to 
it first by sight, and later by touch, smell and hearing. The im-
ages that accompany the radios situate or contextualize them in 
specific ‘niches’, where they were conceived to ideally function, 
increasing our understanding of their particular (symbiotic) per-
formativity. Being descriptive —although in a vaguely familiar for-
eign language— the names ‘close’ the categorization. Thus, the 
device called Radiophonum Piscea Energia, becomes the ‘radio 
(artefact) that runs on energy coming from a fish’. Rather than 
indicating that the radio is (i.e. “Philips FM radio”), this naming 
suggests that it becomes that radio in its very relation to the ‘nu-
trient’ and the process that provides it with energy, and its spe-
cific ‘degree’ of (in this case) mutualism.
PROPOSING A CRITIQUE
Knowledge and learning processes (cognition) cannot be disas-
sociated from their bodily, material manifestations. Being both 
expressions of structural coupling, “development and learning 
are two sides of the same coin” as Fritjof Capra has emphasized 
(1996:261). In evolutionary terms, the structural coupling of hu-
mans with-in environments evidences a capacity to adapt to al-
ternative conditions without precedence for mammals. Human’s 
semiotic capacity and strength provides a possibility to overcome 
challenges. These challenges need to be anchored on an acknowl-
edgement of ecological interdependence, and an understanding of 
the processes of human and nonhuman systems. In other words, 
4.17 Latin name for 
the parasitic radio.
(Detail of the radio 
at the exhibition 
“Devices” in 
connection with 
the final doctoral 
seminar at HDK, 
Gothenburg).
4.18 ‘One and 
Three Chairs’ - 
Joseph Kosuth. 
Wooden folding 
chair, photographic 
copy of a chair, 
and photographic 
enlargement 
of a dictionary 
definition of a 
chair.
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4.19 Life-cycle.
Useful-cycle high-
lighted in red.
anchored on an attempt to understand symbiotic associations and 
symbiogenesis.
Devising is an act of in-scription, of folding. Through the logic 
of this work, both processes, folding and unfolding, have made 
use of prepositiontools. Some of the associations which these 
tools have made possible have been exposed through the materi-
alization of the radios. More specifically, through their terminals 
(with the electrical network, with the wind, with a fish and a flow 
of water). Like any other artefact, the radios give us a glimpse of 
how we live and have lived; artefacts can be thought as traces, 
transitional states of development, the materialization of a given 
knowledge in relation to multiple variables and compromises. 
An archeology of these devices would disclose that the forms 
of symbioses projected in ¡Pestes! emphasize an energetic and 
material engagement to a place, a particular interrelationship to a 
‘niche’, pointing at both, cooperation and competition as sources 
of evolution. It would also disclose that they reflect an instru-
mental concern with the ‘useful’ cycles of the artefacts rather 
than with their whole life-cycles: the commensalism, mutualism 
and parasitism of the proposals can only be conceived during the 
useful-cycle of the radio, that is, during the period when a human 
is using it to listen to radio. 
Based on diagramming developed at 3Ecologies, figure 4.19 
depicts a basic scheme of a life-cycle and some of its potential 
becomings. In this case, of a plastic component of the radio, one 
that is made from fossil resources. The diagram highlights in-
stances of the life-cycle of the product such as: the extraction of 
resources from the earth, the production of materials and inter-
mediate parts, the assembly of the parts to become a product, as 
well as key logistical stances until the moment of acquisition of 
the product by a user. This two-dimensional diagram emphasizes 
the time aspects of the cycle, and takes into account potential 
ways of disposing off or reusing of the product. Highlighted in red, 
is the useful-cycle, which is, as mentioned, the period when a user 
acquires the product and uses it. 
What this type of diagramming may facilitate is to understand 
in visual terms, that generally, life-cycle does not end with useful-
cycle, and —if able to ‘zoom’ in and out of it, enabling one to look 
at specific activities— that simple everyday behaviour such as 
the way washing a cotton t-shirt at 60° in the city of Stockholm, 
affects the sexuality of the frogs in its archipelago, and by exten-
sion the water conditions of the Baltic sea.28 
The relationship that the radios —their processes and com-
ponents— form throughout the whole of their life-cycles, from 
production to waste can only be suggested, hinted at, in these 
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A3
against
fish radio
present
A
against
fish radio +>
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A1
against
fish radio
present/human
A2
against
fish radio
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against
fish radio
past/human
A2
against
fish radio
past/micro
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against
fish radio
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against
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A2
against
fish radio
future/micro
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B
against
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>
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A
against
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4.20 On the mutual-
ism of Radiophonum 
Piscea Energia, in 
relation to its sym-
biotic complexity at 
alternative scales.
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multiplicity and distributive agency, they become not only unpre-
dictable, but even unconceivable. 
As such ¡Pestes! (including its processes using preposition-
tools) is a critique of design as a basic, human, way of devising; 
the practice of production and conception of the artificial. The 
project addresses the need to engage in ontological politics, by 
making explicit some of the symbiotic associations of the devices 
proposed. 
The assemblages that machines constitute with human beings, 
can be said to become, by extension, autopoietic.30 In the sense 
that our own capacity for self generation (autopoiesis), becomes 
extended by means of the structural coupling to the environment 
mediated by (allopoietic) machines. Rethinking the coupling of 
human products (the technosphere) to the biosphere through a 
reassessment of the notion of autopoiesis, might allow to con-
ceive more integrative devising processes.31
Design’s ethico-aesthetical domain imply propositions, in-
scriptions, of possibilities of relation, practices enacted by a hu-
man logic of sense. If the human assemblages can be understood 
to be or become autopoietic, they should also be seen, in their 
incapacity to acknowledge other life forms, as mutilating and ex-
cluding. 
Maturana and Varela define ethics by stating that 
Every human act takes place in language. Every act in language brings 
forth a world created with others in the act of coexistence which gives 
rise to what is human. Thus every human act has an ethical meaning 
because it is an act of constitution of the human world. This linkage of 
human to human is, in the final analysis, the groundwork of all ethics 
as a reflection on the legitimacy of the presence of others. (1998:247). 
Extending this claim through the expanded notion of autopoie-
sis, otherness should include nonhuman manifestations, as in hu-
man-nonhuman and also nonhuman-nonhuman relations through 
assemblages. Thus, the hospitality-hostility that acknowledges 
or disregards others is enacted through the human capacity to 
recognize the entanglement, the interrelations and the continuum 
nature-culture, from the very gestures of everyday practices me-
diated by language and design. 
DEVISING IN SHORT
The devising process inscribes differences that benefit or harm 
some systems or organisms and not others. As such, it implies the 
scenarios. Following a triple ecological register, one should ac-
count for psychological, social and environmental aspects during 
the manufacturing, using, and discarding of the devices. These, 
on their turn could be further explored through alternative spa-
tio-temporal scales, going through a multiple-layered set of rela-
tionships, during the whole of the life-cycle of the device. From 
source to source, energy to waste and waste to energy. 
For example, the radios are made of several components, elec-
tronic or otherwise. Some of them can be singled out such as 
‘wood’, or ‘zinc’. Many of them are composed of several materials, 
which in their turn, may or may not be composite. Sometimes the 
components are made of combinations of materials that are dif-
ficult or impossible to dismantle, to disassociate, as in the circuit 
boards. The production, distribution, consumption and discard 
of each of these materials relate to processes and environments 
where humans behave affecting not only human social and indi-
vidual bodies, but also the environments that humans are capable 
of perceiving, conceiving. 
A schematic example to depict this reasoning can be seen in 
figure 4.20, taking in consideration the design of the mutualistic 
radio, conceived through the (i)logic relationship fish-against-ra-
dio. The mutualism proposed here, can then be understood in its 
narrowness and specificity. 
In figure 4.20, we can observe the present situation “A” (in 
blue) of the mutualistic relation fish-radio. In this present situ-
ation, the mutualism is understood as the providing of food for 
the fish in exchange of energy. This mutualism is time and place 
specific, it ceases to exist as soon as acknowledgement of the 
processes of manufacturing, distribution, and even consumption 
outside of the specific fish-radio domain, are taken into account. 
Moreover, the radio and its components will become other things 
when no longer in use as a radio (in this particular assembly that 
provides the functionality of receiving radio waves and convert-
ing them into sound waves perceptible by the human ear), once 
trashed, reused or recycled. Once again, highlighted in red is the 
useful-cycle, the moment of use to which I refer to.
Within “A” one could think alternative scales, A1: a micro scale, 
A2: a human scale, and A3: a macro scale.29 All of them happening 
at present time. These scales could also be considered at alterna-
tive temporal scales, a past “B” (in orange) and a future “C” (in 
yellow), each of them subdivided into their micro-human-macro 
spatial scales. The result of the speculations of such co-ordination 
becomes overwhelming through the amount of potential relations 
that can be considered. No design response can acknowledge the 
total complexity of such potential and virtual interactions; in their 
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enactment of forms of hospitality-hostility. 
Through the biological notion of symbiosis the partitions of de-
vices become explicit once each given artefact or component be-
comes associated with the systems and organisms that con-form 
the habitat or ecological niche where it per-forms.
The ‘heterotopian’ shifts triggered by the playful use of prepo-
sitions (through prepositiontools) allow us to associate entities in 
a way that seems counter-intuitive and against experience, but 
which nonetheless offer the insights of speculating upon an envi-
ronment as if all forms of association could lead to the constitu-
tion of a world. 
The project entitled ¡Pestes! by means of ‘heterotopian’ propo-
sitions raises awareness of the potentialities of a given environ-
ment. It also suggests a range of possible symbioses of each de-
vice to these environments, depending on the situation and scale 
adopted to consider the relation.
As such, it allows considering and speculating upon the symbi-
otic associations and the symbiogenesis of a given device —that 
is, on its genealogy, its history of structural coupling and ways 
of affecting and being affected throughout the whole of its life-
cycle.
Awareness of the symbiotic associations that we, consciously 
or not, willingly or unwillingly, engage in through the enactment 
of the artificial, brings us closer to the possibility of developing 
designs that acknowledge emergence as well as other forms of 
life. Such awareness frames design as the ethical practice that it 
has always been. 
Concluding
Concluding
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in 
other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter 
into composition with other affects, with the affects of another 
body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to 
exchange actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing 
a more powerful body.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari
Concluding160 161 
I started this work inquiring into the relationship artefact-acci-
dent. These enquiries gradually led to a broader understanding of 
the ecological implications of our cultural activities, which I as-
sociated with issues of hospitality-hostility affecting humans and 
nonhumans.  
It has been of personal importance throughout these years, 
to acknowledge and to try to understand, the ethological, and 
the etho-ecological aspects of design, that is, modes of human 
production that affirm the inseparability of the ethos, the way of 
behaving peculiar to a being, and oikos, the habitat of that be-
ing. Through this perspective, the proposals suggested here em-
phasize the instrumental roles of devices in performing tasks that 
prescribe models or ways of engagement, not only with a particu-
lar activity but more generally with a way of being and a model of 
cognition.
One could say that all forms of how are design questions. 
Whenever we can ask a question, there is the likelihood (some 
would even say the precondition) of an answer. ‘How’ questions 
(as opposed to ‘what’ or ‘why’ questions), pre-figure a way, a 
mode of engagement. The answers to these questions enact ways 
of being and of doing that favour particular stances, positions, 
views. However, when we design a ‘response’, we enact and/or 
materialize how something relates to, not only the thing or situ-
ation we had in mind, but how that relates to a myriad of bodies 
and systems conforming the biosphere in ways that we cannot 
fully predict or control. ‘How’ questions become design questions 
to the extent that they are understood as willed agency. Inevitably 
however, distributive agency forms part of the assemblages en-
acted through the becoming of the processes of doing and mak-
ing things. 
We do not construct something that will have a univocal out-
come, or for that matter a series of (planned) outcomes; we enact 
and materialize triggers with ranges of possibilities. 
Once in contact with the potentialities of other beings and sys-
tems (human and nonhuman), these triggers form assemblages 
of different life-spans and characteristics, ranging from the ex-
plosive behaviour of accidental encounters as in the assemblage 
nuclear plant-tsunami (in all its vast network), to the less dramatic 
but still overwhelmingly complex: cotton t-shirt-washed-at-60°-
in-Stockholm, affecting the sexuality of frogs and by extension 
the water conditions of the Baltic sea. 
This is partly why, as I understand it, the relevance of the play-
ful and ‘heterotopian’ approach to symbiotic relationships lies in 
its unpredictability. The  heterotopian compositions, lead to alea-
tory combinations that push systems and organisms to cohabit in 
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unprecedented spatio-temporal circumstances. Such novel forms 
of cohabitation in their turn lead to the testing of their resilient 
capabilities and of their life in symbiosis. And through this proce-
dure, to our awareness of the relationships themselves.
‘Hows’ far too often assume ‘real outcomes’ and given rela-
tions, but since we cannot quite completely know what nor why, 
it is of importance to adhere to a language that assumes less real 
relations, and thus sensitizes us to the unexpected. My design 
proposals are an attempt to cultivate such disposition. 
Bruno Latour’s notion of an infra-language becomes, in the 
search for  ecological realities, fundamental by demanding a 
practice of languaging which engages in ontological politics. This 
demand occurs since the words used to express or manifest our 
thoughts cannot quite pre-define what ‘is out there’, but rather, 
need to point at potential associations, engaging us explicitly in 
the enactment of these realities and on our taking sides: taking 
positions that expose the devising and the likely partitions of the 
device.
If the notion of device, in spite of becoming a category, forms 
part of an infra-language, it is because, precisely like affordances, 
one can only talk of or investigate a given partition in relation to 
a given entity, at a given time, at a given place. The tree affords a 
wide range of possibilities, depending on what and how it relates 
to. Equally, the device arranges a wide spectrum of possibilities, 
and might trigger planned and unplanned reactions, performing 
both, inclusions and exclusions. 
When “we know nothing of a body until we know what it can 
do” we tend to become careful, mindful, receptive. In this way, 
the device exposes the choices of conviviality, and its preferences 
at addressing precarity: the vulnerability of what, and for whom? 
It also embraces virtuality in its acknowledging of emergence 
without completely assuming the totality of its forms. If we are to 
take, accept and learn to measure risks, and do this in the cos-
mopolitical way that Isabelle Stengers suggests, we are to, not 
only acknowledge the symmetry artefact-accident as Paul Virilio 
wants, but understand its ecological implications: there are only 
processes of transformation, some of which happen unexpect-
edly, and are the result of complex interactions. Accident must 
be understood as a human category with its limitations in spatio-
temporal scales. And through this awareness, attempt to compose 
that etho-ecological cosmos, which is not ideal but real unknown. 
Current studies of cognitive patterns evidence that cognition 
results from a given perceptive coherency based on the cross 
correlation and working together of bodily functions. Through its 
actualization/reorganization, a body enacts forms of knowledge, 
processes which in the case of human beings result in bringing 
forth worlds and the enaction of languaging. 
Understanding cognition as a networked and emergent pro-
cess, has allowed Francisco Varela to formulate the notion of (hu-
man) self as a form of narrative, where the weaving together of 
a personal story brings forth a sense of personal identity. We do 
not notice the transitions, the breakdowns that occur in the lapse 
between the 200 to 500 msec that we call present; the lapses 
of time get knitted together under our current intention (going 
home), until something ‘dramatic’ happens: our wallet is gone!
In spite of the difference between the results of the processes 
of (animal) language and (human animal) languaging, cognitively, 
human and nonhuman autopoietic organisms, share this basis, the 
enaction of a response based on this same emergent process. The 
empathy that might be brought forth through this insight can be 
a source for a refinement of an ethical sensibility of ecological 
dimensions; biologically, we act and coordinate our behaviour in 
similar patterns than any other sentient being. Any evolutionary 
survey of skeletons acknowledges morphological correspondenc-
es between humans and animals, but the study of life processes 
clearly indicate that human similarities to other life forms is more 
common than their differences. This in itself should inspire empa-
thy, wonder and esteem. 
In these pages, I have considered relations and the processes 
of linking and re-linking through the articulation of two projects: 
prepositiontools and ¡Pestes! 
In my view, prepositiontools help us ask ‘what if’, and to model 
and imagine the future as open-ended. The ‘heterotopian’ shifts 
triggered by the playful use of prepositiontools allow us to as-
sociate entities in a ways that are counter-intuitive, but which of-
fer insights for speculating upon an environment as if all forms 
of association could lead to the constitution of a world. They are 
devices that contribute to unfold categories in order to emphasize 
relations and to compose and associate things that we otherwise 
would be unlikely to conceive. In this way, they contribute to think 
and sense the ethical implications of the inclusions and exclu-
sions, of connecting this and not that.  
¡Pestes! explored ‘host-guest relationships’, by working with 
the biological notion of symbiosis. The relations exposed through 
the design proposals articulate degrees of anthropocentrism and 
suggest some of the ecological implications of these conceptions.
As I understand them, both projects enact not only proposals, 
but also critiques of design. They critique a narrow instrumental-
ity of the conception of the artificial, where the emphasis tends 
to be placed on a given epistemology, rather than in the process 
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aspects, the becoming of our lives in symbioses with other beings 
and systems, that is, with emphasis on a ontological project of 
collective becoming. 
By thinking in symbiotic terms, even about artefacts, one be-
comes aware that organisms function only in relation to other or-
ganisms. Although I have not explicitly addressed historical cases, 
it becomes evident that, historically, design has been mostly es-
tablishing parasitic and commensalistic relations with the environ-
ments and beings (other than human) that conform them. With 
the exception of ‘house pets’ such as dogs and cats, if forms of 
mutualism have been developed with species other than human, 
these have normally been unintended, thus not designed or con-
sciously conceived as part of the project itself, resulting from the 
emergence of the distributive agency of a given assemblage.
This is interesting for several reasons. In terms of design, for the 
need to identify and evolve life-cycles of products together with 
their ‘hosts’ (it is in the interest of the parasite to survive), ar-
ticulating a basic but fundamental challenge, that of creating sus-
tainable and resilient relationships that lead to a desirable (hence 
human) co-evolution of species. It is also interesting as a general 
biological manifestation since, as noted, most biological associa-
tions are or have been parasitical. This points at the challenge, 
and, perhaps, a future research opportunity in the field, investi-
gating current manifestations of allopoietic ‘parasitism’: how they 
form assemblages that are likely (or not) to sustain ecosystemic 
resilience through their parasitism by limiting the emergence of 
other physical and biological systems, and also, their potential for 
becoming commensalistic/mutualistic at specific scales.
I believe that biosemiotic as well as ‘vital materialistic’ studies 
(as in Bennett 2010), could expand material and social studies of 
forms of artificial symbioses, and would be of value to develop our 
ethical (onto-epistemo-logical) perception of the environments 
and worlds that we con-form as ethologies. 
In philosophy, for instance, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
notion of art as framing, as developed by Elizabeth Grosz intro-
duces —in my view— an opportunity to conceive and develop 
design forms that explicitly deal with the co-evolution of species. 
Not only from a gender perspective, but more generally as mani-
festations of (social and cultural) structural couplings, where the 
production, consumption and acquisition of devices —as social 
forms of interaction— can be understood as processes of sexual 
selection in tension with natural selective processes. 
By conceiving the production of the artificial (framing, devis-
ing) through the logic of natural selection in tension with sexual 
selection, one will tend to explicitly address the risks of design. 
Thus, not only that the more beautiful a plumage the more visible 
it is for all, which would stand for the ‘cost’ of being, or becom-
ing attractive; but also that things that we do not perceive, or 
are not even aware of producing, affect other beings in tune with 
other aspects of the same environment at the same or alternative 
spatio-temporal scales. In this sense, human’s capacity to pro-
duce waste that is toxic or becomes of detriment to other beings 
and systems has no parallel. The waste=food paradigm of Cradle 
to Cradle fits all species except for one: humans. 
The knife’s hostility does not primarily lie in its cutting tissues 
—even in the extreme case of human violence to humans— but 
in the more pervasive and ‘invisible’ damage occasioned to com-
munities of humans and nonhumans affected by the extraction of 
minerals in areas detached from the locations where most con-
sumption takes place. Similarly, the discarding of the devices that 
no longer ‘arrange’, ‘partition’, the specific task for which they 
have been designed in relation to a human use.  
Acknowledging accidents, design must expect the unexpected 
and incorporate into project activity an opening for chance and 
emergence. This does not imply having total control over the be-
coming of any given device (which is an impossibility). Rather it 
concerns the creation of devices conceived to address multiple 
actors at alternative spatial and temporal scales, creating the 
‘spaces’ for them to participate in a becoming of the device that 
would lead to the sustenance or increase of biodiversity.
There is a need for an explicit simbiotization of cultural diver-
sity, one that also leads to biodiversity. As exposed through the 
proposal of the ‘mutualistic’ radio, the suggestion of curative bal-
anced food, does not only point at a possible ‘application’ for the 
‘improvement’ of a product. It also exposes the choice: without 
fully understanding their ecological roles, we are inclined to have 
preference for the fish rather than the fungi. It is also possible to 
devise an alternative that stimulates the advance of fungi.
Design developed within such a frame, cannot but explicitly ac-
knowledge the complex interrelations which it becomes part of. 
If, as proposed here, ethology registers the (ethical, in the ac-
knowledging of otherness) manifestations of beings, human and 
nonhuman, then, the understanding of human capacities to and 
for structural coupling should lead to a less anthropocentric con-
ception of the artificial. 
Humans’ cognitive plasticity should be acknowledged as a pre-
condition for hospitality-hostility: the thinking act, our reflective 
capacity, as an inquisitive mode of questioning real or imaginary 
worlds. Maintaining awareness of the devising, and its resulting 
devices; on the one hand keen on understanding otherness, on 
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communicating with an-other (some-others), and on the other 
hand, discriminating in its purposeful anthropocentric activity.
Through the process of languaging, we socially and explicitly 
acknowledge our singularity in relation to countless other singu-
larities. As such, our (human) perception of body vulnerability 
becomes enacted through the ongoing process that assesses a 
particular situation, such as one’s exposure to a form of threat, 
in relation to a series of more or less articulated and assimilated 
cultural norms. 
In relation to hospitality-hostility, it can be said that among 
humans, epistemological aspects inscribe a ‘contractual’ human 
social (human-to-human) dimension on the ontological dimension 
of human life in its ecological complexity. It thus incorporates a 
reflexive dimension that complements the more pervasive and 
spontaneous ethical forms of action, the emergent know-how, 
which is anchored on bodily functions in relation to a history of in-
teractions with given cultural and physical environments. In other 
words, and back to our first example, as sentient beings and by 
perceiving the CCTV mast visually, we spontaneously react to its 
presence, which is our first and most basic mode of ethical rela-
tion to it. Then reflexively, we understand its human social impli-
cations, and attempt to elaborate laws, rules of conviviality, that 
impose the least constraints on those who these laws select, the 
chosen groups of beings recognized as interacting with them.
As devices, each text and artefact that I have proposed, par-
ticipates in the possibilities of this assemblage. Through its de-
sign manifestations the project has attempted to enact an ethical 
domain, in order to acknowledge, starting from the most basic 
gestures of the practice of design, the thinking process, and its 
relation to other beings and other systems. 
Thinking, sensing, will always be partial, fragmentary. We 
should attempt, individually, collectively and through technology 
to refine and complete our sense of ecological interrelations. At-
tentive that the divisions inscribed through the design process 
will remain; from the devising follows the device. The less frag-
mentary the thought and its forms enaction, the less damaging 
the resulting conceptions.  
Glossary
GLOSSARY
Allopoiesis: An allopoietic organization (from the Greek allo: “oth-
er”, and poiesis: “a making”) has as the product of its functioning 
something different from itself. (See Varela 1979). Any artefact, 
such as a car, is in this sense an allopoietic machine. In contrast to 
autopoietic organizations such as living organisms, that produce 
themselves and are autonomous because they maintain their own 
organization, artificial machines are allopoietic machines because 
they are not autonomous since they subordinate their organiza-
tion to the production of something different from themselves. 
Considering allopoietic machines in relation to human assemblag-
es, I argue, following Félix Guattari 1995, that allopoiesis should be 
seen in the broader context of evolution and symbiogenesis, and 
in this way, not in opposition but as an extension of autopoiesis.
Assemblage: An assemblage is a spatio-temporal composition of 
humans and/or nonhumans, in which there are “vitalities at play” 
that makes it unpredictable. Thus, the notion of assemblage re-
lates to the notion of emergence; the way complex systems and 
patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions, 
and where the emergent is unlike the sum of its components. In 
the words of Manuel DeLanda, assemblages are wholes charac-
terized by relations of exteriority, “These relations imply, first of 
all, that a component part of an assemblage may be detached 
from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which its inter-
actions are different. In other words, the exteriority of relations 
implies a certain autonomy for the terms they relate, or as [Gilles] 
Deleuze puts it, it implies that ‘a relation might change without 
the terms changing’.” (2006:10-11). 
Autopoiesis: An autopoietic organization is an organization which 
is capable of self production (from the Greek auto: “self”, and 
poiesis: “a making”). An autopoietic system is organized (defined 
as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transforma-
tion and destruction) of components that produce the compo-
nents, that through their interrelation regenerate and realize such 
network. (See Varela 1979, Maturana and Varela 1998). Part of 
what defines an autopoietic network (in contrast to allopoietic or 
thermodynamic systems), is that the autopoietic network is not 
a set of relations among static components —as in a radio or a 
whirlpool— but a set of relations among processes of production 
of components. Living systems are autopoietic organizations. 
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dermine language, because they destroy the ‘syntax’ with which 
we construct sentences “and also that less apparent syntax which 
causes words and things (next to and opposite to one another) to 
‘hold together’” (1994:Xviii). It is in this, de-stabilizing way that 
the design projects of this thesis can be said to be heterotopian 
(from the Greek héteros: the other of two, other, different; and 
tópos: place); they propose unlikely combinations and thus, a dis-
location of experience by means of illogical vicinity (as in figure 
4.2), by displacing the ground on which our human experience 
operates through the use of language. 
Hospitality-hostility: These words share a common etymology, 
from the Greek hostis, meaning “a guest” and “an enemy”. In this 
sense, hostis suggests the possibility of both, hospitality and/or 
hostility. I hyphenate these words with the intention to capture 
their reciprocal conformation, pointing at alternative spatio-tem-
poral scales where hospitality-hostility might manifest itself. For 
example, our hospitality to another person by means of offering 
food (mangoes from the Philippines) might, at a later stage —
due to the unsustainable practices in the production, distribution, 
consumption and/or discard of these goods— become hostile 
not only to our guest, but also to us, the hosts of the gesture of 
hospitality, by causing a deterioration of the environments where 
‘hospitality’ took place. 
Information: I understand information in its etymological sense, as 
in in-form-ation, where the Latin form is a translation of the Greek 
morph. From the Latin form arose the verb informare: “to bring 
something into form”, which is the root of the word information. 
Thus its relationship with the biological discipline of morphology. 
(Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991; Varela 1979:266). According to 
Gregory Bateson, information is difference that makes a differ-
ence to a system (2000:486). Information is a perceiver-depend-
ent event, what in-forms must be valued by a given organism, in 
its capacity to perceiving specific signs. Information, in the con-
text of this work, relates to the notion of exformation, that is, to 
information excluded but contextually meaningful (Nørretranders 
1998) and also, to the sense of exformation that stands for the 
tactics of defamiliarization (Hara 2008). 
Languaging: As the process of “communication about commu-
nication”, languaging is a form of enaction and communication 
characteristic of the human species. Although other beings com-
municate through ‘language’, they are not aware of their use of 
language. Humberto Maturana exemplifies with a communication 
Device: A device (Latin divisa, divisus; division) divides, that is, 
organizes, arranges, frames our environment and defines thus, 
limits and possibilities of relation. In the context of this work, ma-
chines, artefacts, and apparatuses off all kind —in their quality of 
arranging, disposing a given partition— are considered devices. 
The notion relates to the Foucaultian term dispositif (as devel-
oped by Agamben 2009), which has been rendered into English 
as apparatus, the French word however, can designate any sort 
of device; a dispositif is precisely that, something that disposes, 
arranges. By considering these things devices, what I highlight is 
the dividing, the sorting out rather than the ‘solutions’ of a given 
architectural proposal, ‘consumer product’, law, and so on. In this 
way, the notion addresses the inclusions and exclusions of the de-
vising process and its results: devices. 
Enaction: According to Francisco Varela, enaction is a bringing 
forth by concrete handling. This is based on two interrelated is-
sues: that perception consists of perceptually guided action; and 
that cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimo-
tor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided (Varela 
1999:8,12). Enactive knowledge comes through action and it is 
based on motor skills; it is developed by doing, such as manipulat-
ing objects, driving a motorbike, playing a sport or drawing with 
a pen. When talking about human knowledge, one should keep in 
mind this onto-epistemological continuum, where our organisms 
enact forms of knowledge, resulting from a history of interactions 
(ontogeny), always participating and immersed in a given culture. 
In this sense, ‘knowledge’ does not only stand for ‘knowing what’: 
such and such things are in such and such way, as when one as-
sumes ‘facts’. It also includes a ‘knowing how’, which is a form 
of enactment constrained by the capacities of the perceiving or-
ganism in question. At stake is not to specify how a ‘perceiver-
independent’ world can be described, but rather, to understand 
how action can be perceptually guided in a perceiver-dependent 
world. (Varela 1999:13). 
Ethology: Science that studies animal behaviour. It puts emphasis 
on the behavioural patterns occurring in specific environments, 
and stresses the study of relations between an organism and its 
environment. That is, between an ethos (a way of being) and an 
oikos (the habitat of that being). 
Heterotopia: In the context of this work, I use Michel Foucault’s 
concept of heterotopia in its ‘discursive’ (1994) and not in its spa-
tial  sense (1967; 2010). Foucault explains that heterotopias un-
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Symbiogenesis: In biology, symbiogenesis stands for the merg-
ing of two separate organisms to form a single new organism. In 
this work and in a more general sense, I refer to symbiogenesis to 
emphasize co-evolution among both, autopoietic and allopoietic 
systems. Thus, symbiogenesis becomes a synonym for ‘collective 
becoming’. It refers to the history of structural coupling, and the 
history of the lineages of systems and organisms as they change 
through time, and in symbiosis to one another. Pointing at ways 
of affecting and being affected that lead to mutual behavioural or 
systemic change. 
Umwelt: The concept of umwelt, which could be translated as the 
‘world brought forth’ by a given living being, was developed by 
Jakob von Uexküll. In his conception, an umwelt is a perceptual 
sensory sphere constituted by an organism’s capacity to perceive 
signs. Thus, it is the semiotic world of the organism: all that has 
meaning for that organism depends on its capacity to perceive 
those signs. In this work, umwelt corresponds to the notion of 
world, as Francisco Varela understands it (and to the enactive ap-
proach to cognition), being a world brought forth by the possibili-
ties of the cognizing organism itself.
between a cat and her owner. He suggests that “if the cat were 
somehow able to communicate to me something like ‘Hey, I’ve 
now meowed three times; where’s my milk?’, that would be lan-
guage. Her reference to her previous meowing would constitute 
a communication about a communication.” (See Capra 1996:280-
281). In this sense, the ‘language’ would qualify as languaging, 
which the cat is not capable of performing. However, although 
languaging can be said to be the most characteristic feature of 
the human species, other primates such as chimpanzees, by cre-
ating new expressions by combining signs, seem to blur and thus 
point at a need not to distinguish these two modes (language-
languaging) too sharply (see Maturana and Varela 1998).  
Ontogeny: The combination of the Greek words onto (being) and 
geny (Latin: generation, from the Greek génesis, source, origin) 
indicate the becoming of a given organism. Ontogeny is the origin 
and the development of an organism, as in the development from 
the fertilized egg to a mature form. Maturana and Varela mention 
that ontogeny is the history of structural change in a unity with-
out loss of organization in that unity (1998:74). While individual 
organisms develop (ontogeny), species evolve (and thus develop 
phylogeny). 
 
Structural coupling: Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela 
identify structural coupling “whenever there is a history of recur-
rent interactions leading to the structural congruence between 
two (or more) systems.” (1998:75). The notion of structural cou-
pling is valid for all kind of system, living and non-living. One can 
speak of the structural coupling of a car with a city and the mutual 
perturbations/changes that each system triggers on the other. 
In this sense, cars have developed structural congruence with, 
for example, the streets of cities. Both systems are structurally 
coupling, imposing and allowing a range of possibilities and con-
straints on each other.
Symbiosis: The biological notion of symbiosis groups three forms 
of association and categories; mutualism, parasitism and com-
mensalism. A mutualistic symbiosis is an association in which 
both symbionts benefit; an association in which one symbiont 
benefits and the other one is neither harmed nor benefited is a 
commensalistic symbiosis; while a relationship in which a symbi-
ont receives nutrients at the expense of a host organism is called 
a parasitic symbiosis. Partly, what this work attempts is to identify 
and articulate the metaphorical, anthropocentric, and biological 
registers of these categorizations in design manifestations. 
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APPENDIX – A 
Two instances of a series of design exercises using
prepositiontools
APPENDICES
The appendices that follow assemble a range of imagery and at-
tempt to describe or suggest some of the modes of engagement 
with practices which are not evident or have been shortly de-
scribed so far. They are not meant to provide a complete overview 
of the processes for developing the projects, they complement 
what has been already discussed in ways that some might find 
clarifying or simply be curious about. 
The projects presented here, prepositiontools and ¡Pestes! are 
two of several projects developed throughout the PhD work. The 
entire work has ranged from the development of collaborative 
projects such as 3Ecologies, to single papers not included in this 
publication, developed for and presented within specific academic 
environments.
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Ideas using the prepositions ‘of’: of different materials, sug-
gesting for example edible ones (that might leave traces of par-
ticular tastes when in contact with the mouth), washable ones, 
etc. (Illustration above). 
Other suggestions included ‘via’: designed to fit on a tray that 
will after being used, allow them to be easily placed in a recycling 
post.
The playful procedure of taking a card or a stamp, and by 
chance thinking associations with the situation dealt with, has 
led to the development of a relational logic which tends to raise 
awareness about the interconnections of things and processes at 
alternative scales.
Among others, the two sets of prepositiontools (cards and 
stamps) where used at the “Future of Play” in April 2009, a semi-
nar leaded by Rolf Hughes, which is part of the Master program 
in Experience Design at Konstfack in Stockholm. The card set and 
the rubber-stamp set were given to a group of eight students to 
work individually and in groups to develop ideas and situations 
based on “prepositional play”. The brief was:
 
By focusing on grammatical prepositions, you will explicitly conceive 
projects that enact/embody relations-with; that is, with other arte-
facts, with other humans, with the context in which they are immersed. 
Thus, there were two levels of playfulness in the assignment: 
on the one hand, the methodological one, by using the rubber-
stamps and the cards randomly, generating ideas by the free as-
sociations opened up by the prepositions; and on the other hand, 
the play assignment itself, that is, a brief where the final design 
outcome was a play/game.
The following images (Fig. A.4) were taken/generated during 
the workshop. The concepts featured were designed by Farvash 
Razavi.
A.3 ChopsticksThe following ideas are mere sketches generated under no longer 
than five-minute sessions, performed at the early stages of this 
work while trying to understand the potential of the tools. Thus, 
the value of the sketches below lies in the illustration of the ap-
proach, rather than in the usefulness or validity of the design con-
cepts.
These three particular artefacts were cases suggested by Ra-
mia Mazé, and stand for well-known cases of design influencing 
everyday behaviour. 
Ideas using the prepositions ‘under’: Can be implanted on the 
skin… also: The film under the pills will change colour preventing 
broken (or faulty) packages from being used (illustration above). 
Other suggestions included the preposition ‘in/into’: the pills 
leave a trace in the mouth that cause a strong taste if two pills 
are taken by mistake within 12 hours.
Ideas using the prepositions ‘outside’: sunlight ‘crunches’ 
crosses on the wafers (illustration above). 
Other suggestions included ‘behind’: the wafers glow (on the 
chalice for example) when not being seen directly.
A.2 Communion 
wafers
A.1 Birth-control 
package
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APPENDIX – B
Instances of the design process of
¡Pestes!
A.4 Play - Farvash 
Razavi.
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B.1 Project locations in 
Córdoba, Argentina.
A- Parasitic radio
B- Mutualistic radio
C- Commensalistic 
radio
south pacic ocean
south atlantic ocean
argentina
C
córdoba
A
B
I initiated ¡Pestes! in Stockholm during 2010. The project was 
partially funded by Iaspis (The Swedish Arts Grants Committee’s 
International Programme for Visual Artists), the Lars Hierta Foun-
dation, the Anna Ahrenberg Foundation and the Designfakulteten 
(The Swedish Faculty for Design Research and Research Educa-
tion). 
The project was developed in Córdoba, Argentina (Fig. B.1) dur-
ing a three-month period, between March and June 2011.
I designed the radios in collaboration with industrial designer 
Leonardo López. The photographs published here are a combina-
tion of my own, as well as commissioned ones to local photogra-
phers Natalia Pittau, and Diego Combina. 
Leonardo and I designed each radio considering a specific ‘eco-
logical niche’ that ranged from a ‘natural’ context to an ‘artificial’ 
one. A variety of environments, systems and beings were taken 
into account, some of which can be seen on the pages of my per-
sonal sketchbook in figures B.3-4. 
The radios were meant to function as generic ‘artefacts’, thus, 
ideally, by being easily recognized, their presence would highlight 
the symbioses established rather than attract the attention of 
the viewer to their own design configuration. In other words, and 
more specifically, what should result attractive were the terminals 
of the radios rather than the traditional radio receiving devices. 
The photographs of the scenarios and the scenarios with the de-
vices were taken in such a way as to give a ‘realistic’ impression. 
Following in this way, the design intention to focus on the niches 
and the relations established by the devices, rather than on the 
devices themselves.
Through the design process, Leonardo and I developed study 
models, as well as models and working prototypes to test the pro-
posals sketched. All electronic components derive from existing 
parts commercially available in Córdoba. Several parts of the final 
models and prototypes were commissioned to local workshops. 
Technical drawings such as those in figures B.5 and B.6, as well as 
the physical models that we produced were used to communicate 
with the people manufacturing them.
Specialists in food design as well as fish breeders were consult-
ed during the ideation and materialization process of the mutual-
istic radio.  Electrical engineers and technicians were consulted 
during the ideation and materialization processes of the parasitic 
and commensalistic radios.
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B.3 Pages, personal 
sketchbook.
B.2 Modelling process.
Above: failed pieces 
due to faulty mecha-
nization. Below: Leon-
ardo Lopez at work.
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alojamiento
para
imánes
48
5
201
4 22
57
10,5
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45°
5
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DOS DE CADA UNA DE ESTAS PIEZAS
B.5 Example of 
technical drawing (reel 
and cable connec-
tors, commensalistic 
proposal). 
B.4 Pages, personal 
sketchbook.
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B.7 Above: samples of 
food, for the terminals 
of the commensalistic 
radio. Below: model-
ling with components 
of an existing radio.
C 01
PARASITISMO
Pieza “Gancho”
B.6 Example of techni-
cal drawing. (Terminal 
of parasitic radio). 
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B.9 Staging scenarios: 
Above, parasitic radio.
Below, mutualistic 
radio.
B.8 Process: staging 
the scenario of the 
parasitic radio.
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NOTES
SETTING OUT - (Notes to Pgs. 15 to 39) 
1.  See Guattari 2008 and 1995. In his book The Three Ecologies, Félix 
Guattari sketches an ecosophy, which is composed of three ecologies: 
a psychological ecology, a social ecology and an environmental ecology. 
These three interdependent domains prefigure a knowledge strategy that 
stresses the need for an ongoing interdisciplinary approach to ecological 
complexity. It is important to understand not only the ethical implications 
but also the aesthetical dimension of this conception. Guattari empha-
sises that his notion of ecosophy finds itself under an “ethico-aesthetic 
aegis” and mentions “I have stressed the aesthetic paradigms because I 
want to emphasize that everything [...] has to be continually reinvented, 
started again from scratch, otherwise the processes become trapped in 
a cycle of deadly repetition. [...] The increasing deterioration of human 
relations with the socius, the psyche and ‘nature’, is due not only to en-
vironmental and objective pollution but is also the result of a certain in-
comprehension and fatalistic passivity towards these issues as a whole, 
among both individuals and governments” (2008:27-28). A version of the 
potential of this conception applied to design can be found in our “3Ecol-
ogies”. Following Guattari’s conception, and in contrast to other existing 
models, 3Ecologies is a human-centred model that explicitly emphasizes 
the individual dimension, social construction and situated nature of eco-
logical costs and benefits. This modelling allowed us to consider addi-
tional and other factors than those typically in focus, such as the social 
conditions and contingencies of product use, gender, culture and class 
dimensions of environmentalism, ethical and equity issues in globalized 
production and consumption. The diagrammatic and narrative versions of 
the conceptual models of 3Ecologies open for ways of communicating, 
learning and debating sustainability that are often left out of scientific 
and economic discourses, and challenge the reduction of sustainability 
to statistical data that is often solely based on environmental aspects 
of material origins and offsets. Instead, qualitative aspects are visualized 
and potential futures are ‘forecast’. See Ávila, Carpenter and Mazé 2010.
2. The notion of semiosphere was coined by semiotician Yuri Lotman, 
who was inspired by Vladimir Vernadsky’s concept of biosphere. Accord-
ing to Lotman, the semiosphere is the unit of semiosis, “the smallest 
functioning mechanism (…) the semiosphere is the result and the condi-
tion for the development of culture; we justify our term by analogy with 
the biosphere, as Vernadsky defined it, namely the totality and the or-
ganic whole of living matter and also the condition for the continuation 
of life.” (1990:125). The notion of semiosphere in Lotman’s semiotics of 
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B.10 Staging scenarios: 
commensalistic radio.
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sponses and ways of enaction with-in natural and cultural environments 
(see “Boundaries” Pg. 73, and “Relating by languaging” Pg. 78).
5. This is an expression by Isabelle Stengers, who explicitly addresses 
this etho-ecological position in the essay “The Cosmopolitical Proposal”. 
Latour and Wiebel (Eds.) 2005:997. See also “Whose worst-case-sce-
nario?” Pg. 61.
6. Jacques Derrida would say that the origin is always crossed out. Of 
Grammatology (1997). Gilles Deleuze, that “if we call each proposition 
of consciousness a ‘name’, it is caught in an indefinite nominal regress, 
each name referring to another name which designates the sense of the 
preceding. However, the inability of empirical consciousness here corre-
sponds to the ‘nth’ power of the language and its transcendent repetition 
to be able to speak infinitely of or about words themselves.” (2004a:194).
7. I understand affordance following James Gibson 1979. Within design 
discourses, the notion of affordance has been, most notably, developed 
by Donald Norman (2002; 2004). I find however, Gibson’s original ap-
proach more productive, since, in my view, Gibson’s notion tends to high-
light distributive agency rather than agency (see Pg. 58 and note 17 Pg. 
196). Also of relevance to this work is language’s capacity to modify our 
perception of affordances (see in note 5 Pg. 206).
8. Bruno Latour includes in the list of words (“weak terms”) of an infra-
language, the most important words of the vocabulary of what is under-
stood as “Actor-Network Theory” (ANT), including:  network, group, ac-
tor, agency, translation and fluid (2005:174). To this list, and for the same 
reasons (the importance to avoid “global” overarching concepts with the 
intention to remain “local” and situated), this work will incorporate the 
notion of device. For understanding the general tensions in and of the 
ANT discourse and practice as a theory, see for instance John Law’s “Ac-
tor Network Theory and Material Semiotics” in Turner (Ed.) 2009.
9. My translation. The development of these thoughts can be found not 
only in Morin’s Introduction á la pensée complexe, but most notably, in 
Isabelle Stengers’ Power and Invention, where she traces a history and a 
genealogy of complexity, studying its implications in terms of knowledge 
representation. See Stengers 1997.
10. Although the word thing here could be paralleled to ‘object’, it is load-
ed with a distinction following Bruno Latour, where ‘thing’ is used in an 
etymological sense, referring to ting, ding, res, chose, that is, were its 
etymological roots suggest what Latour calls “the collective”, as in res-
publica (the public thing), thus implying a form of collective construction 
culture presupposes a ‘remaking’, a modelling. Lotman writes: “A schema 
consisting of addresser, addressee and the channel linking them together 
is not yet a working system. For it to work it has to be ‘immersed’ in semi-
otic space. All participants in the communicative act must have some ex-
perience of communication, be familiar with semiosis. So, paradoxically, 
semiotic experience precedes the semiotic act. By analogy with the bio-
sphere (...) we could talk of a semiosphere, which we shall define as the 
semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of languages, 
not the sum total of different languages; in a sense the semiosphere has a 
prior existence and is in constant interaction with languages.” (1990:123)
In spite of Lotman’s references to Vernadsky, his concept of semio-
sphere remains a metaphor of the biosphere, operating within cultural 
parameters. Today the field defined as biosemiotics (which studies “the 
life of signs and the signs of life” Hoffmeyer 2008), has assimilated or ex-
panded the notion of semiosphere and makes it ‘coincide’ or overlap with 
that of biosphere. Jesper Hoffmeyer defines semiosphere “as a sphere 
like the atmosphere, hydrosphere, or the biosphere. It permeates these 
spheres from the innermost to outermost reaches and consists of com-
munication: sound, scent, movement, colours, forms, electrical fields, 
various waves, chemical signals, touch and so forth – in short, the signs 
of life” (2008:5), shifting thus from an anthropocentric process to a more 
general biological one, with the implication that it becomes cyclic instead 
of dialogic (see Sebeok 2000). It is in this last sense that I understand 
semiosphere, as the sphere where humans, as living beings immersed and 
participating of the biosphere, participate in the production and circula-
tion of signs. It remains to be highlighted however, that Lotman’s notion 
of semiosphere, as stated in the quote above, does not depart from the 
concept of sign, as in Peirce (the source of most biosemiotic specula-
tion), but from the concept of text, “immersed in semiotic space”. Refer-
ences to this debate can be found in Kallevi Kull’s “On Semiosis, Umwelt, 
and Semiosphere” (1998).
3. According to philosopher Manuel DeLanda, assemblages are wholes 
characterized by relations of exteriority. “These relations imply, first of 
all, that a component part of an assemblage may be detached from it and 
plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions are different. 
In other words, the exteriority of relations implies a certain autonomy 
for the terms they relate, or as Deleuze puts it, it implies that ‘a rela-
tion might change without the terms changing’.” (2006:10-11). See also 
“Glossary” Pg. 167.
4. As will be developed, languages as devices should be understood as 
having a modelling aspect that influence our world views (see “Relation 
as order” Pg. 71). However, languages treated as modelling systems must 
be understood in their fluidity, as dynamic systems which are human re-
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birdsongs, and all kind of erotic display. These forms of excesses exceed 
mere survival, being a form of affirmation of the excessiveness of the 
body. In this sense, sexual selection stands in close relation to natural 
selection (Charles Darwin). In this work, the notion of excess also refers 
to Francisco Varela’s surplus signification, as that which must be valued 
(or not) by a given cognitive agent (Varela 1999:56). Thus the insect’s 
capacity to perceive the smell of the flower and its assessing it as ‘valu-
able’ is what constitutes the perspective and the origin of the cognitive 
agent’s world. See “Framing” Pg. 118.
16. Every time we come across words ending in ‘able’ or ‘ible’, as in some-
thing being walkable, readable, doable, invisible, expandable and so on, 
we are facing something that is made possible due to our (or someone’s/
something’s) relation to some other thing: an affordance. When we talk 
about affordances we understand that a bridge would be, for example 
walkable: it affords humans the possibility to walk over it. Water, does not 
afford that possibility (walking) to humans, but to other organisms, such 
as insects light enough to encounter the material support that allows 
them to walk on it. A linguistic and semantic study of our uses of these 
words can be found in Samuel Weber’s Benjamin’s -abillities, where We-
ber studies (2008) the implications of Walter Benjamin’s use of barkeiten 
or abilities, as in Übersetz-barkeit (in “The task of the translator”) or 
Reproduzier-barkeit (in “The work of art in the Age of its Technical Re-
producibility”). Examples of design’s capacity to explicitly enable can be 
found in Otto von Busch’s Fashion-able: Hacktivism and Engaged Fash-
ion Design (2008).
17. Grosz follows Deleuze, Guattari and Bernard Cache in this particular 
claim: architecture as a foundational gesture, which, in its delimiting of a 
territory, enacts a basic feature of animal territoriality and in this way, a 
manifestation of our own animality. See “Framing” Pg. 118.
18. Grosz writes: “By arts, I am concerned here with all forms of crea-
tivity or production that generate intensity, sensation, or affect: music, 
painting, sculpture, literature, architecture, design, landscape, dance, 
performance, and so on.” (2008:3). Once again, it seems to me that re-
ferring to “design” in this sense, points at the specific disciplinary prac-
tices of design such as graphic, or industrial design, rather than at the 
more general approach suggested here, that of design as ‘a way’ to pro-
duce these sensations, affects, intensities.
HOSTING - (Notes to Pgs. 41 to 64)
1.  Skeat 1993:208-209. This etymological and semantic tension has been 
required not to settle or determine what some-thing is, but what it may 
become, by acknowledging the “political ecology” at stake. See Latour 
2004. Related to this, and following Deleuze, one would not say ‘the tree 
is green’ but ‘the tree greens...’ as “‘a manner of being’ of the thing, an 
‘aspect’ that exceeded the Aristotelian alternative, essence-accident: for 
the verb ‘to be’ they [the Stoics] substitute ‘to follow,’ and they put man-
ner in the place of essence.” (Deleuze 1993:53).
11. In linguistics, a natural language is any ordinary language such as 
English, Spanish, or Japanese. That is, languages used for everyday com-
munication, which can be written, signed or spoken. Linguists mainly 
distinguish natural languages from formal languages such as computer-
programming languages or the languages used in formal and mathemati-
cal logic. Natural languages can also be differentiated from so-called con-
structed languages, such as those devised by groups or individuals to 
develop language games or artistic sensibilities. Although the approaches 
developed through the prepositiontools (Pg. 86) oscillate between natu-
ral and constructed languages, I believe that the playful use of gram-
matical constituents (in this approach, prepositions) does not formalize 
a language (which may be seen as constructed). The uses suggested by 
the prepositiontools imply non-formal or informal uses of a natural lan-
guage, in this case, English.
12.  The sentence has been repeated or referred to over and over and 
is pervasive throughout the body of Borges work. This particular quote 
refers to a saying by Ralph Waldo Emerson and can be found in the Nor-
ton Lectures that Borges gave at Harvard between 1967-68. See/listen 
Borges 2000.
13.  See for example, the overview on framing in relation to ecology pro-
vided by Lakoff 2010.
14. Deleuze and Guattari 1994; 2004. Deleuze and Guattari elaborate 
upon Bernard Cache who believes that architecture is a primordial force 
that deals with the manipulation of the frame (1995:2) My approach in 
this work, deals with the notion of frame mainly through Elizabeth Gro-
sz’s development of it in Chaos, territory, art. Deleuze and the framing 
of the earth which is a particular elaboration that reflects Grosz’s con-
cern with the ontology of art as a manifestation of sexual difference. See 
“Framing” Pg. 118.
15. The notion of excess is here related (following Grosz, 2008) to the 
process of sexual selection as a form of “artistic” expression, a mani-
festation of surplus signification. It refers to the attraction exercised by 
bodies, as in the case of insects stimulated by the perfume of plants, 
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8. Similarly, John Deely distinguishes: “The concept of environmental 
niche simply identifies that part of the environment as physical upon 
which a given biological form mainly depends in deriving the physical as-
pects of its sustenance. The concept of Umwelt, by contrast, shows us 
how a given ‘environmental niche’ is merely the physical part of a larger, 
objective, not purely physical whole which is, as it were, fully comprehen-
sible only from the perspective of the particular lifeform whose world it 
is, whose ‘environment’ is meaningful in the specific way that it is thanks 
only to an irreducible combination of relations many of which have no 
being apart from the lifeworld and all of which contribute to the contrast 
between the physical environment as neutral or common respecting all 
organisms, on the one hand, and parts of the same physical environment 
interpreted and incorporated within a meaningful sphere of existence 
shared by all the member species, on the other hand.” (2001:129-130).
9. “Well the groom [the artefact that closes the door] is indeed anthro-
pomorphic, and in three senses: first, it has been made by men, it is a 
construction; second it substitutes for the actions of people, and is a 
delegate that permanently occupies the position of a human; and third, it 
shapes human action by prescribing back what sort of people should pass 
through the door.” Latour in Bijker and Law (Eds). 1992.
10. My reference to harmony relates, to Maturana and Varela’s notion 
of structural coupling as the structural congruence between two or 
more systems (1998:75). See “Boundaries” Pg. 73. It also resonates 
(while aware of the risks of teleological interpretations) with Jakob von 
Uexküll’s conception of the biosphere as a great symphony, were beings 
are in tune with one another “in counterpoint”. Thus “Every Umwelt has 
its own spatial and temporal dimensions. The Umwelten intersect in many 
ways without disturbing each other. They do not interact mechanically 
but are still connected according to a plan as the notes of an oratorio 
are harmonically connected. It is thus musical and not mechanical laws 
that we need to study if we want to find out about the laws of Life. [...] 
the performances of animals are not products of a harmonic build of the 
body, it is the harmony of the performance that determines that of the 
body.” von Uexküll 2001b. See also “Framing” Pg. 118 and “Other devis-
ers” Pg. 121.
11. This is an extension of the discussion on morality. See the arguments 
on “de-scription”, “inscription”, and “prescription” in both Akrich’s and 
Latour’s essays in Bijker and Law (Eds.) 1992.
12. Note that one might not be aware of being ‘participating’ in any given 
‘use’, as when we find ourselves, for example, triggering systems, hu-
mans, or nonhumans by being perceived by cameras or sensors.
clearly exposed by Emile Benveniste who in his studies of Indo-European 
languages, explores not only the concepts of hospitality-hostility, but also 
that of gift (to which hospitality-hostility relate to) in all its diversity of 
forms of exchange (1973:53; 71).
2. In relation to the notion of structural coupling and autopoiesis (as the 
realization of the living), see also “Boundaries” Pg, 73 and “Glossary” 
Pg. 167.
3. An Actant is: Whatever acts or shifts actions, action itself being de-
fined by a list of performances through trials; from these performances 
are deduced a set of competences with which the actant is endowed; 
[...] an actor is an actant endowed with a character (usually anthropo-
morphic). See “A Summary of a Convenient Vocabulary for the Semiotics 
of Human and Nonhuman assemblies” by Akrich and Latour in Bijker and 
Law 1992. See also the glossary in Latour 2004.
4. For an overview of types of expectations affecting design outcomes 
see, Lidwell, Holden and Butler 2003:68.
5. I understand ‘information’ in its etymological sense, as in in-form-
mation, where the Latin form is a translation of the Greek morph. From 
the Latin form arose the verb informare: “to bring something into form”, 
which is the root of the word information. Thus its relationship with the 
biological discipline of morphology. See Hoffmeyer and Emmeche 1991. 
See also Varela 1979:266. For information’s relation to exformation see 
“defamiliarizing hospitality-hostility” Pg. 53. See also “Glossary” Pg. 167.
6. von Uexküll 2001a:107. Dorion Sagan, in his introduction to von Uexküll 
(2010), expresses that it would be premature however, to talk about a 
distinctly human umwelt. John Deely, on the other hand, mentions that 
“the Umwelt is first of all, even within semiotics, a vehicle for expressing 
especially the role of biological heritage in the use and function of signs, 
rather than for expressing what is species-specifically human in the use 
and function of signs” (2001:126). Deely suggests the word lebenswelt to 
describe a human specific umwelt. (note 7 in this page). See also Floyd 
Merrel’s “A distinctly human umwelt” (2001). And “Relating by languag-
ing” Pg. 78.
7. The term umwelt is contemporary to Edmund Husserl’s lebenswelt 
(life-world). It would be possible to trace similarities between these 
terms. Without reference to Husserl, John Deely has suggested the word 
lebenswelt to be the species-specific human umwelt, alluding to our spe-
cific relationship with language. What in Maturana and Varela’s terminol-
ogy, and in this work, stands for languaging. See Deely 2001.
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use-Recycle. See, “Why being ‘less’ bad is no good” in McDonough and 
Braungart 2002. This critique has become more explicit after the debates 
and tendencies that originate from, for example, Al Gore’s film, “An In-
convenient Truth” (directed by Davis Guggenheim 2006). “The key is not 
to make human industries and systems smaller, as efficiency advocates 
propound, but to design them to get bigger and better in a way that re-
plenishes, restores, and nourishes the rest of the world. Thus the ‘right 
things’ for manufacturers and industrialists to do are those that lead to 
good growth -more niches, health, nourishment, diversity, intelligence, 
and abundance- for this generation of inhabitants on the planet and for 
generations to come.” McDonough and Braungart 2002:78.
19. Gregory Bateson developed a concept of mind (2000 [1972]), where, 
simplifying, mind could be paralleled to ‘nature’. “The individual nexus of 
pathways which I call ‘me’ is no longer so precious because that nexus 
is only part of a larger mind” (2000:471). Resembling in this way Var-
ela’s notion of “self”, which “unit of identity” (In Bateson’s terms) tran-
scend the individual. As proposed by Fritjof Capra in “Bateson Revisited” 
(Capra 1996:297) Bateson’s concept of mind can be developed in relation 
to Maturana and Varela’s model of cognition as distributed agency.
20. See Latour 1997. Or rather, the efforts imply (human) social behav-
iour. In another passage Latour writes “I am a great fan of hinges, but I 
must confess that I admire hydraulic door-closers much more […] Espe-
cially clever is its way of extracting energy from each and every unwilling, 
unwitting passer by. My sociologist friends at the School of Mines call 
such a clever extraction an “obligatory passage point”, which is a very 
fitting name for a door; no matter what you feel, think or do, you have to 
leave a bit of your energy, literally, at the door. This is as clever as a toll 
booth.” (in Bijker and Law, Eds. 1992).
21. See for instance Rockström et.al. 2009.
22. Stengers in Latour and Wiebel (Eds.) 2005:997.
23. See Stengers in Latour and Wiebel (Eds.) 2005:995.
24. Holling, Gunderson et. al. coined the word panarchy, to explain eco-
systemic resilience drawing “upon the Greek god Pan to capture an image 
of unpredictable change and upon notions of hierarchies across scales 
to represent structures that sustain experiments, test results, and allow 
adaptive evolution.” See Holling and Gunderson (Eds.) 2002:5. 
25. The idea that an ecosystem ‘hosts’, provides, the conditions of exist-
ence for an-other, might suggest a network of ‘spheres’ (starting with 
13. Albert Borgmann has developed an alternative notion of device. I here 
introduce the reader to Foucault’s and Agamben’s conception since in my 
view, they are more inclusive and productive than Borgmann’s. Borgmann 
distinguishes between devices and things, a distinction that I find partic-
ularly troublesome; [nontechnological or low-technological] things (i.e. a 
stove) being, in his conception, capable of engaging human beings while 
technological artefacts [devices] such as a central heating system invite 
disengaged consumption. See Borgmann 1984:40-48. For an overview 
and critique of Borgmann’s work see Verbeek 2005:173-99.
14. Agamben 2009. The term dispositif, has been rendered into English 
as “apparatus”, however, as the translators point out, the French word 
can designate any sort of device. See translator’s note in Agamben 2009. 
See also device in “Glossary” Pg. 167.
15. From Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972-1977, ed. C. Gordon (New York. Pantheon Books, 1980:194-96). 
Quoted in Agamben 2009:2.
16. Once again, I am referring to Bruno Latour’s and Madeleine Akrich’s 
arguments in Bijker and Law (Eds.) 1992. See also Stengers 1997.
17. I have mentioned that devices ‘arrange’, Gilles Deleuze believed that 
in formulating the notion of apparatus, Foucault could have been influ-
enced by his (and Guattari’s) notion of arrangement (agencement). See 
Deleuze 1995:89. Regardless of the accuracy of Deleuze’s statement, it is 
relevant to point at a distinction in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy be-
tween arrangement (agencement) and assemblage, since some transla-
tions have rendered these terms as synonyms. Martin Joughin, translator 
of Deleuze’s Negotiations, mentions “… Foucault’s ‘apparatus’ seems to 
me […] more ‘mechanical’ than Deleuze’s ‘arrangement’ (it might be not-
ed that ‘assemblage’, which various translators have adopted for agence-
ment, conveys neither the sense of preparation or orientation toward ac-
tion nor that of reconfiguration –Deleuze himself [Critique et clinique, 
p. 27] translates ‘arrangement’ as agencement).” See Deleuze 1995:196. 
One could say, simplifying and using the logic of our arguments so far, 
that Foucault’s notion highlights “agency” while Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“distributive agency”. For a development of assemblage theory based on 
Deleuzian philosophy see DeLanda 2006. For differences and similarities 
between Deleuzian and Actor-Network approaches to assemblages, see 
Palmås 2007.
18. This is the main criticism to be found in Cradle to Cradle, where Mc-
Donough and Braungart equate the logic of “less” (consumption, pro-
duction, population…) to death, through the “triple R” of Reduce-Re-
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6.  See Serres and Latour 1995:202. Michel Serres asks “Why should 
philosophy continue to speak this telegraphic language consisting only 
of verbs and substantives, without any prepositions, without any declen-
sions or pronouns, when without them we can express neither relations 
nor subjects nor objects? (Serres and Latour 1995:202). Consider how-
ever, the epistemological implications of distinguishing, as Martin Hei-
degger does at-hand and for-hand; or J-L. Nancy’s use of with (2000), 
to name a few philosophical cases. In the context of design research, 
one can think of Christopher Frayling’s distinction between research by 
design, research through design and research for design, the prepositions 
acting as the key to each particular approach.
7.  The denominations of the nine Aristotelian accidental categories vary, 
but the concepts remain. More important than the subcategorizations 
(some of them overlap) is the categorical distinction substance-accident.
8.  DeLanda in Grosz (Ed.) 1999:39. This is (also) the argument of bio-
semioticians, who (mostly based on C. S. Peirce and J. von Uexküll) see 
relation, rather than substance and accident, as the basis for semiotic ar-
ticulation. “The thesis is that relation, rather than substance or accident, 
is to serve as the basis for all semiotic explanation, and that the ontologi-
cal explanation in the traditional categories of substance and accident, to 
whatever extent it is valid, is subordinate to the standpoint of semiotic 
reason of being assimilable to (and subsequently analytically derivable 
from) transcendental relation and ontological relation generally” (John 
Deely in Bains 2001:147). On a linguistic plane, George Lakoff mentions, 
“Most of the research on categorization within cognitive psychology has 
been in the domain of physical objects and physical perception. But per-
haps the strongest evidence against traditional views of categorization 
(…) come from the study of verb particles and prepositions.” (1987:418)
9.  See for instance Lotman 1988; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Lakoff 1987; 
Tyler and Evans 2003. On this issue Ludwig Wittgenstein writes: “If lan-
guage is to be a means of communication, there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements.” 
§242 (2001:75). For an account of linguistic modelling explicitly inter-
related with geology and biology, see DeLanda 2005a.
10.  Warning against an objectivist view of the world, Lakoff states that 
“A collection of symbols placed in correspondence with an objectively 
structured world is viewed as a representation of reality” (1987:Xii). Simi-
larly, Deleuze mentions “difference becomes an object of representation 
always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined 
opposition or a perceived similitude” (2004a:174).
the bio-sphere) enveloping one another. Pointing at the work of people 
such as James Lovelock through his Gaia hypothesis (2000) described 
by Margulis as “symbiosis as seen from space” (1998:2), to the work of 
Vladimir Vernadsky, who proposed  the notion of biosphere as the en-
veloping sphere of life on this planet; as well as the work of Yuri Lotman 
(semiosphere), Jakob von Uexküll (sphere of the senses), and contempo-
rary biosemioticians. In contemporary philosophy, the idea of enveloping 
spheres, has been developed by Peter Sloterdijk, who in his sphären ex-
plicitly discusses the integration and interconnection of several spheres 
that range from the intimate to the global (2009). Bruno Latour, unaware 
of Lotman and the work of biosemioticians (personal conversation with 
Latour 2010), suggests that Sloterdijk’s work stands for a “philosophy 
of design”. See Latour 2008, and 2009. Although I agree with Latour’s 
suggestion of the potential of Sloterdijk’s philosophy to develop design. I 
believe that the metaphorical register of the work of Latour himself (net-
works) as well as the work of Deleuze and Guattari (networks, lines of 
flight, flows), DeLanda (nonlinearity), in their transversality (see Pg. 99), 
are capable of more fluid and empowering thoughts than the spherical 
conceptions named above.
UNFOLDING - (Notes to Pgs. 65 to 103)
1.  Quoted in Easterling 2005:123.
2. Not to mention the energy required for running the washing machine, 
the production and acquisition of the machine itself, the use of deter-
gents and conditioners, the water consumption and the logistical sys-
tems they in their turn require, to name but a few of the most evident as-
pects of energy and material flows. Others similar cases might be found 
in, for instance Rivoli 2005; and Ávila, Carpenter and Mazé 2010.
3. As well as the water and environments of the areas where the t-shirts 
have been produced. These studies have been developed by Prevodnik 
2008.
4. Not that the accident itself is creative, but in the sense that it creates 
(transforms) possibilities.
5.  Virilio 1997:118, my translation. The theme is recurring in Virilio’s work 
(2003, 2005). See also Virilio and Lotringer (1997, 2005). In engineering, 
failure’s and error’s relation to the evolution of useful things has been 
studied by Henri Petroski 1992; 1994; 1997; 2003. In relation to design 
Ezio Manzini talks about “rebound effects” see for instance Manzini 
2003, while Edward Tenner 1996; 2003, suggests that “things bite back”.
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16.  “…each language always implies a deterritorialization of the mouth, 
the tongue and the teeth. The mouth, tongue and teeth find their primi-
tive territoriality in food. In giving themselves over to the articulation of 
sounds, the mouth, tongue and teeth deterritorialize. Thus there is a cer-
tain disjunction between eating and speaking, and even more, despite all 
appearances, between eating and writing. […] To speak, and above all to 
write is to fast. […] Ordinarily, in fact, language compensates for its de-
territorialization by a reterritorialization in sense.” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986:19-20). See also Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s notion of corporeal-
kinetic forms, in the chapter “From animal to human” in Hoffmeyer 2008. 
Perhaps, the most compelling explanations against “representational 
knowledge” in favour of “embodied know-how” can be found in Manuel 
DeLanda’s A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. DeLanda writes: “...it 
is not the case that Eskimos perceive sixty (or whatever) different types 
of snow because they have sixty different words for snow. Rather, given 
the key role that snow plays in their nondiscursive daily practices, many 
synonyms for it can be expected to accumulate and then partially diverge, 
acquiring subtle shades of meaning. Thus, they have so many words for 
snow because they discriminate many different physically stable states 
for snow, using embodied intelligence. Besides [...] the world itself is sub-
ject to processes of individuation which do not depend on human beings. 
In other words, reality does not have to wait for humans to sort it out into 
categories. Sorting processes that produce more or less homogeneous 
classes of individuals (rocks, species) occur independently of language.” 
(2005a:322-323 n87).  See also “Framing” Pg. 118.
17.  Cinema 2, quoted in Lecercle 2002:252.
18. It has been observed that bees can communicate to other community 
members of the presence of, for example, a flower, this is done through 
direct visual contact among bees by means of a series of coordinated 
movements. What they cannot do is to communicate to a third party, for 
example, the bee that has seen the first bee telling of the flower nearby 
does not in its turn articulate these same movements to another bee es-
tablishing chain communication, since this second member lacks the sen-
sory-motor stimuli to enact and pass along the message. In other words, 
they lack consciousness of their use of language and thus, they do not 
know that they are communicating.
19. Krause’s recordings include comparisons of ecological niches before 
and after human management, testifying a radical shift in biodiversity, 
one that we do not see visually and that we do not perceive through our 
auditory system. See: http://fora.tv/2009/09/22/Dr_Bernie_Krause_
The_Great_Animal_Orchestra. The evidence from Krause’s studies would 
please Jakob von Uexküll, who pictured the biosphere as a great sym-
11. There is a clear correspondence between Gibson’s notion of af-
fordance and von Uexküll’s carrier of meaning.  See also “Heterotopian 
propositions” Pg. 109 and note 5 Pg. 206 in particular for a connection 
between affordances and how they can be influenced through the use of 
language.
12. The notion of boundary is fundamental in Lotman’s cultural semiotics. 
Influenced by Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of frontier, Lotman develops the 
concept to become one of the distinguishing features by which one un-
derstands a semiosphere. Being the boundaries of this (semio)sphere the 
field of tension “where languages come into being”, and in opposition to 
its centre, the boundary is “the area of semiotic dynamism” (1990:134). 
As such, the boundary is conceived as an ambivalent notion that both, 
separates and unites. “It is always the boundary of something and so 
belongs to both frontier cultures, to both contiguous semiospheres. The 
boundary is bilingual and polylingual. The boundary is a mechanism for 
translating texts of an alien semiotics into ‘our’ language, it is the place 
where what is ‘external’ is transformed into what is ‘internal’, it is a fil-
tering membrane which so transforms foreign texts that they become 
part of the semiosphere’s internal semiotics while still retaining their own 
characteristics” (1990:136-137). See also Arán and Barei 2002. Although 
I do not develop the concept in this work, the notion of boundary deals, 
on a cultural, semiotic and anthropological level with issues of inclusion, 
exclusion, translation, and forms of arrangement. In this way, it relates 
to the key concepts of this work; device, frame. The issues of hospi-
tality-hostility addressed here could be presented –if more specifically 
focused on the area of cultural dynamics- within the frame of (culturally 
produced) artefacts, which imply the assimilation, and/or transgression 
of physical and social boundaries at alternative scales.
In the context of physical processes, the notion of boundary could 
be interpreted and developed through studies of phase transitions and 
symmetry-breaking processes, as in DeLanda 2005b.
13. On this issue, Lakoff and Johnson point out that “Understanding our 
experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out 
parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances 
of a uniform kind. Once we can identify our experiences as entities or 
substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, and quantify them 
–and by this means, reason about them.” (1999:25).
14.  In Hoffmeyer 2008:301-303.
15.  Maturana and Varela 1998:234. See also Varela 1992. The ethical im-
plications of this view are exposed in Varela 1999, and are further devel-
oped in the sections “Devising” and “Concluding”.
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compared with the method of random provocation under the tools of 
the green hat in Edward De Bono’s Six Thinking Hats, where nouns are 
used to generate ideas. The principle of substitution is common to most 
‘creative methodologies’ including TRIZ (Theory for inventive problem 
solving, Goldenberg et. al 2003). Any creative process does away with 
stability and rest, incorporating a tension that leads to asymmetry and 
reorganization. Lotman borrows from thermodynamics (Prigogine and 
Stengers) to talk about “the moment of creative inspiration as a situation 
of extreme far-from equilibrium which precludes any simple predictable 
development”. (1990:101). Deleuze says: “Thought is primarily trespass 
and violence” (2004a:175). I believe that the main difference with other 
methods that use natural languages to create disruptions is that by using 
prepositions (prepositiontools) we become sensitive, more readily aware 
of the viewpoints, relations with, the stances adopted when creating or 
when the object in question was created.
26. Manuel DeLanda, following Deleuze. See for instance DeLanda 1999.
27. DeLanda mentions that Deleuze “affirms his desire for creating a phi-
losophy of difference, and then denounces the categories of typological 
or representational thinking as obstacles to reaching that goal. The differ-
ences he has in mind are not the external differences between things that 
are part and parcel of classificatory practices, but productive differences 
perhaps best illustrated by intensive differences, differences in tempera-
ture, pressure, etc. within one and the same system, which are marked by 
thresholds of intensity determining phase transitions.” (2005b:54 n60).
28. Among the implications of understanding cognition as a networked 
and emergent process, is that we should not attribute substantial identity 
(i.e. identifying cognition with the brain or the nervous system) to what 
is an emergent property of a complex distributive process, where several 
parts of an organism play a significant role. Another implication is that 
cognition does not flow seamlessly; in contrast, it is formed by a succes-
sion of behavioural patterns. See Varela 1999. Related to this, Winograd 
and Flores 1987:77 use the concept of breakdown (as in Heidegger but 
also Maturana and Varela) to develop computer design based on an onto-
logical perspective of design.
29. Gregory Bateson believed that what is needed is to change our “unit” 
of identity in order to shift our perception of environments: “The most 
important task today is, perhaps, to learn to think in the new way. Let me 
say that I don’t know how to think that way. Intellectually, I can stand here 
and I can give you a reasoned exposition of this matter; but if I am cut-
ting down a tree, I still think ‘Gregory Bateson’ is cutting down the tree. 
I am cutting down the tree. ‘Myself’ is to me still an excessively concrete 
phony. Krause distinguishes among a biophony, a geophony and an ath-
ropophony pointing at the notion of semiosphere in the context of bio-
semiotic studies, and its relation to the von Uexküllian notion of umwelt 
through a variety of sound registers from different systems and beings. 
A description of an ontology of vibrational force can be found in Steve 
Goodman’s Sonic warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear. An 
ontology of sound can also be found in Grosz 2008.
20. Sagan in von Uexküll 2010: 23.
21. In more specific linguistic terms, these displacements of sense, refer 
to what is understood as a functional rather than a logical forms of con-
tainment. See Tyler and Evans 2003:181.
22.  See Lakoff 1987:418. Chris Sinha and Tania Kuteva 1995, as well as 
Andrea Tyler and Vyvyan Evans 2003, have contested Lakoff’s exposition 
of spatial semantics when describing the preposition over, due to its lack 
of syntagmatic information. They advocate for an approach based upon 
distributed spatial relational semantics (Sinha and Kuteva 1995:193). 
Agreeing with the critique, I have chosen to present the image schemata 
from Lakoff 1987 as in figure 3.5, for the reader to understand the basic 
assumptions of the conceptualization. Not challenging recent linguistic 
research, I am instead referring to a body of work that points out the 
complexity of language as enaction. Interestingly, recent linguistic stud-
ies depart from spatial semantics and subsume the logical and temporal 
relations to these forms of bodily associations, which my work with alter-
native formats (cards, rubber-stamps) reinforces.
23.  In defining “central sense” Lakoff follows Claudia Brugman and also 
Susan Lindner. Based on this very model, the semantic network of the 
preposition over has been further developed and refined by Andrea Tyler 
and Vyvyan Evans. See Tyler and Evans 2003:12, as well as 2003:64.
24. Elizabeth Grosz writes, “Is knowledge opposed to the future? Is the 
future inherently unknowable? Although it may be true that certain forms 
of knowing or thinking are incapable of thinking about the new, the fu-
ture, or becoming, there seems no essential opposition between them. If 
dominant modes of knowledge (causal, statistical) are incapable of envi-
sioning the absolutely new, maybe other modes of knowing, other forms 
of thinking, need to be proposed. Only if thinking is itself part of the prov-
enance of the new -which clearly involves a new account of what thought 
is- can thinking be an appropriate modality for dealing with the future, for 
coping with and producing the new.” (1999:20).
25.  The disruptions generated by alternating prepositions could be 
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series of propositions can be distributed in such a way that the responses 
they represent constitute a general solution (as in the case of the values 
of an algebraic equation). But precisely, propositions, whether general or 
particular, find their sense only in the subjacent problem which inspires 
them. Only the Idea or problem is universal. It is not the solution which 
lends its generality to the problem, but the problem which lends its uni-
versality to the solution.” (2004a:201-202).
DEVISING  - (Notes to Pgs. 105 to 158)
1. Sculptor Michael Joaquin Grey has explicitly developed proposals 
to facilitate thinking in relational terms. Grey, trying to understand 
the complexity of natural phenomena, studied relationships while and 
by developing sculptural elements such as “Zoob”, and imagery such 
as “Object as preposition”. Grey conceives the present moment in art 
history of “relational aesthetics” in terms of thinking with and through 
prepositions. Historically, in Grey’s view, art has mostly been engaged 
with nouns, in the production of objects, and with verbs, in developing 
work that refers to processes. Today all these are accentuated through 
the relational logic made possible by focusing on prepositions. Personal 
conversation with Michael Joaquin Grey (2011). I have come across 
Grey’s work after having completed the visual and material proposals of 
the prepositiontools. Closest to the work I have produced is, in its graphic 
form, the work entitled “Object as preposition”. See www.citroid.com.
2.  Similarly, Lakoff’s book Women, Fire and Dangerous Things uses the 
same quote to introduce the category, from the Australian aboriginal lan-
guage Dyirbal, which gives name to his book. What is at stake for both 
authors using this quote is the destabilization of sense in our (Western) 
culture, by means of the apparently illogical taxonomies.
3.  Deleuze: “Aristotle invites us to consider ‘the opinions accepted by 
all men or by the majority among them, or by the wise’ in order to relate 
these to general (predictable) points of view, and thereby form the places 
which allow them to be established or refuted in discussion. The common 
places are thus the test of common sense itself: every problem the cor-
responding proposition of which contains a logical fault in regard to acci-
dent, genus, property or definition will be considered a false proposition.” 
(2004a:199). John Law has written that “the ANT argument is that when 
a (network) object is performed, so too a (network) world is being en-
acted. But a network world is a topos. It is a set of spatial im/possibilities 
which defines the invariance of shapes as they are displaced.” Law 2002. 
See also Mol and Law 2001 for alternative explorations of spatialities.
object, different from the rest of what I have been calling ‘mind’.” (Bate-
son 2000:468). Related to the changes of units of perception is Steward 
Brand’s work, most notably, The clock of the Long Now (2000), also How 
Buildings Learn (1997).
30. The notion of transversality was developed by Félix guattari and used 
in collaboration with Gilles Deleuze. Guattari’s ecological conception of 
transversality is best exposed in Chaosmosis (1995). For an introduction 
to this notion see Gary Genosko’s “The life and work of Félix Guattari: 
From transversality to ecosophy” in Guattari 2008.
31. In grammatical terms, when we try to identify an object, we ask ques-
tions such as “the weight of what, and for whom?”. All objects —of a 
verb or of a preposition— answer the question whom? or what? To find 
the object of a preposition one needs to ask whom or what after the 
preposition. If I say ‘her friend studied Arabic from an old dictionary’, the 
object of the sentence is ‘dictionary’. In this way objects of verbs and 
prepositions will become more explicitly articulated. The word ‘object’ in 
these sentences corresponds to its grammatical usage. As such, it does 
not necessarily correspond with the words ‘artefact’, ‘thing’, or ‘device’ 
in this work. Although it suggests a mode to inscribe artefacts from a 
grammatical perspective, it  operates within its linguistic categorization 
and performativity. Working on this issue, Bruno Latour replaces the di-
chotomy object-subject for terms such as association and substitution, 
or syntagm and paradigm. See Latour 1999.
32.  Rajchman 2000:56. See also Deleuze 1995:44.
33.  Rajchman continues, “Connecting ‘this’ and ‘that’, moving ‘here’ and 
‘there’, it has a different relation to language that Deleuze likens to the 
stammering of another language, not yet spoken, never completely un-
derstood” (2000:56-57). See also Rajchman 1998:3-4; 57.
34.  See Rajchman 1998:56. Interestingly, the etymology of the word ab-
solute ab (off) and solver (to loosen), suggests that the absolute is that 
which is loosened off and on the loose. When “a Catholic priest performs 
the act of ab-solution, he is the vehicle of a divine agency that loosens 
sins from their attachment to a particular soul” It is through the artic-
ulation of such “loosening” that Jane Bennett attempts to formulate a 
“thing-power” to acknowledge epistemological limits, the limits of human 
intelligibility in relation to what things can do (beyond our knowledge, 
control). See Bennett 2010:3.
35.  In the chapter “The image of thought” Deleuze mentions: “A propo-
sition by itself is particular, and represents a determinate response. A 
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features in these classifications (identity, resemblance, analogy and op-
position) they do not form a global identity called an “episteme”. See 
DeLanda 2002:39.
7. “In all fictions, each time a man meets diverse alternatives, he chooses 
one and eliminates the others; in the work of the virtually impossible-
to-disentangle Ts’ui Pen, the character chooses –simultaneously- all of 
them. He creates, thereby, ‘several futures’, several times, which them-
selves proliferate and fork. […] Fang, let us say, has a secret; a stranger 
knocks at his door; Fang decides to kill him. Naturally, there are various 
possible outcomes –Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, 
they can both live, they can both be killed, and so on. In Ts’ui Pen’s novel, 
all the outcomes in fact occur; each is the starting point for further bi-
furcations. Once in a while, the paths of that labyrinth converge: for ex-
ample, you come to this house, but in one of the possible pasts your are 
my enemy, in another my friend.” Borges 1998:83. This recurrent theme 
in Borges is, as is well known, Leibinizian. Deleuze, in his The Fold. Leibniz 
and The Baroque, comments this passage from Borges and its particular 
position in terms of compossibility and incompossibility. Deleuze believes 
that contrary to Borges’ (Leibnizian) God who plays a game without 
rules, Leibniz’s “God palys tricks, but he also furnishes the rules of the 
game” (1993:62-63).
8.  Rajchman 1998:116. The notion of virtuality is recurrent in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work. See for instance Deleuze 1993:105; 2005 and Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994.
9.  See Deleuze 1993. Also Bruno Latour’s “An attempt at writing a ‘Com-
positionist Manifesto’” (2010).
10.  von Uexkull’s fundamental starting point was that living organisms 
respond to signs rather than causal impulses. von Uexküll 2010; 2001a; 
2001b. See also Paul Bains 2001:139.
11.  See Paracer and Ahmadjian 2000; Margulis 1998.
12. Agamben traces back the genealogy of the concept of life in Western 
thought to Aristotle’s De Anima, where one of the foundational concepts 
is that of nutritive power. See “Mysterium disiunctionis” in Agamben 
2004. To this day, nutrition is still identified with life, thus, forms of para-
sitism, whether biological or metaphorical, tend to raise negative conno-
tations by being associated with death.
13. See “Parasite” in Ericson and Mazé (Eds.) 2011:284.
4.  Foucault further developed the notion of heterotopia, shifting his 
analyses from discourses to spaces. In this work, I have developed three-
dimensional artefacts following what I understand to be the logic of his 
‘discursive’ notion of heterotopia. I have consulted the Spanish transla-
tions of Le corps utopique. Les Hétérotopies. Nouvelles Éditions Lignes 
2009. And “Des espaces autres”. “espace, savoir et pouvoir”. Editions 
Gallimard 1994. In El Cuerpo Utópico. Heterotopías. Buenos Aires, Nueva 
Vision 2010. In English see “Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias” (“Des Espace 
Autres”, 1967). Available online, retrieved on February 19, 2008 at http://
foucault.info/documents/heterotopia/foucault.heterotopia.en.html. 
In this work, I sometimes refer to heterotopias as being (i)logical. The 
word logical being highlighted by the bracketing of the “i”. With this, I do 
not suggest that they have no logic, rather, I point out the association of 
words and things which suggest unexpected sense-making that arises 
from a non-experiential logic or articulation of ideas.
5.  Regarding how language influences our capacity to perceive af-
fordances, Umberto Eco writes: “Our capacity to recognize affordances 
is registered, so to speak, in linguistic usage itself. Violi wonders why, 
when faced with a table with a vase standing on it, we are led to interpret 
verbally what we see as The vase is on the table and not The table is 
under the vase. She suggests that ‘the selection of linguistic expressions 
seems regulated by complex configurations of the intentional relations 
between the subject that moves in space and the objects that surround 
it.’ But this is equivalent to saying that our CT [cognitive type] of the 
common vase also includes the sequence of actions that it permits, and 
so a vase is something easily movable that usually stands on something. 
On the other hand, our CT of the table includes not only its morphologi-
cal features but also the notion (I would say, nuclear) that it is used to 
put something on (and never for being inserted under something). But 
Arnheim suggests that language can block our recognition of pertinen-
cy. Quoting a remark made by Braque, he admits that a coffee spoon 
acquires perceptual saliency that differs according to whether it is set 
alongside a coffee cup or inserted between shoe and heel like a shoe 
horn. But often it is the name with which we indicate the object that 
highlights one pertinency at the expense of others.” (Eco 2000: 161-62). 
A debate on what Eco calls pertinency can be found in Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation. Eco et. al. 1992.
6.  In the particular Foucaultian way stated above. Foucault has empha-
sized that every culture orders codes and reflects upon order itself and 
establishes modes of being “In which knowledge grounds its positivity 
and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfec-
tion, but rather that of its conditions of possibility” (Foucault, 1990:XXII). 
I believe, following Manuel DeLanda, that although there are recurrent 
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19. See also “The Autonomy of Affect” in Massumi 2002.
20. Kurokawa 1996. Also available at: http://www.kisho.co.jp/page.
php/292.
21.  “Made by Products”. Unpublished Master in design thesis at Gold-
smiths, London UK, 2006. Personal communication with the author 
(2010), see for example: Sound waves, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=aazkUTFczso. Steam while cooking, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=LRwddo-lg28. TV-display magnetism, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=SOZQ7Y9OlzQ&amp;feature=related. Links retrieved in 
January 2011. Interestingly, this project explores what can be understood 
as Maxwell’s Demon. J. C. Maxwell, stated in the Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica of 1878 that “Dissipated energy is energy which we cannot lay hold 
of and direct at pleasure, such as the energy of the confused agitation of 
molecules which we call heat. Now, confusion, like the correlative term 
order, is not a property of material things in themselves, but only in rela-
tion to the mind which perceives them... It is only to a being in the inter-
mediate stage, who can lay hold of some forms of energy while others 
elude his grasp, that energy appears to be passing inevitably from the 
available to the dissipated state”. Quoted in Dorion Sagan’s introduction 
to von Uexküll (2010). Sagan explains how this (Maxwell’s) logic would 
eventually lead to the production of a perpetual motion machine, which 
“has been deemed impossible, not just theoretically but practically” (von 
Uexküll 2010:24).
22. “The parasite light does not feed off EM fields and is in fact battery 
powered. [...] it uses an electric field sensor to relate the intensity of its 
function - in this case the amount of light emitted from 20 LEDs - to the 
strenght of the field it senses.” Dunne and Raby 2001.
23. See www.tuurvanbalen.com
24. Cohen divides the instances as such: 1. A patient suffering from kid-
ney failure gives a blood sample to the lab, the scientists cut from the pa-
tients’ genome the regions that code for blood production (bone marrow 
tissues), and immune response (the major histocompatibility complex). 
They then extract the genome from the nucleus of a somatic cell taken 
from a sheep and substitute the corresponding regions of the sheep’s 
genome with the DNA cut from the patients’ genome. This recombinant 
DNA is then inserted into the nucleus of a pre-prepared sheep egg cell. 
Cell division in the egg is initiated and after a few divisions implanted into 
the receptive ewe. 2. The surrogate ewe gives birth to the transgenic 
lamb, which is given to the donor patient. 3. During the day, the dialysis 
sheep is free to roam in the patient’s back garden, graze to cleanse its 
14.  For metaphors of disease, see Sontag 1991. For metaphors in Twen-
tieth century biology see Keller 1995. It is relevant to note, that many 
parasites do not cause disease, “they do not disrupt or seriously diminish 
the performance of their host even though they take nutrients from the 
host. Parasites and parasitism should be viewed in the broader context 
of symbiosis and coevolution... Pathogens are defined as entities that 
produce disease conditions in their host.” Paracer and Ahmadjian 2000:8.
15. Although one can speak metaphorically of the wind or the whirlpool 
as autopoietic, the crucial difference, the crucial property of autopoietic 
cycles “is their ability to act not only as self-balancing, but also as self-
amplifying feedback loops, which may push the system farther and far-
ther away from equilibrium until it reaches a threshold of stability. This 
point is called a ‘bifurcation point’. It is a point of instability at which new 
forms of order may spontaneously emerge, resulting in development and 
evolution.” Capra 1996:167.
16. This applies at all spatio-temporal scales. See for instance Manuel 
Delanda’s warning not to compare cities with organisms 2005a:28.
17. I am referring to human, as well as plant and animal sexuality: cell-fu-
sion sex. What in biological terms is called meiotic sex. See for instance, 
Margulis 1998.
18. Deleuze and Guattari: “Perhaps art begins with the animal, at least 
with the animal that carves out a territory and constructs a house (both 
are correlative, or even one and the same, in what is called a habitat). 
The territory-house system transforms a number of organic functions 
-sexuality, procreation, aggression, feeding. But this transformation does 
not explain the appearance of the territory and the house; rather it is 
the other way around: the territory implies the emergence of pure sen-
sory qualities, of sensibilia that cease to be merely functional and become 
expressive features, making possible a transformation of functions.” 
(1994:183). In their own footnote to this paragraph, Deleuze and Guattari 
differ from Konrad Lorenz’s interpretation that territory and territorial-
ity evolve in functional terms by being ecological zones established by 
species’ intra-specific aggression; as when males from the same species 
fight for the possession of territory or the desired female. (Lorenz 2002). 
As framing, that is, as the rendering significant a spatial demarcation, 
the dispute can partly be referred back to Charles Darwin’s The Descent 
of Man, where Darwin suggested that females choose males (sexually 
select) and thus shape the course of evolution. Although supported by 
some empirical studies, this is still controversial, and it is believed that 
both female choice as well as male signals and contests shape sexual 
selection. (Andersson 1994:31).
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are acted on, and solicited, ethically, prior to any clear sense of choice. 
To be impinged upon by another assumes a bodily proximity, and if it is 
the ‘face’ that acts upon us, then we are to some extent affected and 
claimed by that ‘face’ at the same time. On the other hand, our ethical 
obligations extend to those who are not proximate in any physical sense, 
and do not have to be part of a recognizable community to which we both 
belong. Indeed, for Levinas, those who act upon us are clearly other to 
us; it is precisely not by virtue of their sameness that we are bound to 
them.” (2011:6). This passage highlights —to later challenge— not only 
the anthropocentrism of most forms of ethics, but also the racial identifi-
cation (or lack of it) with an-other. The fungi, as entities to be considered 
in ethico-ecological terms is likely to be dismissed prior to any form of 
understanding of their ecological role in a given environment.
28. In Prevodnik 2008. At 3Ecologies, this type of diagramming was 
combined with three-dimensional animations. For our approach to dia-
gramming, see Avila, Carpenter, Mazé 2010.
29. Note that the reference to scale is meant to indicate alternative spa-
tio-temporal worlds (as enacted by other beings). At the human scale, 
Guattari’s triple ecological register: psychological, social, and environ-
mental, indicate our inevitably human perspective and capability or inca-
pability to perceive and conceive other scales.
30. Guattari suggests that “Autopoeisis deserves to be rethought in 
terms of evolutionary, collective entities, which maintain diverse types 
of relations of alterity, rather than being implacably closed in on them-
selves. In such a case, institutions and technical machines appear to be 
allopoietic, but when one considers them in the context of the machinic 
assemblages they constitute with human beings, they become ipso facto 
autopoietic.” (1995:39-40). In a sense, this was already addressed by 
Varela, when considering the perspectives or scales that can be adopted 
to look into autopoietic machines. He wrote: “Although an autopoietic 
machine can be treated as an allopoietic machine, this treatment does 
not reveal its organization as an autopoietic machine. In fact, autopoietic 
and allopoietic descriptions of a system are complementary pairs, de-
pending on the observer’s needs.” (1979:16). 
31. See Paul Bains’ exposition of Deleuze and Guattari’s development of 
the concept of autopoiesis, and its relation to the human capacity of per-
ceiving/conceiving signs - Umwelt. (2001:159-61).
kidneys, and drink water containing salt minerals, calcium and glucose. 4. 
At night, the sheep is placed on a special platform at the patient’s bed-
side. The transgenic sheep’s kidneys are connected via blood lines to the 
patient’s fistula (a surgically enlarged vein). During the night, peristaltic 
pumps remove waste products from the patient’s blood by pumping it 
out of the body, through the sheep’s kidney (a natural, organic filtering 
system) and returning it, cleaned, to the patient. This happens over and 
over again throughout the night. Each time the “clean” blood is returned 
to the body, it picks up more waste products from the cells it circulates 
through, and brings these newly-collected toxins back to the sheep’s kid-
ney to be removed. The sheep urinates the toxins. See www.revitalcohen.
com.
25. “This cyclical, cradle-to-cradle biological system has nourished a 
planet of thriving, diverse abundance for millions of years. Until very re-
cently in the earth’s history, it was the only system, and every living thing 
on the planet belonged to it. Growth was good. It meant more trees, more 
species, greater diversity and more complex, resilient ecosystems. Then 
came industry, which altered the natural equilibrium of materials on the 
planet. Humans took substances from Earth’s crust and concentrated, 
altered, and synthesized them into vast quantities of material that can-
not safely be returned to soil. Now material flows can be divided into 
two categories: biological mass and technical -that is, industrial- mass. 
From our perspective, these two kinds of material flows on the planet are 
just biological and technical nutrients. Biological nutrients are useful to 
the biosphere, while technical nutrients are useful for what we call the 
technosphere, the systems of industrial processes. Yet somehow we have 
evolved an industrial infrastructure that ignores the existence of nutri-
ents of either kind.” MacDonough and Braungart 2002:92-93.
26. The notion of keystone species, attempts to identify forms of life 
that produce a large effect in a given ecosystem. Robert Paine, who 
coined the term, originally exemplified the concept through the impor-
tance of sea stars (which he identified as a keystone species) in coral 
reefs: some sea stars may prey on sea urchins, mussels, and other shell-
fish that do not have other natural predators. If the sea star disappears 
or is taken away from the ecosystem, the mussel population proliferates 
without “control”, driving out most other species, while the urchin popu-
lation exterminates coral reefs. Case studies of ecosystemic resilience 
can be found in Holling and Gunderson (Eds.) 2002.
27. Our identification is stronger with the fish, perhaps by physical body 
correspondence. Judith Butler, on a human social scale mentions “…it 
seems that the ways that others act upon us, without our will, consti-
tutes the occasion of an ethical appeal or solicitation. This means that we 
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